

*Troth & Truthing*

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[The portions in grey were omitted in the oral presentation.]

**Introduction: Fugue**

I was going to tell you at the beginning that this presentation is actually in the form of a four-part invention. I had music in mind, and particularly Johann Sebastian Bach.

But there is a problem with beginning this way. It is true that the presentation is in four parts ... four little presentations that are distinct. However, the problem is that there is actually no such thing as a “four-part Invention.”

There are two-part inventions, which piano students use as warm-up exercises. And there are three-part inventions, also called “sinfonia,” favored by organists. But what might have been called a “four-part invention” is typically referred to as a fugue. So, though I was going to tell you that this presentation is a four-part invention, there is no such thing.

This is not the only problem. If I told you that my presentation today will be a fugue, it would alert you to the fact that there will be four themes contrapuntally developed in an interweaving of repetitive motifs. But this would leave you in the lurch as to the music. The music is not in the themes but is in the hearing of the interweaving. That is, to think of this as a fugue means that it is up to you to sense what the presentation is really all about.

But this is not the only problem with thinking about what you are going to hear as a fugue. The word “fugue” also refers to a disturbed state of consciousness in which a person seems to be performing acts in full awareness but after the fact cannot recollect the acts performed. So you, in listening to this presentation, may not be able to determine whether there is music in it or merely an old speaker’s fugue state ... his intellectual dementia. That is, you may not be able to sense the truth, which is, after all, the theme of this conference. The language gets it right: *fugere* in Latin, from which we have the English word “fugue,” means “flight.”

So be it! Now to the first theme.

**I. Psychology as the Discipline of Interiority is not a Belief System**

[I have introduced this idea in the foreword to a forthcoming book, *The Psychological Difference: Reflections on Psychology as the Discipline of Interiority*, edited by John Knapp and Jennifer Sandoval, to be published later this year by Routledge. I have their permission to use portions of my foreword in a modified form today.]

In the autumn semesters of 2001, 2002 and 2003, I taught a course called “Post-Jungian and Archetypal Theories of Myth” at Pacifica Graduate Institute. It featured the work of Adolf Guggenbühl-Craig, James Hillman and Wolfgang Giegerich, and it also included the writings of Paul Kugler on language, Stanton Marlan on shadow and Ronald Schenk on play. The course went well, I thought, with the exception of the session on Wolfgang Giegerich’s then recently published book, *The Soul’s Logical Life*.<sup>1</sup> The students seemed perplexed and I thought

resistant in spite of my best pedagogical attempts. It was likely one of the murkier moments of my almost fifty years of teaching.

In response to their perplexity, some of the students from the 2003 class organized a weekend seminar at El Capitan Canyon park north of Santa Barbara to be held the following June. They invited the author of our course's text to come from Germany to California in order to explain to them what I had not. Twenty-nine doctoral students attended this most remarkable occasion, to which Greg Mogenson and I were invited to be respondents. The participants were as open and reflective as they had seemed perplexed and resistant earlier. The proceedings were published in 2005 as the book *Dialectics and Analytical Psychology*.<sup>2</sup> Besides *Soul's Logical Life*, this book represents one of the earliest works in English on "psychology as a discipline of interiority." I contributed an "Introduction" to the volume.

In the "Introduction" I made a comment that I did not then explain. But now, today, I have an opportunity to say what I meant by the somewhat cryptic language that I used. I was speaking about what seemed to me to be a "next stage" in Jungian psychology, and the unclear allusion occurs with the word "wave" in the following sentence: "If James Hillman's work on 'archetypal psychology' represents, after Jung himself, second wave Jungianism, the work of Wolfgang Giegerich may well indicate third wave Jungian thinking."<sup>3</sup> Though I did not mention it at the time of the earlier book introduction, I had in mind a category that has been used in tracing the history of the feminist movement, namely, "third wave feminism."

Rebecca Walker is credited with originating this phrase in 1992.<sup>4</sup> She is the daughter of Alice Walker, author of *The Color Purple*, and, like her mother, she is a writer. Since 1992, the phrase has been adopted by many who theorize post-modern feminism. The idea is that first wave feminism originated during the end of the nineteenth century and continued until 1919 when women in the United States were given the right to vote. The liberation of women in first wave feminism had mainly to do with suffrage. Second wave feminism noted that there is more to liberate than simply voting rights and that the logic of first wave feminism had not been extended far enough. So from the 1960s to the 1980s a new thrust in feminism focused on politicized personal lives, sexist structures of power in the workplace, and other issues of equality from economic to reproductive matters, and a central theme was a common female identity. But again the logic was not followed through completely, since it was noted that a feminine essentialism (a putative common female identity) dominated second wave feminism and that diversity of perspective was lacking a necessary expression. Therefore, third wave feminism from the 1990s to the present began to stress diversity and anti-essentialism (no single way of being a woman), globalism, anti-upper-middle-class-white values, queer theory, women of color consciousness, postcolonial theory, transnationalism, ecofeminism, abolishing gender- role expectation, ambiguity and division about pornography, sex work, and prostitution, and so on. All three waves are, to be sure, about women, but all of the waves are also radically different, just as a surfer at the beach knows full well that riding a wave is all about water, but that when choosing a wave to ride all options are by no means the same.

When I wrote the earlier introduction ten years ago, I was thinking of the movement of Jungian theorizing in analogy to that of feminism. Giegerich responded to my use of the wave-metaphor in an essay entitled "Progress of Psychology." He said: "David L. Miller ... diagnosed an instance of a kind of progress in psychology.... If [his] view is correct ..., would it contradict my thesis in this paper that there cannot be any progress in psychology? By no means. Because in the cases mentioned [Jung, Hillman and Giegerich] the psychological position that has been overcome by the later move nevertheless continues to flourish undisturbed side by side with the further developments. Its having been overcome does not outclass it."<sup>5</sup>

My point was that Jung, Hillman and Giegerich are together in stressing that an authentic depth psychology (*psyche*) is about soul and not about the personal ego,<sup>6</sup> but these thinkers are also different. Just as Jung pushes off from Freud on issues of sexuality, Hillman pushes off from Jung on the nature of archetypes, and Giegerich pushes off from Hillman on the thematic of image and imagination.<sup>7</sup>

One may wonder why in psychology “pushing off” is crucial, why various waves are necessary, why different theorizings are important. “Pushing off”—a favorite phrase of Giegerich—is crucial in order to keep a perspective from turning into a belief-system. “Believing or disbelieving is not of fundamental importance” to an authentic depth psychology, as Giegerich has said bluntly.<sup>8</sup> Jung had already said in *The Red Book*, “It is psychologically dangerous to believe too much.”<sup>9</sup> James Hillman wrote in *Re-Visioning Psychology*: “Any psychology that believes itself, that takes itself at its own word, no longer reflects the psyche or serves soul-making.... The righter it becomes, the wronger its effects,”<sup>10</sup> Giegerich noted that his critique of archetypal psychology is not a criticism of the theory of archetypes and images as such, but is a criticism of “*belief* [his stress] in the theory, one’s having become identical with it so that one routinely *envelops* in it any object of study as if in its self-evident backdrop. It is the use of archetypal theory and the theory of the Gods as an *ideology*.”<sup>11</sup> I have published an essay recently on the same point about why belief is un-psychological and dangerous.<sup>12</sup>

To be sure, the same goes for PDI. Psychology as the discipline of interiority is not a belief. If it were a part of a belief system, then Alfred North Whitehead’s comment about European philosophy would be apt. Whitehead wrote that occidental philosophy is merely a “series of footnotes to Plato.”<sup>13</sup> So turning Jungian psychology, archetypal psychology or PDI into a belief-system would be merely a series of footnotes to Jung, Hillman or Giegerich.

The University of Chicago historian of religions, Jonathan Z. Smith, referred to this footnoting as “paraphrase” or “show-and-tell.” Smith addressed an international gathering of professors of religion down the road in Anaheim in 1989, and he said: “...the most important function of theory ... is to force an answer to that most blunt of all questions: ‘So what?’ Too much of what we do ... may be placed somewhere between show-and-tell and paraphrase.”<sup>14</sup> Much Jungian writing is paraphrase of Jung or show-and-tell examples intending to confirm the truth of what Jung thought and wrote. It does not “push off,” like one wave does from another. It does not make waves, as did Jung and Hillman and (now) Giegerich. It does not do what Jung did. It does not think the soul forward. It does not allow soul to think itself forward.

The reason that waving is important to psychology as the discipline of interiority is indicated by the Zen-like concept of “eachness.” Psychology, if it is a discipline of interiority, privileges the soul-truth that appears in particular moments of individual and collective history. A clinician cannot possibly know who or what is going to walk through the door as the patient comes in for a session. For that matter, a clinician cannot possibly know who or what is going to walk through the door as she or he enters the room. What appears in the transference and counter-transference is not predictable according to a set of abstract psychological theories taken as beliefs. What happens in its suchness and eachness must be sensed and honored. And for this reason and for the reason of its unpredictability, the clinician needs all of the theories (all of the waves!) that she or he can get in order to be appropriately connected to the phenomenological eachness of the soul-situation at hand. James Hillman—with help from William James—already in 1981 had insisted on this notion. He wrote: “Eachness: that is the place I share with [William] James—and with Jung, for what else is individuation but a particularization of the soul. For [William] James, eachness is not so much achieved through an individuation process as it is already there ‘just as it seems to be.’”<sup>15</sup>

Wolfgang Giegerich continues the Zen-ish notion, but differently and differentiated from Hillman’s notion of psychological polytheism.<sup>16</sup> In 2012, Giegerich was clear about the idea of eachness: “Concerning the daily work in the consulting room, what I pointed out here [in the book *What is Soul?*] is not to be taken abstractly as the one and only recipe for the therapies of cases of neurosis .... There may be certain phenomena, for example, individual dreams, which need an imaginal approach .... There are many different situations in each actual therapy.... The question always is what this individual phenomenon or situation here and now needs. Eachness. This is why we need to discern the spirits, learn to know when it is time for the one and when for the other approach. For this the feeling function is required, an ‘instinct,’ as it were, that lets us sense what the soul needs: whether it wants us in this specific instance to resistancelessly follow it into its depth or whether what it presents us with it presents for the sole purpose that conversely we have something to push off from.”<sup>17</sup> Again, Giegerich wrote: “In contrast to

all abstract, scientific, and personalistic approaches to psychology,” a psychology “with soul ... pleads for our coming down from the height of comprehensive theories that subsume the individual phenomena under some overall scheme ... down to the humility of a wholehearted dedication to psychological phenomena in their eachness.”<sup>18</sup>

Nothing could be clearer. Depth psychology as a discipline of interiority is attentive, not to ego, but to soul and soul-phenomena. Yes, of course! But just here is a potential irony and a possible seduction. Here there can be a breaking of the wave.

There is a basic difficulty and conundrum for a *depth* psychology that focuses on soul rather than ego. Giegerich has noted, as he put it, that “it is of course possible that the event of a successful truly psychological interpretation creates in the person having performed it [that is, in ego-consciousness] a feeling of being deeply moved or an emotion of joy and thus a ‘spark.’”<sup>19</sup> When soul-work or soul-perspective produces ego-satisfaction, i.e., when it is clinically and therapeutically “successful,” it risks self-destructing, like a wave defining itself in the moment of its breaking.<sup>20</sup> The danger is in wittingly and unwittingly side-slipping or back-sliding from a soul psychology into an ego-ology.

But Giegerich attends thoughtfully to the risk, noting that in spite of the apparent irony there is no real paradox. He says about the feeling of “being deeply moved” or of experiencing “joy” that such a phenomenon “is a psychic event *in view of* and *occasioned by* an actual happening of psychology, which *itself*, however, remains averted, averted even from the subject of doing psychology.”<sup>21</sup> Here Giegerich is observing “the psychological difference” between ontological and ontic, formal and material, syntactic and semantic, and soul and ego. Attending to the “psychological difference” is crucial.

Riding waves requires hard work and constant attention lest one lose one’s balance.

Now to a second theme of the fugue.

## II. The Truth is that Truth is (in) Trouble

One will note that the word “in” is in parenthesis, so that I can read the sentence: “The truth is that truth is in trouble” or “The truth is that truth is trouble.” Even in our psychology today, as Giegerich has said, “Truth is the ultimate repressed,”<sup>22</sup> which is why this conference is needed. Truth is in trouble, and perhaps is trouble. Wolfgang Giegerich has warned us that “Truth is always a terribly upsetting event ... The encounter with our Truth is nothing for sissies.”<sup>23</sup>

But whether truth is trouble or is in trouble, this second thematic of my fugue may *prima facie* seem to fly in the face of Wolfgang Giegerich insisting, again and again, that psychology as a discipline of interiority should be focused on the *truth* of soul, which is also the soul of *truth*.<sup>24</sup> In an essay that wrestles Jung’s wrestling with the notion of the Trinity, Giegerich aligns himself with St. Augustine, whom he cites in Latin: *Noli foras ire, in teipsum redi; in interiore homine habitat veritas*. This is from Augustine’s *On True Religion*, and, in English it says: “Do not go outside, return into yourself; truth dwells in the interiority of man.”<sup>25</sup>

Giegerich is clear that by saying this he is keeping his sensibility firmly on what we have come to call the psychological difference. So he says that saying that “truth dwells in the interiority of man” does not refer to “modern psychologistic introspective self-exploration [i.e., ego exploration] that aims at discovering one’s ... subjective, strictly private, particular inner images and impulses in one’s unconscious.” It rather refers to “the recognition through self-reflection of the (we could say: objective, universal) ‘truth’ of the mind, a truth that is the same in every individual and also, in principle, accessible to every (intelligent) individual.”<sup>22</sup>

Well the phenomenological truth of the current postmodern condition is that truth is in or is trouble. Even before Donald Trump got the name “truthter” by identifying with “birthers,” who doubt that Barack Obama is an American citizen, truth to the contrary notwithstanding, a truthter movement sprang up around conspiratorial theorists who dubbed their Chicago convention “The International Education and Strategy Conference for 9/11 Truth,” at which alternative theories about the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center were discussed.<sup>26</sup> This is absurd, of course, and false, to be sure, but even its falseness is a part of the phenomenological truth of things today, and it is not all.<sup>27</sup> And this is not to mention Ted Cruz’s autobiography title: *A Time for Truth*.

There is, for example, the series of New Yorker Barsotti cartoons that I have provided you in the handout. There is serious thought hiding in these cartoons, in spite of the image of the arrow suggesting un-psychologically that truth is a quest. But the final cell with the clown seems to suggest that truth, or the quest for it, or talk about it, may be a joke. Or that joking (clowning) is a part or the whole of truth.<sup>28</sup>

Speaking of clowns, there is Stephen Colbert. In his October 2005 pilot episode of *The Colbert Report*, Colbert introduced a word that he untruthfully thought that he had coined: “truthiness,” not to be confused with “truthter.” Colbert did, however, invent the Dog Latin version of the term: “veritasiness.” It refers to a so-called “truth” that a person invokes because she or he intuitively claims to know it “from the gut,” as Colbert put it. That is, it just “feels right.” Like the president’s decision to invade Iraq in 2003. Surprisingly, it was named the word of the year by the Merriam Webster dictionary corporation in 2006. I guess it had a truthiness to it.

I could go on with this troublesome truthy litany concerning truth, but I take it that you already get the point. It is no wonder that Anthony Lane, in a recent *New Yorker* movie review wrote: “Call a movie ‘Truth,’ and you’re asking for trouble.”<sup>29</sup> The movie about which Lane is writing, a film starring Robert Redford, is about Dan Rather’s news report concerning George W. Bush’s service in the Texas Air National Guard. The idea of the movie seems to be that if the truth had been told, recent Presidential history might have been different. Another truth problem.

Enough!

But the truth of this trouble with truth by no means begins in our time and with postmodern theory and cartoonery, and not only because the *Oxford English Dictionary* notes that the word “truthiness” has a long history associated with the perfectly good English word “truthy.” No, the trouble begins in antiquity.

It is with Parmenides that a back-and-forth of alternating views of truth begins. The ancient philosopher is said to have said, *to gar auto noein estin te kai einai*, which is typically translated as “thinking and being are the same.”<sup>30</sup> This implies that the truth of being and the being of truth are in a relationship of identity to thinking. Similarly, the Platonic Socrates, in *The Sophist*, says: “The true proposition states about you the things that are as they are” and “the false proposition states about you things different from the things that are.”<sup>31</sup> Socrates’ example is that it is true that Theaetetus is sitting and false that he is, in the moment of their conversation, flying. This view in Parmenides and Plato is the beginning of what has been called the correspondence theory of truth, a perspective that may be said to depend on a notion of the coincidence of judgment and thing-experienced. A judgment is true if my view of it coincides with the way things are. Theaetetus is sitting and not flying.

The Platonic Socrates had some reservations about this view. In *The Theaetetus* Socrates notes that the correspondence in the so-called correspondence theory implies that when a person speaks about something it is its truth for someone, and this leads Socrates to observe that this raises a specter of relativism with regard to truth. He says: On this view “what every man believes as a result of perception is true for him,” and so it would seem that “every man is to have his own beliefs for himself alone.”<sup>32</sup> There is a shadow of subjectivism (egocicity) in this perspective from the beginning.

Nonetheless, with Aristotle the correspondence theory was insisted upon. Aristotle writes in *The Metaphysics*: “To say that what is is not, or that what is not is, is false; but to say that what is is, and that what is not is not, is true.”<sup>33</sup> In his work, *On Interpretation*, Aristotle calls this “the likeness of the experiences of soul to things,” i.e., the truth.<sup>34</sup>

Thomas Aquinas continues the perspective, translating Aristotle’s formula into the Latin phrase *adaequatio intellectus et rei*, “the adequation [correspondence] of mind and thing.”<sup>35</sup> When these correspond, one has truth. Some think that Aquinas borrowed this phrase from Avicenna, but no matter the original source, the tradition perdures ... at least for a while.

The trouble begins with Descartes and continues through Spinoza, Kant, and Hegel. Descartes noted that conformity between a knower and a thing known is not sufficient for truth. Truth is not only correspondence, but is a conformity that is known by someone. By adding the factor of a subject to the objectivity of truth, Descartes in effect shifted the domain of truth from ontology, the being of truth and the truth of being in Parmenides’ sense, to epistemology, the subjectivity of truth, so that the shadow of subjectivism comes out into the light.

But there is more trouble here. Heidegger much later would observe, concerning Aquinas’ formula that “it is impossible for *intellectus* and *rei* to be adequated, i.e., to agree with each other, because they are not of the same species,”<sup>36</sup> any more than are puppies and peanut butter. Therefore, in order for the adequation between mind and thing (subject and object) to occur there needs to be a context, as, in different ways, Spinoza, Kant, and Hegel observed. Something is true, i.e., it manifests a correspondence between understanding and event, in relation to a system of thinking. So truth is dependent on a context rather than on correspondence, and truth exists only when there is coherence within the context. We may *materially* never know for certain whether our judgment objectively and ultimately corresponds with any-*thing*, but we can know for certain *formally* whether or not things cohere within a given system. Brand Blanshard therefore says that “coherence is the sole criterion of truth,”<sup>37</sup> and this modern view of truth is sometimes referred to as the coherence theory of truth. But the back-and-forth does not end with Descartes, Spinoza, and Kant.

Martin Heidegger has carried on the back-and-forth about truth primarily in six essays that were published over a thirty-year period between 1927 and 1957: *Being and Time*, pp. 256-264 (1927); “On the Essence of Truth,” *Pathmarks*, pp. 136-154 (originally lectures delivered in Bremen, Marburg, Freiburg and Dresden, 1930-32); “Plato’s Doctrine of Truth,” *Pathmarks*, pp. 155-181 (1931, 1940); “Letter on Humanism,” *Pathmarks*, pp. 239-276 (1946); “Origin of the Artwork,” *Poetry, Language, Thought*, tr. A. Hofstadter (New York: Harper, 1971) (originally in *Holzwege*, 1950); and, *Identity and Difference*, tr. J. Stambaugh (New York: Harper, 1969) (originally published in 1957).

Heidegger in these works traces what he takes to be a drift toward subjectivity in thinking about truth over two millennia, and he thinks that it may have been encouraged by a weak misreading of Parmenides to begin with. Translating the Greek phrase in whatever language, including Greek, as “thinking and being are the same” may privilege a human thought-judgment of coincidence and identity and it can lead toward a subjectivism. That is, truth happens when ego gets things correct. Theaetetus is sitting and is not flying. That’s the truth. That is, truth is correctness of human judgment. *Orthotēs* in Greek.

But Heidegger thinks that truth is more objective than it is a subjective apprehending and asserting. He goes back to Parmenides and he translates the Greek sentence *to gar auto noein estin te kai einai* as “*das Selbe nämlich ist Denken sowohl als such Sein*,” i.e., “for the same are thinking as well as Being.”<sup>38</sup> What motivates his translation is his turning to language, to Parmenides’ Greek word for “truth”: namely, *alētheia*.

This exploring language for insight is by now a familiar strategy and it has a name: the “linguistic turn.” It affirms that after ontological and epistemological strategies of antiquity and modernity, one can rely on language to carry undisclosed signification.

“Speech speaks (*Die Sprache spricht*),”<sup>39</sup> Heidegger said, And he goes on: “To reflect on language thus demands that we enter into the speaking of language in order to take up our stay with language, i.e., within *its* speaking, not within our own.... We leave the speaking to language.”<sup>40</sup> Heidegger’s point is that, as he puts it: “It is not we who play with words, but the nature of language plays with us.... It is a high and dangerous game and gamble in which, by the nature of language, we are the stakes.”<sup>41</sup> “Language,” Heidegger writes, “is the house of Being. In its home man dwells,”<sup>42</sup> which means that we live in language, and not that language lives in us subjectively. Language is more than a tool ready-at-hand for our personal human and volitional egoic use.

Heidegger is by no means alone in this turn to language, this affirmation of the linguisticity of the being of truth. The phrase, “the linguistic turn,” has been popularized by Richard Rorty’s 1967 book of that name. But the phrase itself likely originated with Gustav Bergmann. In very different ways the perspective that language is constitutive of reality is affirmed, on the one side, by the so-called Vienna School of philosophy, whose proponents are Ludwig Wittgenstein, Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, and numerous anglo-american philosophers, and, on the other side in the humanities by Judith Butler, Luce Irigaray, Julia Kristeva, Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida and Hayden White. In psychology the perspective is stressed by Jacques Lacan, following Ferdinand de Saussure, and also James Hillman, whose emphasis upon the “soul of words” and the “angelology of words” adopts a similar hermeneutical strategy. But it is Heidegger who links the discussion of language to that of truth in the works that I have already mentioned.

So Heidegger attends to the language of truth. “*Alētheia*,” the Greek word for “truth,” speaks of an un-hiding, an un-concealing, an un-forgetting, an un-veil-ment. The Greek root is *lanthanein*, meaning “to escape notice,” “to forget,” “to hide,” and it is related to the noun “*lēthē*” which means “forgetting” or “the place of oblivion,” and is the name of a river to the underworld. The word *lēthē* means “forgetting.” The alpha-privative on the front of the root-word negates—like the English prefixes “un-“ and “il-“—a root that is already negative (hiding, veiling, concealing, forgetting). It is a negating of a negative leading to the positing of truth. Heidegger points this out in 1927 in *Being and Time*.<sup>43</sup> But this was not the first mention of truth as “uncovering.”

Ortega y Gasset introduced this interpretation in his first book, *Meditaciones del Quijote* (Meditations on Quixote) in 1914, thirteen years before Heidegger. Prior to either philosopher, Nicolai Hartmann in *Platos Logik des Seins* in 1909 had insisted on this etymology, focusing on the negative, especially the negation of a negation in the notion. But all of this may have been noted earlier, in 1874, by Gustav Teichmüller in *Neue Studien zur Geschichte der Begriffe*.<sup>44</sup>

All of this revises the later notion of truth (or the later interpretation of Parmenides) as correct human judgment and as the opposite of falseness. As Heidegger puts it: “Thus truth has by no means the structure of an agreement [correspondence] between knowing and the object in the sense of a likening of one entity (the subject) to another (the object).” Rather, “to say that an assertion ‘*is true*’, signifies that it uncovers the entity as it is in itself ... [it] lets the entity be seen in its uncoveredness.”<sup>45</sup>

Why am I doing this? Why am I laboring 2000 years of philosophical back-and-forth from Parmenides to Heidegger? Because this is a conference on truth in relation to psychology as a discipline of interiority, and PDI gets many of its cues from the works of Wolfgang Giegerich, and Giegerich, on the one hand, notes the importance of the “the linguistic turn” in thinking about thinking, and, on the other hand, because his insistence on the importance of truth for authentic psychology is (in my view) is shaped by his early work on Heidegger. Let me explain.

First, Giegerich writes in his essay on “The End of Meaning”: “Modernity is characterized by the fact that man has emerged from his in-ness in a horizon [of religion and myth and nature and metaphysics], from his containment in a womb .... He has lost his myths, his symbols. He now looks back down upon consciousness at large from outside.... The tell-tale sign for this in the history of thought is the ‘linguistic turn,’ the awareness that

everything we are dealing with is first and foremost linguistic, semiotic, information, that man himself is language. The in-ness of the pre-modern situation had also been containment *in* language. When one has one's place *within* language, the words as positivities (phonetic sound clusters), as factual means of expression, are completely unobtrusive.... The words and grammar, i.e., language as such, are taken for granted, much as fish take water as the element of their life for granted....<sup>46</sup>

Again, Giegerich writes: ““For psychology, nothing outside of *logos*... Everything has an inevitable logos-nature.... Jung said: ‘I am concerned with the statement only, its structure and behavior’ i.e., its internal logic and functioning .... The moment something exists for us, it is ipso facto irrevocably already thought, captured in linguistic, logical form ... even the idea that there is nothing outside of logos [or something not in logos] happens in logos ... the fiction of something outside of logos is a logos fiction”<sup>47</sup>

And once more, in the book *What is Soul?* we read: “As humans we live *primarily* in a linguistic cosmos, not in the body. We see what is and happens not directly, not as things-in-themselves, but only in terms of the words and concepts that we have of them. [Cites Jung, *CW*, 8.680] Everything we can possibly know and experience consists of soul stuff, has been filtered through language and images. We touch an oak tree and think that we touch the real thing, but what we touch is ‘oak tree,’ which is a human concept and image. We see a cow, a mountain, the moon, fog, my mother, but all these perceptions are linguistic and mental concepts. Even the idea of something incomprehensible ... *is a linguistic concept*. There is no exit from soul,... and soul is here synonymous with consciousness.... We think that we live *in* the body, *in* the universe, and *on* the earth, but these are themselves ideas in the mind. We live in language and in soul, in consciousness, in ideas and images.”<sup>48</sup>

These comments give testimony to a Heideggerian perspective, but not to Heidegger alone. For example, Giegerich observed that Hegel, too, “insisted that we think in names, in the *words* of language.”<sup>49</sup> OK. But the second reason for invoking the history from Parmenides to Heidegger is more concentrated on the importance of Heidegger for Giegerich, and hence for our discussion of truth in psychology.

I well realize that Giegerich in 2007, in a postscript to an earlier essay, said that when he wrote the essay in 1971 he was under the influence of Heidegger and he implies that he was moved later by a post-Romantic Hegelian logic.<sup>50</sup> Fine. However, in my judgment there is still in his more recent writing about truth a definite Heideggerian hangover, in addition to Hegelian thinking regarding truth. Besides, I have already quoted Giegerich as saying that a “psychological position that has been overcome by a later move nevertheless continues to flourish undisturbed side by side with the further developments. Its having been overcome does not outclass it.”<sup>51</sup> I do not mean to imply that Giegerich's perspective on truth is Heideggerian; rather, I mean to suggest that Giegerich's description of psychological truth that is relevant to PDI has been informed by the step that Heidegger has taken in regard to *alētheia*. Let me try to make the point by sharing the following statements by Giegerich concerning truth.

“For the psychological standpoint each phenomenon is itself a psychological *truth*.... Judgments, theories, hypotheses can be true or false. Not so psychological phenomena. They *are* what they are and have to be taken as such.... Psychology is constituted by the *methodological decision to conceive* even of suppositions and judgments, of theories and ideas that people came up with, *as* phenomena, *as* psychological truths, *as* ‘facts,... and *not* as *people's* suppositions and hypotheses.... How could the psychologist possibly know what is a right and what is a wrong move for the soul?... The actual phenomenology together with its self-movement is the only kind of truth that exists for him.”<sup>52</sup>

“It is necessary to note that the soul's truths do not receive their truth character from anywhere else—in contrast to our usual concept of truth, which is about the correspondence between our propositions or opinions and the real facts and as such fundamentally comparative, questionable, in need of justification. Since they are the soul's truths, these truths are primordial, irreducible, ‘archetypal.’ They have their



measure *within themselves*, indeed they *are* the measure for, or the ground (in a metaphysical sense) of, what can be empirically experienced as true.”<sup>53</sup>

In each of these statements (from 2013 and 2004) Giegerich is distancing himself, like Heidegger, from both the correspondence and coherence theories of truth. Then in 2012, in an essay in response to Mark Saban that is posted on the ISPDI website, Giegerich used specific Heideggerian diction in describing positively his notion of truth. Here is the comment:

“Psychology is not in the business of creating and inventing ‘illuminating psychological fables.’ It is in the business of being responsive to a prime matter (whatever this may be in each case), of *reflecting* and *refining* it, of *reconstructing* its inner logical life so as to *release* it into its truth (its disclosedness, unconcealedness).”<sup>54</sup>

“Disclosedness” and “unconcealedness” translate Heidegger’s *Erschlossen*, *Unverborgenheit*, and *Entbergung*.<sup>55</sup> And, in the essay “God Must Not Die!” Giegerich restates Heidegger’s perspective on truth.

“... psychological stories can only describe the movement from ‘implicit’ to ‘explicit.’ Their end is the coming to light of what was already inherent in the beginning. No new events. No external influences. Nothing new happens. The point of soul images and narratives is to present and portray one single particular moment or soul truth. And what appears as their narrative action (plot) is merely the self-unfolding of the inner logic of this self-enclosed moment of truth, that is to say, its full releasement into its truth.”<sup>56</sup>

The “self-unfolding” nature of the truth of soul and the soul of truth indicates that “truth is in itself historical, dynamic, a living process: part of the soul’s logical life.” It is in the process of “becoming.”<sup>57</sup> For this reason I like to think of it as truthing, rather than as truth. Gerundal, giving quality to everything, rather than naming something. This is the point to which I have been trying to get in the second motif of my fuge.

### III. Betrothed to Truthing: No Infidelity and no Divorce

I realize that there is a good deal of Greek and German in the linguistic turns of my second theme. But what about English? Can there be truthing insight in English’s turns of language? When the people wanted to name what we are calling “truth,” what word and image and idea came to mind? This will be my third theme, a third motif in the fuge. Which, thankfully, is brief compared to the first two motifs. The philological history is clear and undisputed.

The English noun “truth” comes from Middle English “truthe,” and earlier “trouthe,” “treuthe,” and “treowthe.” The Old English source of these words is “trēowth,” which is from “trēowe,” and means “faithful.” The family is related to “trust” and “tryst.” The history leads to the idea of “truth” and “truthfulness,” on the one hand, and “troth,” on the other.<sup>58</sup> That is, the English language carries the idea of betrothal, of fidelity and engagement, in the philology of truth. This lends itself to an old idea, perhaps *passé*, of pledging one’s troth or fidelity, as in the phrasing of the vows in the wedding ceremony of the Episcopal and Anglican *Book of Common Prayer*: “Thereto I plight thee my troth.”<sup>59</sup>

We are wedded, whether we like it or not, to what is, to what is truthing: the soul of truth and to the truth of soul. It is a sort of arranged marriage, arranged in the nature of things. Divorce is not possible. There can be no infidelity. There is “no exit,” but not in the sense of Jean-Paul Sartre or of Louise Bourgeois.<sup>60</sup> The troth sense of truth is not existential; it rather is ontological and psychological. As Margaret Cho said recently: “There is no statute of limitations on truth.”<sup>61</sup> Truth truths. Troth troths. What is the case is the case. It self-unfolds in the process of truthing. It is what engages us, whether or not we engage it ... consciously.<sup>62</sup>

Some explanation may be needed to unpack the notion of truthing as self-unfolding, which would be a new and fourth motif in my fugue. Let me attempt the explanation not by way of philosophy, alchemy and psychology, but by way of Franz Kafka and Wallace Stevens, since I think of my fourth thematic as a poetics of truthing and troth.<sup>63</sup> And my name for this fourth and final motif is “stoned.”

#### IV. Stoned: A Poetics of Truthing

Let me begin with Kafka and his parable about Prometheus. I quote:

There are four myths about Prometheus. According to the first myth, Prometheus was bound and his fetters were forged to the Caucasus, because he had betrayed the Gods to men, and the Gods sent eagles which ate from his ever-growing liver.

According to the second myth, Prometheus, the beaks hacking at him, pressed himself in his pains against the rock, deeper and deeper, until he became one with the rock.

According to the third myth, his betrayal was forgotten in the course of the millenniums, the Gods forgot, the eagles forgot, he himself forgot.

According to the fourth myth, they became tired of what had become pointless. The Gods became tired of it, the eagles as well, and the tired wound closed.

The inexplicable mountains remained. – The myth attempts to explain what cannot be explained. Since its ground is one of truth it has to end up in what cannot be explained.<sup>64</sup>

Never mind that the parable *does* explain the nature of the truth of the rock and the rock of truth. It begins with the traditional version of the story of Prometheus in the Greek mythological imagination. In the next three versions, which take place over time (millennia), the mythological signification is little by little withdrawn: negated, and in the negation forgotten, and the myth comes to be without meaning or meanings; it is trite (tired), and it leaves Prometheus pressed into the rock so that only the rock remains, just as it is all along. But covered with myth earlier. This is the story of *alētheia*, unforgetting the forgetting. Unfolding the folds of truth.<sup>65</sup> Yes, becoming conscious. Or, as James Hillman put it using a medieval Latin notion: *notitia*, “taking note.”<sup>66</sup>

Something similar to Kafka’s parable seems to be the force of the late poem by Wallace Stevens, written five years before his death when he was seventy-one. The poem is titled “The Rock”<sup>67</sup> and it is divided into three numbered parts, the first of which is called “seventy years later.”

This first part presumably reflects the poet’s looking back over his life and work, though it also may be a looking back over the history leading up to the present age. “It is an illusion,” the poem muses, “that we are ever alive, / Lived in the houses of mothers, . . .” “Even our shadows no longer remain. / The lives these lived in the mind are at an end. / They never were.” That is, the lives that we lived were enveloped in an illusion of meaning about which we have become now conscious and to which we have become alive, and so it no longer remains. All that was myth and metaphor: poetry. And the poem now says: Even the poems, which Stevens calls “the sounds of the [blue] guitar . . . were not and are not.” The past meanings, even those of Stevens’ earlier poems, are like “green leaves [that] came and covered the high rock,” obscuring, as the poem says “the particularity of being.”

So in the second part of the poem, which Stevens calls “the poem as icon,” we hear that “it is not enough to cover the rock with leaves,” which is to say, with the “leaves” of page after page, in book after book, of former significations and meanings. The poem says explicitly: “The fiction of the leaves

is the icon / Of the poem.” “We must be cured of it by a cure of the ground, / Or a cure of ourselves, that is equal to a cure / Of the ground.” Stevens wrote in an earlier poem: “The rock cannot be broken. It is the truth. / It rises from land and sea and covers them. / It is a mountain half way green and then, / The other immeasurable half, such rock / As placid air becomes.”<sup>68</sup> The truth of the rock is the rock of truth; but we have covered it over—forgot it (*lēthē*)—with leaves and leaves of meanings that we need to be cured of—unforgotten, made conscious (*alētheia*). This is the opposite of T. S. Eliot who wrote in “The Four Quartets”: “We had the experience but missed the meaning.”<sup>69</sup> Stevens’ insight is opposite: namely, we had the meanings (so many “leaves”), but missed the experience, i.e., the psychological truth.<sup>70</sup> As Stevens’ poem says: the leaves “cover the rock,” making “meanings of the rock” with such “imagery / That its barrenness becomes a thousand things, / And so exists no more.”

When Stevens suggests that we now need a “cure” of this covering of the rock with meanings, he uses a word with multiple possible senses. “Cure” is from Latin *cura*, meaning “care,” as in care of the soul. The Latin also gives English the word “scour,” so that a scouring clean of the ground would reveal the underlying bedrock. Other meanings of *cura* suggest *cuuve*, “cover,” as in hiding or concealing, and *curiologic*, which is a kind of hieroglyphic in which objects are represented with images and pictures. But one interpreter thinks that Stevens’ use of the phrase “cure of the ground” is invoking the Greek term *kuriologia*, meaning the use of literal expressions, i.e., a use of *proper* proper names, appropriating linguistically the truth of the way things are. This poem, as icon, is attempting that by noting that precisely we have covered the rock and now need to note that precisely.<sup>71</sup>

The third part of the poem begins: “The rock is the grey particular of man’s life, / The stone from which he rises up—and—ho, / The step to the bleaker depths of his descents.” But the poem then takes a surprising turn. We now hear that the rock has to do with “air,” with the “planets,” with a “silent rhapsodist,” with “turquoise,” with “redness,” with “mango’s rind,” and finally with a “tranquil self.” That is, the “grey particular of a man’s life” is lively and full of color. It is, as the poem finally says “night’s hymn of the rock” with “midnight minting fragrances.” It may be “grey,” but it is also colorful and even aromatic. It is the truth of being which is the being of all beings. It is the truth of soul and the soul of truth.

Two short poems by other contemporary poets confirm the shimmering aliveness of the rock of truth. The first is by Charles Simic and is called “Somewhere Among Us a Stone is Taking Notes.”

Go inside a stone  
That would be my way.  
Let somebody else become a dove  
Or gnash with a tiger’s tooth.  
I am happy to be a stone.

From the outside the stone is a riddle:  
No one knows how to answer it.  
Yet within, it must be cool and quiet  
Even though a cow steps on it full weight,  
Even though a child throws it in a river;  
The stone sinks, slow, unperturbed  
To the river bottom  
Where the fishes come to knock on it  
And listen.

I have seen sparks fly out  
When two stones are rubbed,  
So perhaps it is not dark inside after all;  
Perhaps there is a moon shining

From somewhere, as though behind a hill—  
Just enough light to make out  
The strange writings,  
The star-charts  
On the inner walls.<sup>72</sup>

The second short poem confirming Stevens' "Rock" is by Gregory Orr and is called "The Stone that is Fear."

The stone sat at a desk lit by a single candle.  
The walls of its room, like the inner walls of its body,  
Were covered with mirrors.  
The stone was writing. It looked up occasionally,  
Staring at the thousand reflected candle flames  
That seemed to be points of light perforating a dark sky.  
It glanced at its watch that ran on blood.  
It returned to its writing.<sup>73</sup>

This audience will recognize the movement, the dialectic, in the logic of the Kafka parable and the Stevens poem, and in the aliveness of the poems by Simic and Orr. The dialectical logic was described by Wolfgang Giegerich as the logic of the soul, psychology's dialectic, in the El Capitan seminar.

The psyche—Giegerich argues—starts from an original position, like a sort of rock or stone.<sup>74</sup> This position is not a thing, but is a no-thing and is linguistic and noetic. It is a proposition, an idea, and it belongs to the mind, to thinking. But its interior logic is dialectical. It proceeds by way of negation. The position becomes untenable psychologically, so it is negated. But the negation is also as a position finally untenable, so there comes to be a negation of the negation. But the negation of a negation is oddly absolute (in the sense of the world *absolvere*, "to be freed from," as in religious absolution), and the dialectic has uncovered (*alētheia*) by dialectical logic, the truthing of the original psychological ground of soul to which we are always already betrothed.<sup>75</sup>

These dialectical negations and negations of the negations to get at the original unity where we already are are like the uncovering of the rock by taking away the leaves and like Prometheus becoming the rock which he was from the beginning. One is left with the truth, but only by way of its truthing, its self-unfolding, disclosing that to which psychologically one is always already betrothed.

It is a lively process, always underway, even if unconsciously, in the process of which we are brought face to face with the naked Goddess (*anima* = "soul"), like Actaion seeing Artemis.<sup>76</sup> The naked truth. It involves a dismemberment by the hunting dogs, like the dismemberment of the leaves on Stevens' rock and the dismemberment of Prometheus and his myth. It is a dissolution (absolution) and a death of ego's perspective in the face of authentic depth.

### **Coda:**

This is my fugue concerning our conference theme, my "four-part invention," which does not exist. But I do have a coda in the form of poetic advice about truthing and troth. Not belief. Poetry. About the rock of truthing. I am thinking about the lines by T. S. Eliot concerning what he calls "the place of solitude where three dreams cross/ Between blue rocks." Eliot's plea is: "Teach us to sit still / Even among these rocks."<sup>77</sup> That is, teach us to sit still amidst the truthing of truth to which we are, whether we will or no, betrothed.

And there is the line of Theodor Roethke alerting one to the fact that, as the poem puts it, "the deep eye sees ... shimmer on the stone."<sup>78</sup> The shimmer is what Wolfgang Giegerich has called the "Dionysian frenzy" of the

psychological dialectic that may be referred to as “liquidity.”<sup>79</sup> The historicity and aliveness of the truthing of soul and the soul of truthing.

But perhaps best of all are the lines of haiku by the poet Gioia (Joyce) Timpanelli:

We have been catching fireflies  
When all the while  
The stones are glowing.<sup>80</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Wolfgang Giegerich, *The Soul's Logical Life* (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1998).

<sup>2</sup> Wolfgang Giegerich, David L. Miller and Greg Mogenson, *Dialectics & Analytical Psychology* (New Orleans: Spring Journal Books, 2005).

<sup>33</sup> *Dialectics & Analytical Psychology*, p. x. I repeated the use of the “wave”-metaphor in the “Introduction” to the issue on “Philosophy and Psychology” of *Spring* journal (*Spring* 77 [2007]: 6: “If Jung and Hillman may be thought of as first and second wave Jungian thought, Giegerich’s work may be thought of as third wave Jungianism.”

<sup>4</sup> “Third Wave Feminism,” in: [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Third-wave\\_feminism](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Third-wave_feminism), accessed 12/11/15.

<sup>5</sup> See: *The Soul Always Thinks*, Collected English Papers, vol. 4 [New Orleans: Spring Journal Books, 2010], p. 575.

<sup>6</sup> For example, see: Wolfgang Giegerich, *Soul's Logical Life*, p. 33 (“Psychology has to be about the life of soul”) and p. 38 (“The subject matter of psychology, the soul, is ... not ‘empirical,’ it is not a ‘transcendent mystery,’ it is the dialectical logical life playing between the soul’s opposites”); Wolfgang Giegerich, *What is Soul?* (New Orleans: Spring Journal Books, 2012), pp. 5-26 (“psychology with soul”).

<sup>7</sup> See the chapter by Wolfgang Giegerich on “Geist” in the book, *The Psychological Difference: Reflections on Psychology as the discipline of Interiority*, edited by J. Knapp and J. Sandoval (New York: Routledge, forthcoming), where the dynamic (creating a wave!) of Jung pushing off from Freud is noted.

<sup>8</sup> Wolfgang Giegerich, “The Psychologist as Repentance Preacher,” *Spring* 82 (2009): 210.

<sup>9</sup> C. G. Jung, *The Red Book*, ed. S. Shamdasani (New York: Norton, 2009), p. 335f.

<sup>10</sup> James Hillman, *Re-Visioning Psychology* (New York: Harper & Row, 1975), p. 145.

<sup>11</sup> Wolfgang Giegerich, *What is Soul?* p. 122; and *The Soul Always Thinks*, p. 48; and cf. pp. 28, 49f, 71, 208, 473f and 578.

<sup>12</sup> David L. Miller, “Jung’s Warning about Faith: The Psychological Danger of Belief,” M. P. Sipiora, ed., *Imagining Psychological Life: Philosophical, Psychological and Poetic Reflections* (Pittsburgh: Trivium Publications, 2014), pp. 99-106.

<sup>13</sup> Alfred North Whitehead, *Process and Reality* (New York: Free Press, 1979), p. 39.

<sup>14</sup> Jonathan Z. Smith, “Connections,” *Journal of the American Academy of Religion*, 58/1(Spring 1990): 12; and, *On Teaching Religion* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 58f.

<sup>15</sup> “Psychology: Monotheistic or Polytheistic?” in: David L. Miller, *The New Polytheism* (Dallas: Spring Publications, 1981), p. 133f. This is an expanded version of an article with the same title published in 1971 in the journal *Spring* 1971: 193ff, but the reference to James and “eachness” does not occur in the earlier version. Hillman had addressed the same problematic in his Eranos lecture in 1976: “Egalitarian Typologies versus the Perception of the Unique,” *Eranos* 45-1976 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1980), pp. 221-280.

<sup>16</sup> See Wolfgang Giegerich’s differentiation of the notion of “eachness” from that of “polytheism,” in: “Comment on James Hillman’s ‘Psychology: Monotheistic or Polytheistic?’” in: *Soul-Violence*, Collected English Papers, vol. 3 (New Orleans: Spring Journal Books, 2008), pp. 339-352, which is a response to Hillman’s earlier 1971 version, but includes a 2007 “Postscript” that addresses the difference in what would become Hillman’s notion of “eachness” and Giegerich’s later notion of “eachness” (see especially pp. 350f).

<sup>17</sup> Wolfgang Giegerich, *What is Soul?* pp. 334f. Cf. *Soul-Violence*, pp. 73f, 350: *The Flight into the Unconscious*, Collected English Papers, vol. 5 (New Orleans: Spring Journal Books, 2013), pp. xiii, 132, 395 and 397.

<sup>18</sup> Wolfgang Giegerich, *Soul-Violence*, p. 350. Cf. Wolfgang Giegerich, “The Psychologist as Repentance Preacher,” *Spring*, 82 (2009): 205: “I think we have to let each new event and manifestation of soul teach us afresh what ‘soul’ and ‘soulful’ means. Eachness, rather than preconceived standard definitions.”

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<sup>19</sup> Wolfgang Giegerich, *What is Soul?* p. 86n53.

<sup>20</sup> This image is taken from a poem, *Self-portrait in a Convex Mirror*, by John Ashbery. The poem's theme is the *kenosis* of soul-work and it trades on a painting by Parmigianino. See the discussion of this in: Harold Bloom, "The Breaking of Form," *Deconstruction and Criticism* (New York: Seabury Press, 1979), p. 30. The relevant lines from the poem are: "They seemed strange because we couldn't actually see them, / And we realize this only at a point where they lapse / Like a wave breaking on a rock, giving up / Its shape in a gesture which expresses that shape."

<sup>21</sup> Wolfgang Giegerich, *What is Soul?* p. 86n53.

<sup>22</sup> Wolfgang Giegerich, *The Soul's Logical Life*, p. 217. In an essay about Jung giving up thinking in reporting the cathedral dream, Giegerich writes: "Jung had maneuvered himself into total intellectual isolation, into his private *idios kosmos*.... The insistence and exclusive relying on immediate experience meant the *dissociation of certainty from truth* and the renunciation of truth in favor of subjective certainty.... The way of *truth*, of *logon didonai*, so it seemed, was once and for all closed, indeed prohibited." And earlier he says: "This (cunningly naïve) sense of immediacy still haunts Jungianism to the present day." Giegerich also calls it "phony." ("Psychology as Anti-Philosophy," *Spring 77* [2007]: 43, 45, 35)

<sup>23</sup> Wolfgang Giegerich, *The Soul Always Thinks*, p. 509n6.

<sup>24</sup> For example, see: Wolfgang Giegerich, "The Reality of Evil," *Collected English Papers*, vol. 6 (New Orleans: Spring Journal Books, 2013), pp. 250f: "For the psychological standpoint each phenomenon is itself a psychological truth ... Judgments, theories, hypotheses can be true or false. Not so psychological phenomena. They *are* what they are and have to be taken as such.... How could the psychologist possibly know what is a right and what is a wrong move for the soul?... The actual phenomenology together with its self-movement is the only kind of truth that exists for him." Cf. "Psychology as Anti-Philosophy," *Spring 77* (2007): 35, 43, 45, on Jung's "renunciation of truth in favor of subjective certainty; "Saban's Alternative: An Alternative?" from the website is the ISDPI, a response to Mark Saban's "A Tautegorical Imperative," <http://ispdi.org/images/stories/PDFdocuments/Saban's%20Alternative.n.pdf>, accessed February 10, 2016, p. 22, on truth reflection of the inner logical life so as to release its truth, its unconcealedness, its disclosure; *Soul's Logical Life*, p. 274, on alienation even being a form of truth so that untruth has a place in truth, because truth is inescapable"; "God Must Not Die!" *Collected English Papers*, vol. 6, p. 230: on psychological stories show the coming to light of what was inherent from the beginning, i.e., the self-unfolding of the inner logic of self-enclosed truth in releasement"; *Dialectics and Analytical Psychology*, p. 27, on using the word truth syntactically as opposed to semantically; *Soul's Logical Life*, pp. 214-221, 256, 260, 313: on truth as the event of seeing the naked reality as Artemis in a wilderness, a fact that is repressed in psychology today; being permeated with truth is a Dionysian dismemberment; it is an activity and a process; and so on.

<sup>25</sup> "Materialistic Psychology: Jung's Essay on the Trinity," *Collected English Papers*, vol. 6, p. 163.

<sup>26</sup> Mark Leibovich, "Just the Facts," *New York Times Magazine*, November 18, 2015: 21-24.

<sup>27</sup> Cf. Wolfgang Giegerich, *Soul's Logical Life*, p. 274: "Even alienation is a form of Truth. This is the reason why psychotherapy, why the alchemical project of making gold out of dung, is possible in the first place. .... The neurotic condition as a distinct form of untruth has from the outset, unbeknownst to itself, its place within truth. We should not try to 'get out of' our neuroses—because this attempt *is* the very neurosis, is the attempt to escape Truth. We should [rather] take our neurosis seriously with all its contradictions and carry it to its own conclusion, where it would sublimate itself. The neurosis 'has everything it needs' to become Truth 'within itself.' Indeed it already *is* one's own truth, but in the form of its rejection, in the form of dodging it. Truth is inescapable." See my later comments on "betrothal" and "troth."

<sup>28</sup> Charles Barsotti was the cartoon editor of *The Saturday Evening Post* until its demise in 1969, and published in *The New Yorker* magazine from 1962 until he died in 2014 at age 81.

<sup>29</sup> Anthony Lane, "Movies," *The New Yorker*, October 26, 2015: 74. The review ends with the sentence: "The path of wishful thinking ... leads awfully close to mush."

<sup>30</sup> Parmenides, Frag. 5 (Diels); cf. Stanley R. Hopper, "Le Cri de Merlin!" *The Way of Transfiguration*, eds. R. M. Keiser and T. Stoneburner (Louisville: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1992), pp. 188-189; and David L. Miller, "Prometheus, St. Peter and the Rock," *Eranos 57-1988* (Frankfurt am Main: Insel Verlag, 1989), pp. 75-89. In this narrative, I am following Martin Heidegger's account in *Being and Time*, tr. J. MacQuarrie and E. Robinson (London: SCM Press, 1962), p. 256ff.

<sup>31</sup> Plato, *The Sophist*, 263B; see also James DiCenso, *Hermeneutics and the Disclosure of Truth* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1990), pp. 1-29. Cf. Plato, *The Theaetetus*, 156E-157A, and 160E.

<sup>32</sup> Plato, *The Theaetetus*, 161D, cf. 170C and 171C.

<sup>33</sup> Aristotle, *The Metaphysics*, IV.vii.1.

<sup>34</sup> Aristotle, *De Interpretatione*, I.16A.6

<sup>35</sup> Aquinas, *Quaestiones disputate de veritate*, Qu. 1, art. 1.

<sup>36</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 258.

<sup>37</sup> Brand Blandshard, *The Nature of Thought*, vol. II (New York: Macmillan, 1940), p. 228; cf. H. H. Joachim, *The Nature of Truth* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1964); James DiCenso, *Hermeneutics and the Disclosure of Truth*, pp. 13-21.

- <sup>38</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Identity and Difference*, J. Stambaugh, tr. (New York: Harper, 1969), pp. 103 (German), 38 (English).
- <sup>39</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Unterwegs zur Sprache* (Pfullingen: Verlag Neske, 1959), p. 12; *Poetry, Language, Thought*, A. Hofstadter, tr. (New York: Harper, 1971), pp. 190f.
- <sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>41</sup> Martin Heidegger, *What is Called Thinking?* tr. Wieck and Gray (New York: Harper, 1968), pp. 118f
- <sup>42</sup> Martin Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism," *Pathmarks*, W. McNeill, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 239. Cf. Gaston Bachelard, *Earth and the Reveries of Will*, tr. K. Haltman (Dallas: Dallas Institute Publications, 2002), pp. 4-5.
- <sup>43</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, pp. 256-263.
- <sup>44</sup> See Julián Marías, "Philosophic Truth and the Metaphoric System," in S. R. Hopper and D. L. Miller, *Interpretation: The Poetry of Meaning* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1967), pp 41ff
- <sup>45</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 261; cf. "Plato's Doctrine of Truth," *Pathmarks*, p. 178.
- <sup>46</sup> Wolfgang Giegerich, *The Soul Always Thinks*, pp. 218f.
- <sup>47</sup> Wolfgang Giegerich, "Saban's Alternative," p. 29.
- <sup>48</sup> Wolfgang Giegerich, *What is Soul?* pp. 74-76.
- <sup>49</sup> Wolfgang Giegerich, *The Soul Always Thinks*, p. 335, where numerous references to Hegel are given.
- <sup>50</sup> Wolfgang Giegerich, *Soul-Violence*, p. 349.
- <sup>51</sup> Wolfgang Giegerich, *The Soul Always Thinks*, p. 575.
- <sup>52</sup> Wolfgang Giegerich, "The Reality of Evil?" p. 250f
- <sup>53</sup> Wolfgang Giegerich, *Dialectics and Analytical Psychology*, p. 27.
- <sup>54</sup> Wolfgang Giegerich, "Saban's Alternative. An Alternative?"
- <sup>55</sup> Cf. Wolfgang Giegerich's comment on "emergence" and unconcealing in the work of Heidegger in: *The Soul's Logical Life*, p. 227, and the explicit references to Heidegger on "truth" in *What is Soul?* pp. 122-124, and on p. 188, where he writes: "Truth as the *logos eōn* (the existing or prevailing logos) wants to be *made* true (disclosed, unconcealed), so as to become in the first place what it implicitly has been all along: *alethēia*."
- <sup>56</sup> Wolfgang Giegerich, "God Must Not Die! C. G. Jung's Thesis of the One-Sidedness of Christianity," p. 230.
- <sup>57</sup> See Wolfgang Giegerich, "Mark Saban's Alternative" and *Soul's Logical Life*, p. 260.
- <sup>58</sup> Eric Partridge, *Origins* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1959), p. 740f; *Oxford English Dictionary* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 3416, 3324. .
- <sup>59</sup> *The Book of Common Prayer* (New York: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1952), p. 301.
- <sup>60</sup> The allusions are to Sartre's play, *No Exit* (New York: Vintage, 1989), and to the exhibit of sculpture by Louise Bourgeois during the winter of 2016 at the National Gallery of Art in Washington, DC, including the sculpture, "No Exit," that gives the title to the exhibit.
- <sup>61</sup> Cited in Lily Burana, "Styles," *New York Times*, November 8, 2015, in an essay on the Margaret Cho's view that "sex work is simply work.... There is no shame in it.... There is no statute of limitations on truth."
- <sup>62</sup> See footnote 25 and also Wolfgang Giegerich, "Saban's Alternative," p. 12: "Truth is always. We cannot ever fall out of it, we are always encompassed by it."
- <sup>63</sup> I am trying here to follow Wolfgang Giegerich's use of the word "poetic." When writing about Friedrich Hölderlin, Giegerich says: "He worked arduously a logical/poetic enlightened poetic speech.... Hölderlin's poetry is as philosophical/logical as it is poetic" (*Animus-Psychologie*, [Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1994], pp. 171f, my translation). And concerning the *Logic* of Hegel, he says: "It has rightly been termed a work that as a genuine philosophical one is in itself poetry. And what inspires it is Love" (*The Soul Always Thinks*, p. 65). In both of these comments there is an allusion to Bruno Liebrucks, *Sprache und Bewusstsein* (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1979), vol. 7, p. 8 and *passim*. I also have in mind a comment by Kafka: "Art, according to Kafka, is locked into a holding pattern around truth, so, in place of direct control of flight, aircraft obey signals emanating from some center of control: 'Our art is a being-blinded-by-truth. The light on the fleeing grimace is true; but nothing else.' 'Art flies around truth, but with the explicit aim of not burning itself.'" (In Laurence Rickels, *Aberrations of Mourning: Writing on German Crypts* [Detroit: Wayne St. U. Press, 1988], p. 276, citing: *Hochzeitsborbereitungen auf dem Lande und andere Prosa aus dem Nachlass* (Frankfurt a/M: Fischer Verlag, 1953), p. 104.
- <sup>64</sup> Franz Kafka, "Prometheus," *Parables and Paradoxes* (New York: Schocken Books, 1961), p. 16; cf. Kafka's story about Poseidon (*Ibid.*, pp. 85-87) in which, again, only the rock remains. The final lines are: "Poseidon became bored with his sea. He let fall his trident. Silently he say on the rocky coast ...." (*Ibid.*, p. 87). See my earlier treatment of these fictions in: David L. Miller, "Prometheus, St. Peter and the Rock," pp. 85-90.
- <sup>65</sup> My argument here basically follows the lines of the argument about "absolute metaphor" by Beda Allemann in "Metaphor and Anti-metaphor," eds. S. R. Hopper and D. L. Miller, *Interpretation: The Poetry of Meaning*, pp. 103-124.

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- <sup>66</sup> James Hillman, "Anima Mundi: The Return of the Soul to the World," *Spring 1982*: 85.
- <sup>67</sup> Wallace Stevens, "The Rock," *Collected Poems* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1975), pp. 525-528. My interpretation here follows the lead of J. Hillis Miller in *The Linguistic Moment* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), pp. 390-422. Also, see my earlier interpretation of this poem in: David L. Miller, "Prometheus, St. Peter and the Rock," *Eranos 57-1988* (Frankfurt am Main: Insel Verlag, 1990), pp. 85-90.
- <sup>68</sup> Wallace Stevens, "Credences of Summer," *op. cit.*, p. 375.
- <sup>69</sup> T. S. Eliot, *The Complete Poems and Plays: 1909-1950* (New York: Harcourt Brace and Company, 1952), pp. 133.
- <sup>70</sup> Stevens likely gets the image of "leaves" as the metaphors in leaves of pages of poetry from Walt Whitman's poem *Leaves of Grass*.
- <sup>71</sup> In this working with the word "cure," I am, again, following J. Hillis Miller (see footnote 66).
- <sup>72</sup> Charles Simic, "Stone," in David Walker, "Stone Soup," eds. S. Friebert and D. Young, *A Field Guide to Contemporary Poetry and Poetics* (New York: Longman's Press, 1980), p. 147.
- <sup>73</sup> Gregory Orr, "The Stone that is Fear," *ibid.*, p. 150.
- <sup>74</sup> Cf. John Sallis, *Stone* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994) *Stone* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994).
- <sup>75</sup> Wolfgang Giegerich, *Dialectics and Analytical Psychology*, pp. 8, 6.
- <sup>76</sup> Wolfgang Giegerich, *The Soul's Logical Life*, pp. 203-276
- <sup>77</sup> T. S. Eliot, *The Complete Poems and Plays: 1909-1950* (New York: Harcourt Brace and Company, 1952), pp. 66f.
- <sup>78</sup> Theodor Roethke, *Collected Poems* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1975), p. 236.
- <sup>79</sup> Wolfgang Giegerich, *The Soul's Logical Life*, p. 190.
- <sup>80</sup> Joyce Timpanelli, *Stones: For the Hours of the Night* (New York: Droll Kolbert Gallery, 1978), title page. See John Sallis' discussion of Heidegger's notion of "shining truth" and Hegel's notion of "shine" in aesthetics, in: *Stone* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), pp. 1-18, 42-43.