Reflections on the Jungian nature of psychology as the discipline of interiority: a response to Saban’s ‘Misunderstandings’

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Abstract: Psychology as the discipline of interiority is the name of the psychology that has developed from Wolfgang Giegerich’s work in the field of analytical psychology. This article offers a counterview to that of Mark Saban’s claim that Giegerich’s psychology is ‘irrelevant’ to Jungians today and is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of Jungian psychology. It will be shown that, in fact, it is a fundamental misunderstanding of Giegerich’s work that has led Saban to form erroneous conclusions. Links between Jung’s and Giegerich’s conceptions of the ‘objective psyche’ will be highlighted, along with other examples of how, contrary to Saban’s conclusions, psychology as the discipline of interiority has obvious connections to, and grounding in, Jungian psychology.

Keywords: dreams, interiority, objective psyche, opus magnum, psychology as the discipline of interiority, soul, unconscious

...how great are the disadvantages of pioneer work: one stumbles through unknown regions; one is lead astray by analogies, forever losing the Ariadne thread ... the pioneer only knows afterward what he should have known before. The second generation has the advantage of a clearer, if still incomplete, picture; certain landmarks that at least lie on the frontiers of the essential have grown familiar, and one now knows what must be known if one is to explore the newly discovered territory ... a representative of the second generation can spot the most distant connections; he can unravel problems and give a coherent account of the whole field of study, whose full extent the pioneer can only survey at the end this life’s work.

(Jung 1949, para. 1234)
Theories thus become instruments, not answers to enigmas in which we can rest. We don’t lie back on them, we move forward, and, on occasion, make nature over again by their aid.

(Jung 1912, p. 86, italics in original)\(^1\)

The stated aim of a recent paper by Mark Saban, published in the *Journal of Analytical Psychology*, ‘Another serious misunderstanding: Jung, Giegerich and a premature requiem’ (Saban 2015, pp. 94-113) is to ‘attempt to reflect upon the relationship between the psychology of Wolfgang Giegerich (the self-styled Psychology as the Discipline of Interiority) and Jungian psychology’ (ibid., p. 94). Saban emphasizes that his goal, ‘is not to offer a criticism of Giegerich’s psychology as such, but merely to show that, contrary to Giegerich’s repeated protestations, the “rigorous notion” at its centre finds no source in Jung’s psychology, implicit or explicit’ (ibid., pp. 94-95). In his article, Saban utilizes a paper by Marco Heleno Barreto, also published in the *Journal of Analytical Psychology*, entitled ‘Requiem for analytical psychology: a reflection of Jung’s (anti)catastrophic psychology’ (Barreto 2014, pp. 60-77) to demonstrate and support his conclusions.

Engaging in an objective and scholarly reflection on the relationship between Jungian psychology and the work of Wolfgang Giegerich is an important undertaking. It not only continues the ongoing work of deepening and broadening our understanding of Jung’s psychology but can also shed light on possible misconceptions concerning Giegerich’s work. It is welcomed because having more writers and thinkers in the broader Jungian community taking on Giegerich’s contributions can help clarify them in terms of meaning, validity, and provenance. It is within these parameters that I base my following remarks. I will not comment specifically on Saban’s discussion of Barreto’s paper.

Unfortunately, as a ‘reflection’ in the sense of an objective observation of where the two sides are similar, and where they are not, Saban’s article proves disappointing. It does not directly point out or discuss any links or commonalities between Giegerich’s thought and Jungian psychology. The intent is to not only make a strong case for showing that the origins of psychology as the discipline of interiority (PDI) are not related to Jung’s psychology in any way, but to also come to the unequivocal conclusion that Giegerich’s psychology is ‘irrelevant’ to ‘modern Jungians’. This seems a surprising, even baffling conclusion to draw especially when utilizing a paper not even written by Giegerich himself (Saban excuses this approach by pointing to Barreto’s ‘uncritical use of Giegerich as an authority throughout

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\(^1\) Jung quoting William James in the foreword to the first edition of *The 1912 New York Lectures on the Theory of Psychoanalysis*. 
But one gets a sense of what propelled Saban to reach such a strong position when early in the paper there is the claim that Giegerich seeks a ‘systematic inversion of Jung’s psychology’ and does so operating ‘under the banner of a renewal of Jungian psychology in its essence’; and that Giegerich’s ‘numerous articles and books have sought to carry through a radical deconstruction of many of Jung’s key ideas’ (ibid., p. 94, my italics). These characterizations, plus the felt sense of urgency and hyperbole evident throughout his article, almost imply that for Saban there is some kind of nefarious plot at hand here to undermine Jungian psychology and that we should be on guard against or, even better, dismiss Giegerich’s work altogether. Saban seems here to be on a mission to save the Jungian world from Wolfgang Giegerich.

If it is in fact true – after over 30 years of work as a Jungian analyst and theorist practising, supervising, teaching, lecturing, and writing voluminous papers and books on the subject – that in Giegerich’s work there wasn’t a modicum of relevance to Jungian psychology, it would be very curious indeed. Saban’s article also seems to imply that because the core of Giegerich’s understanding of psychology has no connection to Jungian psychology, in order to gain some kind of legitimacy, or ‘to establish the Jungian credentials of his psychology’ (ibid., p. 100), Giegerich seeks to graft his foreign ideas on to those of Jung’s and then hope we all think it’s the same tree.

The present article is put forth neither as an apologia for Giegerich and his work, nor as an approval of psychology as the discipline of interiority as such, and certainly not as summary of Giegerich’s ideas and work. But such over-the-top, hyperbolic conclusions drawn by Saban should not go by without an effort to respond to some of the misconceptions and strange assumptions he has put forth. It must also be stated that, in pointing out some obvious links between Giegerich’s thought and that of Jung’s, the aim is not to legitimize the former’s work. It must stand or fall on its own merit. The goal, as stated above, is to try and counter one-sided claims, such as those found in Saban’s article, with a more factually balanced account.

‘Inside’ versus ‘outside’

What is central to understanding the evolution of any body of thought is the question of whether new ideas, interpretations, reformulations and critiques
originate from within it, or from a position ‘outside’. Saban compares a critique of Jung’s psychology coming from outside the field, that of the philosopher Slavoj Žižek, to Giegerich’s critique of Jung. Žižek’s is from, ‘an honestly and clearly established external position’ (ibid., p. 95), while Giegerich, implies Saban, should be more honest and admit that his critique also originates from a position ‘outside’ the scope of analytical psychology.

This brings up a vital point. If Jungian psychology is to continue to deepen, evolve and be consistent with the status of modern consciousness as it evolves, how is it to do so? Clearly it must do so within itself. It cannot be forced into some structure or idea that is foreign to its core foundational principals, its spirit, and its inner truth. Saban’s argument is that Giegerich does exactly this.

By bringing in ideas that, in Saban’s view, are alien, irrelevant, and even anathema to analytical psychology, Giegerich’s contributions cannot represent any kind of a development or augmenting of Jungian thought. Saban claims that Giegerich ‘picks and chooses’ from Jung’s theory in order to support his own ‘external’ take on analytical psychology, a ‘unifocal, neo-Hegelian’ one. Saban writes, ‘Giegerich’s procrustean approach apparently authorizes him to lop off any aspect of Jung’s psychology that doesn’t fit his own preconceptions’ (ibid., p. 110). In the end, claims Saban, Giegerich’s work is based on ‘one man’s fantasy’ of what constitutes analytical psychology.

In fact, rather than a casual ‘lopping off’ of ideas from Jung’s psychology, as Saban flippantly paints it, in all points where Giegerich’s work forces him to diverge from that of Jung, there are clearly stated, theoretically sound and – characteristic of his writing style – persuasively demonstrated reasons for doing so. What is also important to note is that Giegerich’s stance on many of these points has been consistent in his writings over the course of four decades. This is not a fly-by-night superficial look at Jungian psychology. This is a decades long, careful study by one of the most penetrating minds in our field. If it were indeed ‘one man’s fantasy’ I doubt that Giegerich’s work would have attracted the attention that it has within the Jungian world and that Saban himself would have been interested enough to join the international society focused on developing these ideas – even presenting a well received paper at the first international conference in Berlin. Plus, he was in good company: during my training in Zurich, recognized Jungian scholar Dr. David L. Miller, honorary member of the IAAP as well as the ISPDI, stated that in his opinion one book that all training candidates should be reading is Giegerich’s The Soul’s Logical Life.

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3 Žižek’s ‘critique’ of Jung constitutes passing references in three scattered sentences in the work cited by Saban.


5 International Society of Psychology as the Discipline of Interiority
In any case, discerning whether or not something new is truly a development from within the original body of work, a ‘saying it again as best as possible’, or rather something smuggled in that does not belong, is not always easy. One is here reminded of Jung’s response to critics who charged that he was imputing an overly religious element into the psyche that originated either in his personal (subjective) background, or in his own desire to find it there. Jung replied:

‘I did not attribute a religious function to the soul, I merely produced the facts which prove that the soul is naturaliter religiosa, i.e. possesses a religious function. I did not invent or insinuate this function, it produces itself of its own accord without being prompted thereto by any opinions of suggestions of mine.

(Jung 1944, para. 14)

With time, of course, Jung’s followers have taken this position for granted, despite the fact that it departed in a radical way from the earlier Freudian view of religion and psychology.

We also know that for Jung the ability to discern whether or not an interpretation of a dream, fairy tale or symptom comes from the material itself, or comes rather from an ‘outside’ ego perspective is vital to the authenticity of the interpretation. He wrote: ‘It [the dream] has a say now, not you!’ This and other similar references by Jung, which are foundational to PDI’s understanding of ‘interiority’, are mentioned by Saban (rightly) as early attempts by Jung to differentiate his approach to dream interpretation from that of Freud’s. For Giegerich (and Jung), however, it is much more than this. Far from being simply a technical approach to dreams, for Giegerich this perspective of Jung’s is crucial in determining whether or not something is psychological at all. For Giegerich himself, there is no question that his critique must remain, as he would put it, ‘inside’, objective, and psychological. He writes:

Without regard to what is said and done to the left and right of me, I want to go more and more into the depths at the one point at which I stand, that is, I want to go all the way through with that theory or school to which I belong. Not a glance across the fence to the others, not an expansion into alien regions.... The ground on which I stand and from which (the horizon within which) I approach the topic that is up for discussion here is that of Jungian psychology. It is my Hic Rhodus, hic salta. I will therefore argue completely internally.

(Giegerich 2010a, pp. 176-77)\(^6\)

Whether or not PDI is an internal unfolding of Jungian psychology, revealing more depth and potential in some areas while withdrawing and even

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\(^6\) The above stated aim is, of course, in contrast to those who bring into the Jungian body of work theoretical streams that could be considered ‘alien’, such as traditional Freudian psychoanalysis, neurosciences and other biologically based approaches, psychiatric and medically-orientated standpoints, CBT, body work, etc. Giegerich's stated focus is to go ever more deeply into Jungian psychology per se.
countering others, will remain up to readers in our field to ascertain. Whether or not Giegerich’s contribution is ‘one man’s fantasy’ or has rather ‘produce[d] itself of its own accord without being prompted’ and will develop into something valuable for a larger community, will also be determined over the course of time.

Strange assumptions
Many analysts will have no interest in reading Giegerich’s work, despite the interest (both positive and negative) that it is generating in our field. This is, of course, fair enough, and to these readers his work will quite naturally be ‘irrelevant’. Whether or not these particular people will fall into Saban’s category of a ‘modern Jungian’ (whatever this designation implies) is, of course, another question.

Saban, however, has clearly read some of Giegerich’s work. Nevertheless, reading the material and having an understanding of it take hold are, of course, two different things. From my reading of Saban’s article, and other comments of his regarding PDI, I have the impression that he has not comprehended what Giegerich is getting at. It is obviously problematic if one publishes a critique of someone’s work from a position of not having fully grasped its meaning, especially when general, sweeping, categorical conclusions are drawn and then championed from this position.

This fundamental misunderstanding leads to unfounded claims and strange assumptions. Saban seems to think that when Giegerich’s notion of interiority is adhered to, i.e. when a psychologist’s focus is on the soul in a phenomenon or, as Jung says (see below), letting the phenomenon have its say, he or she is in danger of being hypnotized by the power of the ‘almost religious’ objective soul. Saban’s fears, for example, that when an ethical stance from a psychologist with a PDI orientation is called for, it will, on principle, not be forthcoming. He is worried that in the psychologist’s desire to ‘let the phenomenon speak for itself’ or to see the psychological dynamic as the psyche speaking about itself, the subjective position will be lost altogether and the psychologist could then be subsumed in the process: ‘there is nothing to stand in the way of possession by the archetype’ (Saban 2015, p. 104).

Saban tries to support this view in a roundabout way by introducing the dynamics at play in the work of the artist. He claims that Giegerich and Jung are at odds in terms of the idea of the ‘model of artist/visionary as empty vessel’, i.e. that the artist is more or less the conduit for art that originates in the culture at large and basically comes through him or her as an expression of the age. Giegerich uses the terms opus parvum and opus magnum to distinguish the personal from that of the cultural or historical work. Saban uses a suggestion of Barreto’s that some of Jung’s visions and dreams might be transpersonal in nature (magnum opus), i.e. collective and not having to do with the personal Jung. This coincides with Giegerich’s position, says Saban, but he then
describes how Jung himself attached personal importance to the visions he was having that lead to the creation of his Red Book. From this, as well as using a quote from Giegerich about Goethe and the writing of Faust (see below), Saban suggests that Giegerich and Jung are miles apart in their understanding of the work of the artist and his or her relation to culture. In other words Jung, claims Saban, is on one side demonstrating that the artist must personally engage the raw artistic material, while Giegerich is on the other, maintaining that the artist must not get in the way, but rather be the empty vessel.

But it is not as simple as this. In fact, one can quite easily find that all three – Jung, Giegerich and even Goethe – are on the same page with regard to ‘objective’ cultural material coming through the artist:

1. Goethe: ‘The poems made me, not I them’ (Bielschowsky 1908/2013, p. 34).
2. Jung: ‘It is not Goethe that creates Faust, but Faust that creates Goethe’ (Jung 1930, para. 159). ‘These [great poetic] works positively force themselves upon the author; his hand is seized, his pen writes things that his mind contemplates with amazement. The work brings its own form; anything he wants to add is rejected, and what he himself would like to reject is thrust back at him’ (ibid., para. 110). ‘Great poetry draws its strength from the life of mankind, and we completely miss its meaning if we try to derive it from personal factors’ (ibid., para. 153).
3. Giegerich: ‘Faust has nothing to do with Goethe’s “personal”, “inner”, development. With it, Goethe, did not work on his Self, his wholeness. It is a work of art that belongs to mankind’ (Giegerich 2001, p. 151).

For more context, let us continue with Giegerich’s text directly after the above quote, ‘[Faust] does not have the logical status of a personal dream. Let us hear Jung himself: “Thus, what was active and alive in him [Goethe] was a living substance, a suprapersonal process, the great dream of the mundus archetypus (archetypal world)”’ (ibid.). It is quite clear here that Giegerich and Jung are on the same page.

Now, what Saban does not include in his argument is the fact that just a few paragraphs following the lines he chooses to quote, Giegerich makes the same points Saban is making, i.e. that it is the work of the individual that turns the objective raw material into something that speaks to the culture at large. Giegerich writes:

And his [Jung’s] dreams and active imaginations are important for the magnum opus (i.e. beyond his personal psychology) only because of what Jung as a great psychological theorist (thinker) and genius made of them, not by themselves. As the name suggests, the magnum opus is a Work and requires one’s active labor.

(ibid., p. 153)
So the material must be worked by the individual, but as a ‘suprapersonal process, the great dream of the mundus archetypes’ (Jung & Jaffé 1989, p. 206). The ethical stance here is to let the material indicate what it needs to say, and to give it its place in the world. Jung and Goethe worked on the material, but kept their personal selves separate so that the material, the living voice, could speak through (or as) them unhindered. There is here a (psychological) difference between the man and the collective psyche (‘soul’), even though the location is the same place, i.e. the consciousness of the person. The material is viewed as having its own beginning and end, its own boundaries, its own life, interior to itself, but at the same time within the artist.

Giegerich writes, ‘With his statement about the poems that made him, Goethe points much rather to the inner dialectic of intellectual, poetic, artistic productivity, namely that it is at once subjective and objective, production and product, active and passive’ (Giegerich 2013a, p. 313). Why this is so important for Giegerich is because for him the psychologist, like the artist, takes a similar stance toward psychological phenomena, i.e. a subject-subject-object stance with regard to psychological phenomena. In other words, the subject finds itself in a position of being ‘object’ to itself.

So clearly for Giegerich the stance of the psychologist and artist is not an either/or; not either an empty vessel or engaging this creative force. It is personally engaging the material but as something objective and foreign. Otherwise it stops being a great work and becomes something personal and particular.

Referring to Dante’s work, Giegerich writes:

Art-making is the relentless working-off of the duality of the subject (author) versus object, experience (content) versus representation (form), origin or cause versus result, in favor of the singularity of the work of art that has everything it needs within itself. Dante’s work speaks for itself. It comes to us with its own authority. And this is so precisely because it has logically once and for all left behind both its empirical starting point as an experience in a human subject as author and this subject itself. . . . Dante’s work is not a report about inner experiences from “the unconscious”, not his “individuation process”. It is the self-unfolding of a self-sufficient fantasy from out of its own internal necessity.

(ibid., p. 278)

Unfortunately, Saban’s confusion here leads to an even greater misunderstanding. He seems to be anxious that Giegerich and Barreto (and by implication, all who adopt PDI) could find themselves supporting an ethical-free approach to any pernicious effect that may exist in the world (magnum opus). With Giegerich’s separation of opus parvum and opus magnum, Saban writes, ‘there is nothing to stand in the way of possession by the archetype, a possession that can have disastrous effects, both personal and collective’. After feeling the need to quote Jung discussing the ‘six million murdered Jews, the uncounted victims the slave
labour camps, in Russia, as well as the invention of the atom bomb’, Saban continues, ‘The horrors that Jung is describing here [the holocaust no less!] are what happens when “real historical process” is divorced, as Giegerich insists it must be, from the “personal-subjective dimension” and the “human all-too-human”’ (Saban 2015, p. 104). The implication here is that Giegerich is advocating, even insisting on, a literal hands-off approach to all matters of the world in general and that the psychologist as a citizen of the world should not take a stand either way even in extreme cases. This, of course, is obviously an irresponsible, even reckless, characterization by Saban and the extent to which it is misleading raises a large red flag in terms of whether one should take his article seriously at all.

Giegerich is clear that the psychologist as psychologist, working with whatever matter he or she is attending to, must not allow a personal/subjective view into the work. The matter must be allowed to ‘speak for itself’. Even the holocaust, when viewed psychologically, must be attended to dispassionately, professionally, logically, or it will not be heard. Indeed it would be psychologically unethical, if one put one’s own ‘stuff’ onto the matter when listening to what ‘it’ had to say. Jung said, ‘Let it have a say now, not you … who is listening to the daimonion [“soul”]? We talk but it says nothing, it does not even [for the unpsychological attitude] exist’ (Jung 1973, p. 532).

When not actively engaged in the work of psychology, in other words when not ‘listening to the daimonion’, of course the psychologist is as involved in the practical events of the world as anyone else. He or she is happy, sad, frightened, hopeful, whatever. If I felt, just to use an extreme example, that the rising of the earth’s temperature was related somehow to the ‘soul’s magnum opus, in a psychological study of this phenomenon I would necessarily have to bracket out any moral or personal judgements that might arise in me. However, in my personal life, out of a deep concern for this problem, I could of course still choose to recycle, use energy efficient light bulbs, discuss this with my member of parliament and work at decreasing my carbon footprint! Giegerich himself, as ‘citizen of the world’, is politically active in a direct, practical, hands-on manner in his own community in ways he sees as important and necessary. The distinction drawn between the position and purview of the everyday citizen (Jung’s civic man) and that of the psychologist, expressed in what Giegerich has called the ‘psychological difference’, has obviously not been comprehended here.

Another false assumption put forward by Saban is that, ‘A dream should therefore never be taken to be offering a comment or viewpoint on the actual life of the dreamer’ (p. 96) and that Giegerich has a ‘contempt for the ordinary’ (p. 103), that is the personal, ‘human’ aspect of the work. For Giegerich, in fact, the dream can be therapeutically ‘utilized’ by the dreamer and the analyst in order to bring awareness and understanding to the personal situation. This remains an important aspect within the personal
dynamics and domain of psychotherapy. If the analyst adheres to Jung’s guidance here: ‘In myths and fairytales, as in dreams, the psyche tells its own story...’ (Jung 1945, para. 400), ‘we can treat fairytales as fantasy products, like dreams, conceiving them to be spontaneous statements of the unconscious about itself’ (Jung 1942, para. 240), and thus remains clear regarding the objectivity of the dream, i.e. that it is speaking not about the personal patient directly but about itself and its own dynamic, the dream can, without confusion or distortion, be used in this manner. Most patients naturally are not, initially at least, in a position to comprehend that a dream or symptom is the ‘soul’s’ objective ‘statement’ about itself. But it is certainly the analyst’s job to assume this position, listening and tending to the ‘soul’s’ development over time while staying, at the same time, with the patient. To achieve this, the analysts must have an eye on both worlds, the psychological and the personal. Giegerich writes:

As practising therapists we are not totally identical with the psychologist in ourselves. We must have one leg in psychology and one leg in practical reality, the sphere of the human, all-too-human. We must be able to display a true unadulterated access to soul as well as a practical knowledge of the world (which includes a realistic insight into human nature) and understand the needs of the patient as human being. And, this is most important, we have to know when it is a question of the one and when of the other. (Giegerich 2012, pp. 315-316)

Apparently Jung, in session, due to his interest and focus on the archetypal aspect of the analysis seemed to occasionally ‘forget’ about the actual patient in front of him. Whether or not this is true, Giegerich also stresses that the attention must be on the ‘soul’ or the ‘archetypal aspect of the process’ which is obviously something ‘other’ than the personal, ego aspect of patient. Saban exaggerates this aspect of Giegerich’s theory and claims, as stated above, that he holds a ‘contempt for the ordinary’ or the personal dimension in the consulting room. It is true that in his writing Giegerich regularly de-emphasizes the ‘human’ aspect in order to focus on the ‘soul’ or the objective aspect of consciousness (which, of course, always manifests in the human). However, it is only as psychologist focusing on the soul that the personal or ego concerns take a back seat, so to speak, and there is never ‘contempt’. It feels this way, perhaps, to Saban and others because of ego psychology’s obsession (in Giegerich’s view) with the person. His or her feelings, views, thoughts, etc. are the focus rather than ‘soul’. This does not mean that Giegerich (and Jung, as cited above) do not care about the person, but rather that they are primarily engaged in psychological work, not personal

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7 The clinical use of dream analysis following a PDI theoretical approach continues to be debated by members of the ISPDI on its website discussion forum: www.ispdi.org.
counselling or ego-oriented work. The increased awareness of and ability to have a differentiated attitude toward the two realms during the hour constitutes part of the art of psychotherapy. Recognizing the difference (the ‘psychological difference’) between these two perspectives is an important contribution of Giegerich’s work. There is obvious clinical relevance here in that treatment of each respective side must be approached from entirely different perspectives. (See Giegerich 2013b, Neurosis: The Logic of a Metaphysical Illness, Spring Journal Books).

The psychological ‘subject’

Saban seems to avoid anything but a simple subjective (here)-objective (there) view of how consciousness, in the practice of psychology, might function. In his attempt to de-Jungianize Giegerich’s psychology, he has come to the conclusion that Giegerich has opted out of the subjective-objective relation between the ego and the unconscious, ‘as Jung taught’, and has rather a ‘free-floating, untethered’ (p. 100) conception of the objective psyche. For anyone who has spent time working with the concepts of PDI, it will immediately come as a surprise to read this, as in fact the exact opposite is the case. Giegerich is adamant that the ‘soul’ has to be in or of the Real; no mystification, no reifying, no abstraction. In fact, this important contribution of Giegerich’s to our understanding of an objective psyche serves as an antidote to the problem of hypostasizing and concretizing Jung’s notion of the unconscious. Imagining the unconscious as some kind of container in our mind where our dreams and visions come from, keeps it away from consciousness in some other imagined location that we relate to as if it were really separate. Giegerich urges us to wake up to the obvious reality that the unconscious does not exist as a ‘thing’, and to sharpen our psychological awareness so as to include this fact in our thinking. This, in my view, is a much needed clarification, even correction to the way the unconscious is often understood in our field.

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8 Of course, with some patients there may be little or no ‘psychological’ or archetypal depth to the therapy. The issues may be predominantly ‘personal’. The analyst naturally adjusts his or her approach to whatever presents itself in the consulting room.

9 With the notion of the ‘Real’, Giegerich is concerned with how the soul exists in the concrete world as what he refers to as the ‘existing concept’. This is similar to his idea of the soul existing as the logic of everyday life, or the syntax of the everyday world. Jung spoke of the picture that looms behind the everyday. For more on the ‘Real’, see Giegerich 2010a, ‘Psychology – The Study of the Soul’s Logical Life’, Collected English Papers. Vol. 4, pp. 325-50, especially p. 333.

Of course Jung did not believe that the unconscious ‘existed’ but spoke of it as a ‘thing’ in order to think, teach and grasp the workings and depth of the psyche. But our thinking can become lazy and cling to a reified version of the unconscious instead of seeing the noun as a simple spacial, imaginal aid to use in service to comprehending how the mind functions, and sees itself.

Giegerich’s notion of interiority does not need another ‘location’ (the unconscious) to realize depth in, for example, a dream or symbol. Rather than operating in an ‘untethered’ manner away from the phenomenon, interiorization is thinking coming to its centre, focusing on itself, penetrating to the internal dynamic of its own objective manifestation of itself as the phenomenon. In other words, it is consciousness ‘seeing’ (or positing itself as) consciousness existing in the real world, something ‘out there’, a phenomenon, a ‘fact’. Subjective consciousness is part of this process, but its perspective is no longer only as personal ‘ego’, rather, it has shifted and is being utilized by the ‘objective’ mind; it is now operative in the action of, as Jung would say, ‘the psyche observing itself’. In order to grasp this insight of Jung’s we have to advance from a simple subject (here)-object (there) perspective to something more complicated and consistent with the reality of consciousness, its operative, structural logic. Jung wrote:

And once the [evolution or] complexity [of psychology] has reached that of the empirical man, his psychology inevitable merges with the psychic process itself. It can no longer be distinguished from the latter, and so turns into it. But the effect of this is that the process attains to consciousness. In this way, psychology actualizes the unconscious urge to consciousness. It is, in fact, the coming to consciousness of the psychic process [PDI would say, the coming to consciousness of the logic of consciousness displayed as the phenomenon], but it is not, in the deeper sense, an explanation of this process, for no explanation of the psychic can be anything other than the living process of the psyche itself. Psychology is doomed to cancel itself out as a science and therein precisely it reaches its scientific goal. Every other science has so to speak an outside; not so psychology, whose object is the inside subject of all science.

(Jung 1954, para. 429)

Never forget that in psychology the means by which you judge and observe the psyche is the psyche itself. Have you ever heard of a hammer beating itself? In psychology the observer is the observed. The psyche is not only the object but also the subject of our science. So you see, it is a vicious circle and we have to be very modest.

(Jung 1935, para. 277)

11 ‘I, for my part, only try not to give any false or misleading names. All these terms are merely names for the facts that alone carry weight. The names I give do not imply a philosophy, although I cannot prevent people from barking at these terminological phantoms as if they were metaphysical hypostases’ (Jung 1946, para. 537). Also, ‘The collective unconscious is not to be thought of as a self-subsistent entity; it is no more than a potentiality…’ (Jung 1922, para. 126).
And again:

for the human psyche is far more than a mere object of scientific interest. It is not only the sufferer but the doctor as well, not only the object but also the subject, not only a cerebral function but the absolute condition of consciousness itself ... [analytical psychology] goes beyond itself ... for as soon as psychotherapy takes the doctor himself for its subject, it transcends its medical origins and ceases to be merely a method for treating the sick.

(Jung 1929, para. 174, italics added)

Jung is saying here that his psychology ‘ceases to be merely a method for treating the sick’ because it now incorporates the comprehension of its own dynamic structure into its ongoing work. It realizes that the terms ‘subject’ and ‘object’ or ‘doctor’ and ‘patient’ are now relative. Neither can now be an Archimedean point from which to position itself vis à vis an ‘object’.

The above insights of Jung’s into the uroboric, tautological nature of the psyche are foundational in terms of his advanced conception of an objective psyche, and are also the basis for Giegerich’s notion of interiority and interiorization. This thinking is what led Jung to teach that in looking at dreams etc., ‘Above all, don’t let anything from outside, that does not belong, get into it, for the fantasy image has “everything it needs”’ (Jung 1963, para. 749). This is downplayed by Saban as being only a technical point simply meant to distinguish his work from Freud’s, or as a ‘common-sense injunction’ (Saban 2015, p. 97), i.e. nothing really out of the ordinary. Saban writes, ‘when Giegerich turns these injunctions into a comprehensive axiom expressing the tautological principle that the “soul always speaks about itself” he has missed the point’ (ibid., p. 97). But as late as 1953, a time when Jung had no pressing need to differentiate his work from Freud’s, he was still writing, for example, ‘We must always remember that in any psychological discussion, the psyche is always talking about itself’ (Jung 1954, para. 483). It seems to me that not taking Jung at his word here, not unpacking the far-reaching implications of this far-reaching insight into the psyche and instead trying to corral its power and radicalness into a ‘common sense injunction’ is, if not subversive, then surely ‘missing the point’.

To someone bent on preserving a conservative relationship between ego and unconscious, ‘doctor’ and ‘patient’, it would be quite baffling to take Jung’s insights here seriously and even participate in the movement of the ‘psyche talking about itself’. Instead, this insight is treated as a ‘nothing but’, leaped over, sectioned off and quarantined. With the notion of interiority, Giegerich, on the other hand, moves to expand and amplify Jung’s thinking here, conceptualizing it, for example, as a movement into what he (Giegerich) calls the ‘wilderness’ or ‘pre-existence’12 of consciousness.

12 See Giegerich 2001, ‘Excursus: domesticated wilderness and pre-existence’, pp. 115–19; and an interpretation of the Actaion and Artemis myth as ‘the notion of true psychology’, or the psyche (as Actaion) ‘hunting for itself (as Artemis) pp. 203 ff.
‘With Jung beyond Jung’

Saban writes that Giegerich ‘has the remarkable temerity to insist that his, Giegerich’s, psychology is in fact more true to Jung’s core notion of psychology than the psychology that Jung himself presents in the *Collected Works*’ (Saban 2015, p. 109).

Saban would be justified in responding to this claim with a strong reaction, and I imagine it is shared by others who may have come across it. In fact, I have never read it put this way by Giegerich (Saban cites no reference); what he has written is that PDI wants to ‘Go with Jung beyond Jung’.13 There is an important difference in the nuance between the two statements. Greg Mogenson writes:

The question arises: does this show, as some of his critics contend, that Giegerich is a contrarian who has gone off on a hobby-horse of his own? Or is it rather the case, as others maintain, that even when Jung’s views are contradicted, Giegerich’s contribution is to be seriously taken as a radical and contemporizing “return to Jung” in as much as his insights are the result of a deep fealty with and thoroughgoing application of essential impulses and interpretive gestures that are at the heart of Jung’s own psychological vision?

(Mogenson 2010, p. 5)

For many of those who have spent time with Giegerich’s work, finding their way into its depth, coming upon this phrase – ‘with Jung beyond Jung’ – felt, in fact, like an acknowledgment of something already implicitly felt. It came, then, not as a shock, a challenge or an affront, but rather as something affirming, motivating, even inspiring.

Giegerich clearly feels we need not use kid gloves when honouring the work of those who came before us. He writes:

Jung, who is usually seen as a defector from Freud, once made the perhaps surprising statement that he, Jung, was the only one of Freud’s followers who developed further those themes that were closest to Freud’s heart. In other words, he felt that in the deepest sense he was true to Freud despite the radical disagreement between them. I view my relation to Jung in a similar way. I think I have been true to Jung, to his deepest concern, however in a way that also - yes! - violates him.

(Giegerich 2010b, p. 300)

13 Giegerich writes, ‘In 1956 Jung lamented that “my later and more important work (as it seems to me) is still left untouched in its primordial obscurity … ” … it is our task to finally do justice to his late work. But I think that this would not be enough. Or, to do justice to his late work would have to mean more than simply trying to understand it and basing our own work on it. Rather, we have to go *with Jung beyond Jung*… Our loyalty has to be to the living spirit within Jung’s work, to the unresolved problems that have come up through his work, to its internal necessities. Orthodoxy is not the best way to be true to Jung’ (Giegerich 2007, p. 247).
Since Jung’s death there have been a number of amendments or challenges to analytical psychology based on, for example, how Jung’s insights should be interpreted, where emphasis in the theory should be placed, as well as debates about what constitutes ‘true’ Jungian psychology. The notable examples are Marie-Louise von Franz founding another training institute in 1992, and James Hillman founding Archetypal Psychology in the early 1970’s. We also know that while Jung was alive two well-known followers, Erich Neumann and Michael Fordham, disagreed with him on certain points of his theory. It is also clear that different institutes around the world tend to accentuate and develop specific aspects of Jung’s psychology.

Saban writes, ‘Of course, the blatant evidence for a profound difference between Jung’s and Giegerich’s psychologies obliges Giegerich to acknowledge differences between his psychology and Jung’s’ (p. 109).

In fact, rather than feeling ‘obliged’ in the negative sense portrayed by Saban here, Giegerich has always been clear and forthright in his writing when his work differs from Jung’s and why he believes it needs to be so.14

It goes without saying that Giegerich’s work needs critical examination. Some think it too philosophical, too intellectual, too difficult to understand. Some have commented that his critique of Jung’s work is too severe and at times unfair. Indeed, Marco Heleno Barreto, whom Saban characterizes as blindly following Giegerich, charged that Giegerich had adopted a stance that was unduly sarcastic when critiquing Jung in the article, ‘God must not die! C.G. Jung’s thesis of the one-sidedness of Christianity’. Barreto writes, ‘Was the [Giegerich’s] sarcastic stance relevant to the argument? Not at all. On the contrary: … it unnecessarily throws a shadow of doubt on a, for the rest, consistent position’ (Barreto 2010, pp.130-31).

Detractors of Giegerich’s work, like Saban, clearly feel that the ‘animus’ edge of Giegerich’s logical emphasis goes beyond the pale. They feel he is too free with his axe, shows too much disrespect toward Jung and that, in his attempt to ‘prune’ puts the entire tree in danger.

Giegerich’s response to this might be reflected in the following quote:

It might appear to the one or the other reader that my purpose … has been an inimical attack on Jung, perhaps an attempt to pull him down from his throne, as it were. But Jung has not been my target at all. The target is our psychology, it is we. Jung is too great a thinker, and I feel too personally indebted to him for a wealth of insights, to think an unsparing exposition of the weaknesses of his conception could do him any harm. Quite the opposite, if we felt that we have to spare him radical criticism, we would not respect him.

(Giegerich 2014, p. 321)

14 In 2008, for example, in a lecture presented at a gathering at the ETH Zürich to mark 50 years since the opening of the C.G. Jung Institute in Zürich, Giegerich outlined seven ‘responses’ to Jung’s work. The text of this lecture can be found Giegerich’s Collected English Papers. Vol. V, Ch. 1. See also Giegerich 2010b, pp.265-66.
Susan Roland once stated in a lecture that she felt Jung was not just *writing* the *Collected Works*, he was *doing psychology* as he was writing. I find the same process described by Rowland at work when reading Giegerich. In other words, I often have the sense that whatever phenomenon is being addressed, whether it be the ‘unconscious’, religion, technology, neurosis or psychology itself, there is an objective factor at work. It feels as if the phenomena are in some way expressing ‘themselves’ in Giegerich’s work or, put another way, that psychology is not only being written, it is happening.

It is my view that Giegerich represents the most challenging, refreshing, important critique of Jungian psychology since James Hillman. Yet Giegerich goes beyond Hillman, laying out a clear and persuasive critique of archetypical psychology. He does this, in part, by going back to Jung’s key notions, especially that of the objective psyche, with fresh eyes revealing yet another dimension from which to comprehend its movement and depth. Far from being ‘irrelevant’ and ‘seeking a radical deconstruction’ (Saban 2015, p. 94) of Jung’s work, the intent here, it seems to me, is to give expression and amplification to aspects of analytical psychology yet to be fully developed. This has the potential of helping to keep analytical psychology relevant and consistent with the status of consciousness as it exists and continues to evolve, as well as ensuring that the seeds planted by Jung (and those before him) may continue to bear psychological fruit.

**Translations of Abstract**

« La psychologie comme discipline de l’intériorité » est l’aboutissement de près de quarante ans de travail de l’analyste jungien Wolfgang Giegerich, dans le champ de la psychologie analytique. Cet article propose un point de vue opposé à la déclaration de Mark Saban (*JAP*, Février 2015) selon laquelle le travail de W. Giegerich est fondé sur une incompréhension fondamentale de la nature de la psychologie de Jung, et, dès lors, « n’est pas pertinente » pour les jungiens contemporains. J’avancerai que c’est, en effet, à cause d’une incompréhension fondamentale du travail de W. Giegerich que M. Saban a été amené à faire des conclusions erronées. Les liens entre les conceptions de Jung et de Giegerich sur la nature de la psyché seront étudiés en même temps que d’autres exemples selon lesquels la psychologie comme discipline de l’intériorité a des liens, et des fondements, évidents avec la psychologie jungienne.

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16 ‘Jung myth and mystery fiction’, April 2010 Lecture, Edmonton, Canada
17 For example, see *The Soul’s Logical Life*, pp. 103-91; ‘Once more, the reality/irreality issue, a reply to Hillman’s reply’, *Collected English Papers*. Vol 3. 317-36.

Schlüsselwörter: Psychologie als Disziplin der Innerlichkeit, objektive Psyche, Seele, Innerlichkeit, opus magnum, Träume, Unbewußtes

La psicologia come disciplina dell’interniértà’ (PDI) rappresenta il culmine di quasi 4 decadi di lavoro dell’analista junghiano Wolfgang Giegerich nel campo della psicologia. In questo articolo viene offerto un punto di vista diverso alla dichiarazione di Mark Saban (JAP, February 2015) che il lavoro di Giegerich sia basato su una incomprensione fondamentale della natura della psicologia Junghian Ed è quindi irrilevante oggi per gli junghiani .Si sosterrà che è sicuramente una incomprensione del lavoro di Giegerich che ha portato Saban a conclusioni errate. Verranno discussi i legami fra Jung e Giegerich sulle concezioni della natura della psiche, insieme ad altri esempi del come la psicologia come disciplina dell’interniértà abbia ovvie connessioni a fondamenti nella psicologia junghiana.

Parole chiave: La psicologia come disciplina dell’interniértà. Psiche obiettiva, anima, interiorità, opus magnum, sogni, inconscio

Психологиякаквнутренняядисциплина» (PDI) – это кульминация почти сорокалетней работы на поле аналитической психологии юнгианского аналитика Вольфганга Гигериха. Эта статья предлагает точку зрения, противоположную той, в которой Марк Сабан (JAP, февраль 2015) утверждает, что работа Гигериха основана на фундаментальном непонимании природы юнгианской психологии и, тем самым, «неуместна» для современных юнгианцев. Будет доказано, что на самом деле именно фундаментальное непонимание работы Гигериха привело Сабана к формированию ложных заключений. Будут обсуждаться связи между концепциями Юнга и Гигериха о природе психики, а также другие примеры того, как психология как дисциплина о внутреннем мире обладает очевидной связью с психологией Юнга и основывается на ней.
La Psicología como disciplina de la interioridad (PDI) es la culminación de casi cuatro décadas de trabajo en el campo de la psicología analítica por parte del analista Junguiano Wolfgang Giegerich. El presente artículo ofrece una perspectiva opuesta a la afirmación de Mark Saban (JAP, Febrero 2015) respecto de que el trabajo de Giegerich está basado en una comprensión errónea de la naturaleza de la psicología Junguiana y es por lo tanto ‘irrelevante’ a los Junguianos en la actualidad. Se argumentará que en realidad es una falta de comprensión fundamental del trabajo de Giegerich, la que ha conducido a Saban a formarse conclusiones erróneas. Se discuten las conexiones entre las concepciones de Jung y de Giegerich sobre la naturaleza de la psique, junto a otros ejemplos que muestran cómo la psicología como disciplina de la interioridad tiene conexiones obvias con, y está enraizada en, la psicología Junguiana.

Palabras clave: Psicología como disciplina de interioridad, psique objetiva, alma, interioridad, opus magnum, sueños, inconsciente

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