Saban’s Alternative. An Alternative?

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In his paper held at the ISPDI Berlin 2012 conference, “The Tautegorical Imperative: Mythos and Logos in Jung and Giegerich, Hegel and Schelling,” Mark Saban wants to “offer an alternative approach informed by Schelling’s philosophy of mythology” in contrast to “Giegerich’s arguments against a myth-based psychology.” I have responded to his views more or less briefly both orally during the conference and afterwards in a written exchange with him in the ISPDI online discussion forum. But I think that these discussions were mostly concerned with individual arguments only so that the central and crucial issue has still not been clarified sufficiently enough. There is still more in Saban’s position that can help us to get a better, fuller understanding of our own position. We can learn something from it. And so now, I want to turn to his paper and his subsequent substantial online posts once more, this time focusing on what is ultimately at stake in this dispute. My purpose is not so much a response to Saban, but rather an analysis of his scheme.

Exteriority

In his rich, detailed post of August 2, 2012 to the discussion forum, Saban writes at one point apropos of dream interpretation,

The mantra “nothing to be let in that does not belong there,” seems plausible because of its wonderful simplicity, and indeed it can be hugely fruitful when applied to a dream or a myth or a fairy tale, but of course even there it can only be applied in a relative sense. After all, who is to decide what ‘belongs’? In the case of the dream do we not let in the associations of the dreamer, our psychic and somatic countertransference reactions, synchronistic events, our half-remembered knowledge of myth etc etc. Do these belong? Could we exclude them even if we wanted?

Saban’s initial high praise (“hugely fruitful”) for Jung’s abbreviatedly cited alchemical dictum—so essential for a “psychology as the discipline of interiority”—is immediately thereafter relativized by him and ultimately reduced to absurdity. It is reduced to absurdity because it is thought that we should not, and indeed simply would not be able to, exclude material that clearly comes from outside, regardless of whether it may belong or not. Why not? Simply because there is no way how to determine whether it belongs or not.

However, this absurdity is not inherent in Jung’s dictum. It is rather the result of a refusal on Saban’s part to let himself thinkingly in for what it says. A sign for this refusal is already the word he chose for this adage, “mantra.” In our Western, non-religious usage of the word, “mantra” suggests a mindless, mechanical repetition, if not rattling-off, of the sounds of a phrase without awareness of or attention to what it says. The mind is closed to the inner meaning of the sounds, not intently present in and tarrying, dwelling, with it, just as conversely the inner meaning of the sounds does not reach the conscious understanding, insight, and feeling of the person. Both sides are immunized against each other. By using this word, Saban inadvertently tells us how he relates to this sentence, namely, as if it were merely a dead thing that comes as a finished product and that one can pick up and use (apply) just like
that. Something that he does not relate to in the way that we relate, for example, to a book by opening, reading, and understanding it, or to a puzzle that we try to solve.

In the post to the ISPDI discussion forum in which he introduced himself (July 22, 2011), he stated that he did not want this society to be “a place where we all [...] sit around competing about who can use the word sublation most often.” This fantasy of a completely mechanical, unthinking activity fits well to his later “mantra” idea that we are here concerned with. That earlier fantasy was by no means induced by an observation of actual tendencies of such external thinking in PDI. It was his fantasy, his preoccupation. His fear of this imagined danger betrays that he relates (of course, negatively relates) to something inherent in his own structure of consciousness. He is not simply critiquing or fighting an unacceptable mechanical style actually found in others “out there,” but in truth much rather an internal other that he wants to avoid.

Similarly in his “The Tautegorical Imperative” he warns against “accepting them [Giegerich’s writings] uncritically as a new dogma to replace the old,” where “old dogmas” refers to the teachings of Jung and Hillman. Again a strange imputation. Who would want to “accept” (whatever) “uncritically”? To whom does he speak, to churchmen, to believers? Why does he feel the need to imagine these psychologies as dogmas? Dogmas are not simply views and convictions, but hardened, codified convictions. They are by definition undebatable and thus, like a mantra, sealed. And, this is even more significant, instead of offering ways how to dissolve the alleged rigidly dogmatic form into the fluidity of living thought, Saban has nothing better to propose but an “alternative.” A simple substitution—precisely the type of replacement that he warns against.

For the modern mind, dogmas, qua dogmas, are a red rag to a bull, because the modern mind wants to be autonomous and insists on accepting only what it finds credible on the basis of its own judgment. Jung did not establish a dogma. He had, on the contrary, reproached Freud for having made, as Jung saw it, a dogma out of his sexual theory. And with all his innovations, Hillman did not want to simply replace Jung’s psychology, providing an alternative, an external other, for it. He wanted to re-vision it, re-vision it from within itself. The “re-” shows that he wanted to rework the same. A kind of alchemical further refining and deepening of the same prime matter. Similarly, I did not want to externally substitute my scheme of things as an other for that of Hillman’s archetypal psychology. I offered to archetypal psychology much rather a way of how to critically re-think itself. The same, not an other. Alternatives, by contrast, logically exist side by side, the way things exist in space, neatly separated, without being intrinsically related and connected to each other. Their only relation is the external superficial one of their otherness.

Returning after these additional examples of a tough-minded mechanical style of thinking to our alchemical dictum and to Saban’s apperceiving the latter as something that, the moment when it is encountered, is already complete like an object (“mantra”), we find that in the quoted text this apperception receives confirmation by his attributing a “wonderful simplicity” to it.

But is it really that simple? Or, if we were to accept the predicate of simplicity, would we not have to be mindful of Schelling’s, Jung’s, and Heidegger’s insistence that, as Jung once put it, “the simplest is the most difficult of all”? The alchemical adage would be really simple if it demanded of us not to let in anything at all from outside. That would be a clear-cut commandment that we could apply just like that, mechanically, without further thought. But our dictum says: “Nothing from outside that does not
belong should be allowed to enter.” This entails an obvious contradiction. It does not flatly prohibit any external associations whatsoever. On the contrary, it confronts us with the idea that certain external material could, despite its externality, be internal to the image itself! Generally (this is what our adage demands), what is outside of the dream image is only external and must be kept out; however, in some special cases, what is outside is nevertheless intrinsic to what is inside. And because it has, despite its factually emerging from outside and as something external, psychologically nevertheless always already been inside (i.e., the inner property of the dream image), according to our adage it is allowed also to explicitly enter.

This is an amazing idea. Here our thinking is needed. What can possibly be meant by this at first glance unlikely dictum? It is an open question that requires our concentrated effort to understand it, because the idea of something external that is nevertheless actually internal, and something internal that in fact appears only from outside, does not make any sense to our everyday commonsensical understanding. It cannot be imagined or represented (vorgestellt), it can only be thought. Even more difficult is the other absolutely necessary question, rightly raised by Saban, “who is to decide what ‘belongs’?” It is a question raised by him, but he also right away dismisses it with his concluding purely rhetorical questions, “Do these belong? Could we exclude them even if we wanted?” Instead of devoting himself thinkingly to the question of what the deeper meaning of this strange dictum might be, he contents himself with the naturalistic objection, worthy of the New Testament sceptic Nicodemus, that in practical reality it does not work.

Saban has to dismiss those questions that he himself rhetorically does raise because obviously nowhere is there any expert judge in sight who could decide what “belongs.” Nobody, even if he were Jung himself, can claim to legitimately function as this judge. And so we can see why the naturalistic mind feels that we simply have to, just like that, apply to the dream images whatever external material happens to come up (“the associations of the dreamer, our psychic and somatic countertransference reactions, synchronistic events, our half-remembered knowledge of myth etc etc.”). The mere positive fact, the natural event, that associations have popped up, the fact that countertransference reactions have occurred, etc., is here thought to be sufficient reason to let them into the dream image in our interpretation of it. We could formulate the net result of Saban’s reflections on the alchemical dictum in the following statements: “Forget the question of whether the external material belongs or not. That’s all there is to it. For we could not even exclude it even if we wanted.”

We see in all this a perfect example of the standpoint of externality and everyday naturalistic thinking. It shows here in several regards.

1. Saban approaches the alchemical dictum externally, taking it thing-like as a mantra, or as an instruction by an external authority to be either simply obeyed (acted out) or not, and thus like an unopened package. He does not enter it thinkingly. He stays outside as an external observer and views and reflects about the possibility or impossibility of its practical application.

2. He thinks that the question of whether something external belongs would, in order to be tenable, require a decision by a likewise external judge (or perhaps, instead of a literal judge, by external distinguishing marks objectively to be found in the external material itself).

3. The external material (the associations, countertransference reactions and so on) is taken up in its factualness and positivity, as natural occurrences—“as they come off the street,” so to speak.
4. When this external material is let into the image in our interpretation of it, the relation of the external associations, etc., to the image is also an external one, a mere juxtaposition or combination, or an external reflection of the one in the other, because if the question of whether it belongs or not is not answered, the relation cannot be an intrinsic one. It is “physical,” not “(al)chemical.” Accordingly, in another part of his post Saban expressly opts for “the holding together of the logical and the naturalistic, seeing one through the other, and maintaining their conflict, however messily unassimilable they are to each other.” An avowal of and commitment to disiunctio. The analyst brings dream images and associations together much like a billiard player lets different balls bump into each other. Bang! Mindlessly, that is to say, without a mind that judges and insights what belongs and what not. For Saban, “the richness of psychological life consists precisely in the complex and ultimately irresolvable relationship between thought and world. The endless excitement of that relationship depends upon surprise, a surprise generated by the fathomless alterity against which we always find ourselves bumping.” This clashing even becomes his very definition of soul. “... soul is to be found in the mythic conflict at the heart of the modern individual” [in the bang! between “the apparently exclusive and contradictory ideas of myth on the one hand and individual experience on the other”]. No soul-making. No opus. No putrefaction, sublimation, distillation. Just the positive-factual event of the surprise or clash.

And finally,

5. the notions “inner” and “outer” themselves remain radically external to each other. They are conceived as literal, completely abstract (and thus mutually exclusive) binary opposites, an external dichotomy. They are then like things in space, just as in our everyday thinking a piece of jewelry is either inside a box or outside of it. Tertium non datur. The imposition of Jung’s alchemical adage to us, by contrast, is to actually think the thought of something that can be verily external and yet intrinsically belong inside the image—and thus to think the thought that, pictorially expressed, inside and outside are yin-yang-like one in the other. But such an intrinsic relation can here not be thought. Consciousness has not overcome the naturalistic standpoint of externality and apartness—and, as we heard under point 4, on principle does not want to overcome it. It is committed to alterity as its supreme principle.

All five points are interrelated facets of one and the same psychological standpoint.

To Saban’s question “Could we exclude them [the associations of the dreamer, our psychic and somatic countertransference reactions, synchronistic events, our half-remembered knowledge of myth etc etc.] even if we wanted?” Jung would have answered, “Yes, absolutely.” When Jolande Jacobi had published a paper in a psychological journal in which she discussed Jung’s views in contrast to those of Freud, Jung objected: “I don’t use free association at all [Jung’s italics] .... In dream analysis I proceed in a circumambulatory fashion, having regard to the wise Talmudic saying that the dream is its own interpretation” (Letters 2, p. 293f., to Jacobi, 13 March 1956). The dream its own interpretation! The dream as a self and relating to itself by interpreting itself!

If this is the case, would it not precisely imply that all external material has to be kept out? But surprisingly, the Talmudic dictum, although it is as difficult to think as our original one, can pave the way to the answer to the questions how something that is clearly external can intrinsically belong to the dream itself, and who is to decide what belongs.
A dream, considered as a text in the sense of positive fact, does of course not interpret itself at all. It does not do anything. It is written on a piece of paper and just sits there mute. If it is to interpret itself, we must circumambulate it, which also means that through forming this hermetic circle around it we close it over against what is outside. But true circumambulation means even more than this negative stance to the external. It means, positively, our dedication to the dream, dwelling with it, abandoning ourselves to it. Our interiorizing ourselves into it. Or conversely, harking back to the idea of circumambulation as the formation of a circle around it, we could also say that it means enclosing the dream within our mind and heart and in this sense going pregnant with it.

Only then is the dream a real dream in the first place. The written dream as such, the dream as an objective fact, as a mere text on paper, is not a dream in the full psychological sense at all. As fact, the dream is fundamentally mute and also does not have a meaning at all. The real dream, the dream as psychological reality, originates only in our dedication to it. It is fundamentally subjective-objective. It is the relation between ourselves and the dream text. The dream needs us to be a dream in the first place and to come alive. Only once we have given ourselves over to it and interiorized ourselves into it can it begin to speak and, at the same time, to interpret itself. It speaks and interprets itself only in and through us.

But it is only truly it that interprets itself if we have really entered it, are really in the image in its inner complexity, in the spirit and logos of the image, so that we, our mind, our soul, our feeling, can become, as it were, its musical instrument through which it can make itself heard. Oportet operatorem interesse operi (the one who works the work, the adept performing the opus, must be in the opus, CW 12 § 375), the alchemists said—which is of course the very opposite of Saban’s psychological commitment to aloofness.

Entering the dream in the sense given must not be confused with our becoming one of the actors in its inner drama, the way we are supposed to enter a fantasy in the Jungian method of active imagination. If this were how we entered, the dream would not interpret itself. It would be changed, the drama it displays would go on. The clue for what “entering” means we can get from a passage in a late letter of Jung’s. “It is quite possible that we look at the world from the wrong side and that we might find the right answer by changing our point of view and looking at it from the other side, i.e., not from outside, but from inside” (Letters 2, p. 580, 10 August 1960, to Earl of Sandwich). Of course, the right way to look at the world is not our concern. It is a philosophical, not psychological concern. But the move itself that Jung proposes, if applied to our relation to dreams, can tell us what entering the dream would have to mean. It is the shift of our standpoint from outside to inside. We have to get to a point where we can see the dream from within itself, with its own eyes, so to speak. Our interiorizing ourselves into the dream is, as I pointed out, tantamount to our going pregnant with it, and thus it is the dream’s taking hold of us and emerging in our consciousness from within ourselves. It is our being touched in our imagination and feeling, our consciousness’s being deeply affected and permeated, by the spirit and logic of the image. The dream is no longer the object of our reflection about it. No longer a vis-à-vis. And thus also no external juxtaposition of dream and associations, no “holding together of the logical

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1 In this context I disregard that things are more complicated: that the dream is actually subjective-subjective-objective. I discussed this more complex relation, for example, in “Imaginal Psychology Gone Overboard,” my The Soul Always Thinks, New Orleans (Spring Journal Books) 2010, pp. 480 ff.
and the naturalistic.”

As the simultaneity of “interiorization into” and “going pregnant with,” this type of relation between the dream (or the opus) and the interpreting real human being (or the operator) is a repetition of the yin-yang-like relation that we found between inner and outer.

But when (and if) this inwardness in the dream image’s logos (I could also say: in the soul of the dream image) has happened, then the dream ceases to be the literal dream text as a positivity (merely the letters and words) and turns into something that within itself opens up to the world and into a world. The field is wide open. The dream image then possibly resonates and reverberates with seemingly remote personal or historical memories, with amplificatory images from mythology. And then the answer to the question “who” is to decide what belongs and what not is clear. It is the dream itself, the living image that decides, it as its productive, generative internal logical life. Only those associations or amplifications are permissible that are its, the dream’s memories, not mine. “It has a say now, not you” (Jung in another context).

Our inwardization into the dream means our (methodological, temporary!) going under into the dream, our emptying ourselves, so that we can go pregnant with it and, ipso facto, the inner spirit or logic of the dream image itself may be given free rein in us to productively unfold itself, its inner complexity and potential. This is why it is so vital not to allow anything from outside in, not even the idea of the dreamer (!), and on the contrary altogether dissolve the naturalism of the unio naturalis, because external associations would inevitably serve as a distraction and inhibit, maybe even quench, the image’s further thinking itself in us. As Jung insisted time and again, free associations only lead back to our personal complexes and away from the dream. Literally external material merely “held together” with the dream is deadly. Psychological dream work in the Jungian spirit is the art of letting the dream interpret itself, which, in order to exist, presupposes our having given way to it so that it can do its thing in and through us. An art! A subtle art. PDI is a discipline of interiority, the art of methodologically going under into the “matter” at hand.

But since it is an art, it is also always possible that we do not succeed, or not enough. And even if we have truly interiorized ourselves into the dream (or should I say: if the dream has absorbed us into itself?), this interiorization is probably never total. We are finite human beings and exist as the psychological difference, the difference between ourselves as biological organism and naturalistic consciousness, on the one hand, and ourselves as soul, on the other, between our psychic and our psychological realities. So there is never any guarantee that what we do when working with a dream is in fact letting the dream interpret itself.

This is why we have to be on guard and try, using our feeling function and relying on our psychological conscience as the only guidelines available to us, to consciously discriminate between all associations and amplifications that in fact may come up concerning the question of whether they really belong or not. “Believe not every spirit, but try the spirits whether they are of God ...” (1 John 4:1). Whose memory is it, who has the association or amplification, me or the image? Does my amplification really come as its, the dream image’s, self-interpretation, self-articulation, or is it my external reflection about it?

Conversely, with respect to Saban’s charge that our dialectical thinking results in total sameness and thus in “the absence of remainder,” the fact that we can never be certain that it is truly the dream that is
interpreting itself through us, we do not really need to worry about a total disappearance of any “re-
mainder.” On the contrary!

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The standpoint of exteriority naturally entails a disinterest in inwardness, even a blindness to it. In-
wardness and inwardization are too subtle, sophisticated for it—not positive and commonsensical
enough. At one point Saban makes a kind of confessional statement: “For me this massive labour of
transforming one’s logical status from one point of view to another, from the semantic to the syntactic
etc, seems not only unnecessarily over-determined for everyday psychological work (and is there psy-
chological work which is not in some sense everyday?), but also in a sense inappropriate to the task”
(my emphases). A momentous confession. Ultimately—it tells us—he feels committed to the everyday
perspective, to the naturalism of ordinary, conventional psychological consciousness. By contrast, what
the discipline of interiority aspires to is for him overly extravagant, hyperbolical, off-beam, and ipso
facto misses the real practical needs of psychotherapy. This is the return, on an intra-psychological
level, of the skeptical objection with which depth-psychological therapy in the early days used to be
confronted by the commonsense of the man in the street: it is completely unnecessary to talk about
dreams and childhood memories and spend so much time on feelings and fantasies as is spent in analy-
sis; all that the patient really needs is to pull himself together, to go out into the fresh air, to get some
good advice and maybe some educational measures. The particularly Jungian thesis goes even beyond
the ordinary depth-psychological approach and insists that a patient is best served precisely through
attention to the hinterland of the soul, that is, the soul in its absolute negativity—but as such in Saban
it now meets with equivalent objections by the commonsense of the conventional depth-psychologist.

Saban asks, “But what is the justification for committing to PDI? Why interiority rather than exteri-
ority?” And revealing his utilitarian orientation he contrast this with the situation in science: “If you
say to the scientist, ‘why commit yourself to science” he or she will say, ‘well, just look at what sci-
ence has done’ ......,” which for me would, however, be a surprising answer coming from a scientist, be-
cause for me the reason for going into science, i.e., the motivation (and precisely not the “rational justi-
fication” from the point of view of its usefulness), would be something like curiosity, the passionate
desire to know. But it is true, science can also point to its amazing achievements and the practical use-
fulness of its results. Psychology in the spirit of inwardsness has nothing like that to show for itself. It
cannot, and does not desire to, prove its efficacy and usefulness, the way the behaviorists tempt to do.
And it does not have an external utilitarian justification at all, which does, however, not mean that it is
totally without rational justification. Rather, its justification lies within itself. How else could things be
for a psychology as the discipline of interiority? By its colorful tunes the lark blissfully climbs up into
the air. No physical ladder. No external foundation. No solid ground.

When asking, “why are we required to commit to PDI?,” Saban shows that he does not all along
know by himself why psychology in the spirit of inwardness is important. This in turn shows that he is
not the right person for it. Nobody is obliged to be committed to interiority. This psychology is only for
those who love it, who are deeply touched and reached by the inwardness and absolute negativity of the
soul, who do have a sense of soul (in contrast to psyche and to the practical affairs and conflicts of
daily life). The psychology as the discipline of interiority does not proselytize. It does not want to
claim others for itself nor approach them with a “you should, you ought to join.” It is perhaps like with

W.Giegerich, “Saban’s Alternative” (15 Sep 2012)
poetry. Nobody is required to write or appreciate poetry. The spirit of Schelling’s statement about his later “positive philosophy” (in contrast to his earlier “negative philosophy”) applies mutatis mutandis to PDI, too. Schelling said, “Positive Philosophy is the truly free philosophy; he who does not want it, may leave it alone. I leave it up to each individual. I only say that if someone wants, for example, the real process \[\text{Hergang}\], if he wants a free world creation etc., then he can have all this only by means of as such a philosophy” (SW vol. XIII, p. 132, my transl.). In the same way, PDI leaves it up to each individual. But for PDI it is not only a question of whether one wants it or not. It is above all a question of whether one is able to see what it is about in the first place or not, to see the \textit{aurum nostrum} in contrast to the \textit{aurum vulgi}.

And as to Saban’s questioning “this massive labour of transforming one’s logical status,” we have to say that the word “massive” is, of course, absolutely misplaced (we are not in the realm of heavy industry), but apart from this, the alchemical refining work indeed happens to be a long \textit{opus}; becoming proficient in the \textit{Art of Archery}, or in the art of playing a musical instrument musically or in the discipline of interiority happen to require effort. Even an ordinary trade must slowly be learned. But whereas in most trades, there is a time when the former apprentice has become master, in PDI we generally start out from natural consciousness and, vis-à-vis of every new dream, symptom, or patient story, have time and again to work ourselves up to the appropriate standpoint of interiority from scratch \textit{while} we work with the material, in the doing of it. And it is precisely a sign of a “master” of PDI that he can, with methodological awareness, each time go honestly back to square one whenever he is confronted with a new phenomenon to be worked.

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So far I exemplified the standpoint of exteriority in the area of practical psychological, our working with dreams. But this standpoint makes itself also felt in the area of the very categories of psychological thinking. Saban blames me for “a persistent tendency in [my] writings to dichotomise or binarise: Interiority vs Exteriority, Opus Magnum vs Opus parvum, the syntactic vs the semantic, the horizontal vs the vertical etc etc.” Again, as with the above “mantra,” while at first being able to acknowledge the usefulness of these distinctions, but only partially “from an heuristic point of view,”\(^2\) ultimately they result for him “in conceptual sterility or absurdity.” His charge is that they “become sedimented into absolute ontological categories,” and that for me “… a phenomenon is either to be included in one of the two dimensions or it is in the other, but never both.” This is nonsense. While it is true that these categories \textit{as such} exclude each other, \textit{phenomena} can participate in both at once, without in any way compromising the respective absolute difference between the categories. Let me elucidate this point only with one, the semantic/syntactical, difference. Obviously, already on a positive-factual level, one and the same sentence has a semantic or content aspect and at the same time a syntactic structure, and the absolute difference of the categories congeals in the really existing distinction between dictionaries and grammar books. To speak of dichotomizing makes no sense.

And \textit{in psychology} this distinction is not merely of heuristic value, but vital for making ourselves conscious, conscious of soul. When Nietzsche, for example, said, “I fear we cannot get rid of God because we still believe in the grammar,” he made us aware of the fact that it is not enough to say, “God is dead.” This semantically clear-cut, unambiguous message is, according to Nietzsche, contradicted by

\(^2\) Or “however useful it may be sometimes to talk as though the two are separate phenomena.”
the belief in the substantiality of the sentence subject *unwittingly invested in*, and thus confirmed by, the syntax of this very sentence! In other words, psychologically viewed, the person who with full conviction says “God is dead” or “God does not exist” says nevertheless at the same time, but completely unwittingly, “God exists.” Did Nietzsche here dichotomize, binarize? Is this distinction conceptually sterile or absurd? Or did this distinction serve him only as a heuristic tool? No, it is psychologically indispensable. By means of it Nietzsche *opened our eyes* to a deeper, more fundamental but heretofore unnoticed, unthought, level, the level of psychological reality, or, to say it with Jung’s words from another context, to the picture that looms up “behind the impressions of the daily life—behind the scenes.” He left the naturalism of the commonplace mind and advanced to the “psychological difference,” the difference between the psychic and the psychological, the semantic and the syntactical, and thus to the interiority of soul. Much the same could be shown for the other distinctions mentioned by Saban.

This example from Nietzsche could *in nuce* also provide the outlines of an answer to Saban’s consternation about my general idea that, as he puts it, “there is no necessary relation between what individuals think, say and do, and the so-called logic of their culture.” The person who thinks that God is dead is contained in, but unaware of, the logic of his or her culture, in this case of the syntax of this culture’s language. Because his explicit thought is contradicted by the culturally provided logical form of his thought, it is obvious that the two aspects (individual thought and logic of the culture) are here radically separate (and in general separable). This, however, does not at all mean that the logic of the culture is “a disembodied logical abstraction hovering above humanity,” as Saban imagines it, *needs* to imagine it on account of his one-dimensional, only-horizontal dualistic set-up. No, in this case that person even actually performs that very logic of the culture in practical life by thinking this semantically deviant thought, but totally apart from the explicit thought. Language is certainly “anchored in concrete reality,” indeed, it is itself a concrete reality.

What Saban does by defaming these distinctions as illegitimate dichotomizing and as ultimately absurd, is, in the last analysis, to deny the psychological difference and to opt for the external picture of “the impressions of the daily life” (which for him is, of course, to be *externally complemented* by the fundamentally unrelated, even contradictory ideas of myth) while altogether eliminating the whole concept of “what is behind the scenes,” in other words: the soul as it is understood in psychology in the Jungian tradition.

What for Jung, Hillman, and me is the phenomena’s (vertical) relation to their own internal depth and thus an internal otherness of the same, for Saban has obviously been replaced by the external (horizontal) relationship of literal alterity, the bumping into each other of inner and outer, thought and world, personal experience and myth. Pointing to a passage in which I state that while the psychology of an individual in a given culture might be consciously rational, the collective psychology of the culture in which this individual dwells, can simultaneously be in a state of “participation mystique,” Saban counters: “Surely the relationship between individual and collective cannot really be as dissociated as this? Are the two not entwined to such an extent that they are ultimately indistinguishable...?” Ultimately indistinguishable! Here we see that his attack on the various distinctions listed above boils ultimately down to a leveling out or obliterating of the differences altogether. Here the advocate of “unfathomable alterity” reveals *his* type of sameness.
Misconceptions and Insinuations

Saban’s construal of the logical form of a culture, if it is considered being clearly separate from what individuals think, as “a disembodied logical abstraction hovering above humanity,” and the relation between the individual and the logic of the culture, if so conceived, as “dissociated” is already one example of his several misunderstandings and misconstruals.

A major one is his view of what dialectics in Hegel is. Having referred to Lévinas and Derrida and “an ethics based upon the call of the other” he says that “it is in this context that I see the relationship of the dialectic to otherness.” First of all, viewing Hegel in the context of those thinkers, who never let themselves in for the thought that was thought by Hegel, is unproductive from the outset. When Derrida believes to be critiquing Hegel, he does not critique Hegel, but much rather merely further displays his own position, only this time against the foil of his preconceptions about Hegel. Like Heidegger, and in fact all modern thinkers since Feuerbach, Derrida acts as if the metaphysicians up to Hegel had been standing on the same ground as the one that he and the modern thinkers know to be theirs, so that critical objections of the modern thinkers to the earlier ones might theoretically be feasible. He is unable to see that Hegel (and the entire tradition of Western metaphysics including, by the way, Schelling) are fundamentally other, that an abyss, a discontinuity, separates him from them and that only if he were ready to cross over this abyss and let himself in for this Other could he be in a position to do justice to the metaphysical thinkers. The thinking committed to the unbridgeable difference and to ineradicable otherness is apparently not capable of seeing its own other, but interprets it merely as mistaken, faulty version of the same.

This is also why the phrase “relationship of the dialectic to otherness” does not make any sense. It is a meaningless combination of words. It is the apperception of the concept of dialectics from the viewpoint of externality. This thinking starts out from the presupposition of ineradicable otherness and ipso facto ruins its chances of ever understanding what dialectics in Hegel’s sense is about. Saban’s thought is here informed by the binary opposition of same and other. But what is dialectics? Dialectics begins with whatever it happens to begin with and unfolds this “matter’s” internal contradictions and their consequent process, or rather: lets them self-unfold. Just as in alchemy the prime matter is enclosed in the hermetically sealed alchemical vessel and the adept’s full concentration goes exclusively to what is inside the retort so that any external other has always already been left behind and simply is no topic any more, so it is, mutatis mutandis, also in the case of dialectics. The talk of a “relationship to otherness” is simply out of place, a crude misunderstanding of what be it alchemy or dialectics are about. Much as, in the sphere of externality, anatomy, physiology and biochemistry reveal the hidden internal complexity of the living organism and the function of its parts, substances, and processes (organs, cells, genes, hormones, etc.), so does dialectics reveal in the sphere of the spirit the internal complexities of concepts, beliefs, and cultural realities, the only difference being that in the realm of externality violent force is necessary (anatomy dissects the body), whereas dialectics works nonviolently by letting the complexities self-display. It works merely by one’s devoting oneself intensively to a chosen topic and, rather than operating with it without questions asked, taking it absolutely seriously, i.e., taking it at its word. Then it will show what it entails, namely that it involves complications that were not expected. These complications or, more specifically, contradictions can then again be taken at their word, and so
on. It is a process of learning by experience.

But Saban construes dialectics in a totally different way. “To negate, to negate the negation, to sublate is to force the other into a digestive process whereby it returns as same. Hence the absence of remainder. Nothing is left outside, nothing is so other that it cannot be fully sublated into sameness.” Many things are wrong with this statement. Nobody negates anything in Hegel’s dialectics. Nobody sublates anything. Negation or sublation in dialectics is not a technique performed by us upon some other. It is not our doing at all. Dialectics is, as indicated, merely our observing how an idea (or what one’s topic happens to be), if taken at its word, does not work as promised, and it is this experience, that is, the original idea’s own self-contradiction, that negates this idea and—in the sense of learning by experience (“aha!”)—by itself of necessity leads to a revised, corrected idea that takes what has been experienced into account. No force at all. And where is there anywhere here an alleged “other” that is allegedly forced? The real work of the dialectical development is done by the idea to be examined itself, all by itself and upon itself. There is from the outset only a “same,” the idea at hand, since everything external that does not belong, I could also say: every “other,” is excluded from the beginning, which, however, conversely implies that it is false to say that there is no remainder, that nothing is left outside. Of course there is: everything else that is not in focus remains outside.

From the cited passage we also learn that for Saban the dialectic means a forcing (!) the other into a digestive process. This view is connected, in his fantasy, with the idea of an “attempt to depotentiate the other through appropriation.” “The animus (logos) seeks to appropriate anima (image).” “... consciousness seeks to transcend everything that does not correspond and is not adequate to the concept.” Saban warns against the idea of “the sublation of the old into the new, so that it is swallowed up entirely in order to create a new all embracing total myth.” All this shows that Saban’s interpretation of dialectics is informed by an imperialistic expansionist fantasy, by the dream of conquering the world, the All. There is a seeking, a program, a will to transcend, overcome, subsume and subdue, to incorporate; a compulsive attempt to devour and assimilate everything heterogeneous and to force it into a sameness.

This way of seeing things again betrays the standpoint of exteriority, inasmuch as, with its orientation outwards to what is all around it (“the other”), it is a political power fantasy, modeled after the image of great conquerors, like Alexander the Great, Caesar, Genghis Khan, Napoleon. It is Saban’s imperialistic fantasy; even, or precisely, by fighting it Saban nevertheless also confirms it. This imperialism is probably the unacknowledged shadow of his (and Lévinas’) “ethics based on the call of the other” (Derrida already pointed to the sublime violence of Lévinas’ Other). Be that as it may, this imperially interpreted dialectics has certainly nothing to do with Hegel’s dialectic nor with dialectics as practiced in psychology. They both perform the exactly opposite movement to the movement of expansion, conquest, swallowing, appropriation, namely, the mind’s absolute-negative interiorization into a “matter,” into one single topic, concept, or phenomenon at hand, the mind’s abandoning itself to and going under in it so as to allow the matter’s internal complexity to emerge and unfold step by step. Not expansion but depth. Not “the other” and the manifold of what all there is all around, but merely “this.”

Apropos of the “ethics based on the call of the other” and Saban’s idea of “an urgent need to rediscover a primal ethics behind logos” we can see again that his standpoint is that of externality. Ethics in
the traditional (in contrast to the special *psychological*) sense addresses and constellates “the civil man” in us (as Jung called it) and not the psychologist qua psychologist in us. It has its place out there in the social arena, in the literal world, outer reality. It is concerned with interpersonal relations, “the relations between the ego and the external other (i.e., people or the environment),” not with “The Relations Between the Ego and the Unconscious,” or, as I would prefer to say, the relations between the I and the soul. “People” are by definition outside of psychology’s sphere of vision, provided that one has a rigorous notion of psychology and abides by it. The only ethics relevant for and in psychology is the ethics of soul itself, the ethics of soul-making, of the image, of logos, of dream interpretation, etc., an ethics of which Jung’s dictum discussed above—not to allow in anything that does not belong—is one exemplary maxim.³

* * *

I come to another type of misconstrual. Referring to both Hegel and Giegerich (it is silly to put these two authors into the same sentence and connect them with “and” as if they were on the same level and of the same rank. But this is done by Saban), he says, “Consciousness seeks to transcend everything that does not correspond and is not adequate to the concept. ... Myth, as a mere form of *phantasie* must be seen as a moment on the way to truth.” “... Hegel and Giegerich [...] reduce the content of mythology to a clumsy, pre-logical attempt at expressing logical forms.” “For Hegel and Giegerich the images and stories of myth resemble the shadows on the wall of Plato’s cave: all we need to do is turn around and see the reality and truth of the notion.”

What an absurd misrepresentation! For me, myth is itself the appearance of the truth and not a mere moment on the long way to a final truth. Neither for Hegel nor for me is there, in the overall development of history, a progression from clumsy to perfect, from mere shadow and “chaotic darkness” to truth.⁴ Myth is perfect in itself and has everything it needs within itself. For Hegel the absolute is always, and always already, present, just as for Jean Gebser there is an “ever-present origin.” Instead of a linear upwards move, a rise in the sense of improvement, from illusion to truth, there is in history (and as history) only a form change, a metamorphosis, of truth. Truth goes through a historical process, passes through different stages, appears as different truths, according to the statuses of consciousness and the actual modes of being-in-the-world, above all the forms of production. The truth of Stone Age hunters is different from the truth of Greek polis-dwellers at the time of Plato and again from the truth of Medieval man as well as from that of industrial modernity. But in each case it is the authentic manifestation of the full-fledged truth and of truth as such. Truth is in itself historical, dynamic, a living process: part of the soul’s logical life. It is *absolute* truth, which is the opposite of the abstract, static idea of truth as otherworldly, supratemporal, and self-identical that Saban seems to work with. Truth is always. We cannot ever fall out of it, we are always encompassed by it. However, it is not always easy to see it. It requires dedication, effort, and a certain soul depth of apperception. And it becomes the more difficult to see it the more complex and diversified the culture is becoming.

³ Other maxims are, for example, the related one about our having “to stick to the image” (our obligation to pay attention to the sensual precision and exactitude of the image), as well as: “It has a say now, not you,” “Say it again, as best you can,” “Tarry with the negative, with what has been *in via ejectum,*” “Don’t mistake daily-life impressions for manifestations of soul dignity; don’t judge dreams from realities,” “Inwardize the matter absolute-negatively into itself,” “Beware of the physical in the matter,” etc.

⁴ The only idea of historical progress in Hegel is that there is an advance in the “consciousness of freedom,” an idea that does not seem altogether implausible in view of the actual historical changes.
The idea of a linear historical progress from clumsy beginnings to final truth and to the glory of the notion is a crude, simplistic idea in Saban’s mind-set. He did not find it in Hegel or in my work, but projects this his own fantasy of linearity upon it. His assertion that, for Hegel, “consciousness seeks to transcendent everything that does not correspond and is not adequate to the concept” betrays a shockingly un-Hegelian, namely abstract, concept of the concept, which is nevertheless ascribed by him to Hegel. Myth and religion are for Hegel from the outset relative to and exist only for the existing concept (in Hegel’s sense). Religion, just as art and philosophy too, is the manifestation of the absolute spirit, the spirit that knows itself. What Saban suggests, the move from the “clumsy, pre-logical” to pure “logical form,” is, by contrast, conceived as a process of abstraction, of stripping, so that in the end only an abstract, emaciated, formal-logical, concept is left, in other words, precisely that which Hegel vehemently criticized as the abstractions of Verstand. I find these allegations intolerable because they are based on ignorance.

There is nothing wrong with a critical reading, but everything wrong with a crude misreading. Where is here the lauded “ethics based upon the call of the other”? Would such an ethics, as, by the way, also any ethics in a more traditional sense, not require that one only talks about something if one really understands it, and that otherwise one remains silent? Where is the respect of Hegel (and of Schelling as well!) as philosophers, as thinkers? What Saban says about them makes me ask if it is based on a real study of their works, or only on hearsay? At any rate, it appears that their work is seen by him as consisting of propositions and opinions (opinions that one can pluck out and concur with or reject, as if they were building bricks, rather than being integral living thought, thought that needs to be entered thinkingly). Saban’s real other (to whose call he should, according to his own principles, respond) are in the last analysis not so much Hegel and Giegerich as it is thought, the interiorization into living thought.

* * *

This same fantasy of an upwards development comes out in his description of my thesis of “the birth of man” as a “development which allows for the beginning of reflective thought, the commencement of the soul’s logical life.” This is a crazy statement. As the informed reader will remember, I located what I called “the birth of man” at the threshold of the 19th century, the time of the Napoleonic era, at the beginnings of the Industrial Revolution and after the end, or better: conclusion, of the age of classical Western metaphysics with Schelling and Hegel, and I described it, for example, as the radical shift from the uroboric logic of the copula or of identity, the logic of the judgment, to the modern logic of the function (Frege) and the unbridgeable difference. This time (the beginning of the 19th century) is supposed to be, in my view, the beginning of reflective thought, with Heraclitus, Plato, Descartes and so on preceding reflective thought? Impossible.

But the real value of Saban’s statement for us is something else. It shows an additional misreading, namely, that for him “reflective thought” and “the soul’s logical life” are synonymous, mean the same thing. They blend into the same. He does not discriminate them. For me the two represent an absolutely crucial difference, the difference between something particular and a universal. And his non-discrimination throws a light on the numerous confusions and problems he has with my view of the history of the soul (as also with Hegel’s, or Jung’s and Schelling’s, for that matter).

The “soul’s logical life” has no commencement in history at all. It is not a late product of history.
This is part of its definition. History is itself the process of the soul’s logical life. The soul is itself logical life. Just as “truth,” it is always, as long as there has been soul, as there has been humanness. And everything that takes place in human history, as far as it is of psychological significance, takes place within the soul’s logical life. Therefore I comprehended already the most archaic sacrificial slaughters, prior to any reflective thought in the narrower or explicit sense at all, as the soul’s killing itself into being, that is to say, as a manifestation of the soul’s logical life, and described their complex internal logic. As Jung said, quoting Faust, “‘Im Anfang war die Tat’ (in the beginning was the deed). Deeds were never invented, they were done. Thoughts, on the other hand, are a relatively late discovery” (CW 18 § 553).

Precisely. Jung understood what Saban blinds himself to. In contrast to “the soul’s logical life,” which is inescapable (unhintergehbar), reflective thought is a particular potential within this logical life from the outset, a potential that only emerges as such (explicitly) in the course of the soul’s history at a particular point, manifests concretely in a new logical form, and further develops along with history through diverse stages. This means that myth, mythic image, is by no means pre-logical. Just like “deed,” “image” is of course a manifestation of the soul’s logical life, the apparition of the truth (the truth of a certain stage of cultural, psychological development). But image as well as deed nevertheless precede the status of reflective thought proper, of logos in the specific sense (“logos” as in the phrase, “from mythos to logos”), of the form of conceptual thought, which emerged, in Western history, only with the earliest Greek thinkers.

And again, the much, much later soul event of “the birth of man” thus in no way amounts to the beginning of reflective thought, let alone to the commencement of the soul’s logical life. It is much rather a further, previously unheard-of change, a breakthrough, to be sure, on the level of reflection but to an utterly new dimension. A change that we can find best symbolically expressed in modern man’s having been able to leave the earth and to fly to the moon and into outer space, outer space, which in turn, being absolutely hostile to humans, can be considered as the image of the logic of that modern radical Otherness hailed by Saban.

Saban’s non-discrimination between the logical in the wider sense of the soul’s logical life or the existing concept in Hegel’s sense, on the one hand, and the logical in the sense of a specific, particular form of reflective conceptual thought, on the other, has the sad effect that for him logos shrinks to the lesser meaning, to explicit reflection, indeed, to the abstract formal-logical concept, to the merely rationalistic stripped of any mystery, depth, and infinity. But this is something Saban has to take the responsibility for. He must not blame others for his reductive and abstract sense of the soul’s logical life or of the Concept in Hegel’s sense.

His utterly abstract sense of logic and thought also comes out succinctly in his difficulty with my distinction between “thought proper” as thought thinking itself and “empirical thought,” thought about non-thought. He says he does not “recognize the absolute difference between the two,” and points to the fact that “thought is bound up with language, but language is never pure ... [T]he building bricks of thought can never fully escape their sensible, image-based origins.” We see quite clearly that “thought thinking itself (in contrast to thinking about other things)” is immediately understood by him as meaning the stripping of thought from all sensible, imaginal, metaphorical traces, which, I agree, would be impossible. A purist abstraction. But my distinction refers to something very different and very simple.
What I called empirical thought is thought concerned with trees, animals, houses, mountains and rivers, the stars, our neighbors, events, etc., in other words, with objects in empirical reality. By contrast, thought that thinks itself is concerned, for example, with “identity,” “difference,” “essence,” “being,” “cause,” i.e., with concepts that are exclusively thought’s own internal products and property. They exist only in the mind and have no referent. Trees (although an image or concept in the mind, too) you can nevertheless in fact see out there. But not “essence” or “being.” “Being” does not exist. It is a notion, only a notion. And then, also notional, also the mind’s internal product and property, there are the figures that we have to deal with as analysts, the philosophical trees, the stone that is not a stone, the slippery mountain of fairytale and dream. They are different from trees, stones, mountains in ordinary parlance in that they, like the logical categories, do not have an external referent. As psychological images they only refer to themselves.

The fact that the language we use is even in the case of thought proper ultimately always in some way image-based is of no relevance whatsoever for the question of the possibility of thought thinking itself. I don’t have a problem with imaginal and metaphorical language, or with images in general. I love them. For me they don’t threaten thought. But the absence of the psychological difference and of the difference between the semantic and the syntactical in Saban’s thinking forces him to work with the totally abstract, literal difference (binary opposition) of the logical or thought, on the one hand, and the sensible or imaginal, on the other, and ipso facto to construe “thought proper” quite literalistically as meaning that our human linguistic expression of thought would have to be absolutely cleansed from everything sensible and imaginal.

This lower-level (personalistic, literalistic) interpretation by Saban of psychological concepts comes out in many other features as well, e.g., in his external literal view of interiority as the “challenge of heroically rising to the level of commitment required,” whereby “commitment” is viewed as an existential, if not existentialistic one. He has a totally abstract notion of commitment as if it were something in its own right (sort of: “commitment for commitment’s sake,” rather than quite practically a person’s commitment to a particular cause, discipline or approach). The entrance into the standpoint of interiority is seen, in an overblown way, as a “heroic ascent,” as an existential “leaving the everyday world behind to enter the abstraction of the psycho-logic.” Saban speaks of a “massive labour of transforming one’s logical status ...”: obviously he imagines a Herculean task, when in reality it is no more than the task of learning one’s trade and practicing it professionally. All this is very far removed from the simple, down-to-earth adoption of a specific methodological standpoint, the standpoint of interiority, far removed from any existential commitment. In Saban, everything is interpreted on the semantic and concretistic level because the distinction between the semantic and the syntactical (or logical form) is not available.

As we have seen, due to his reductive (downwards) blending of the difference between the two senses of “logical,” Saban had to misread Hegel’s and my view of history as a linear upwards development from Platonic shadow to truth and from clumsy mythic image to the soul’s logical life. Conversely, however, on account of this reductive blending, he also incapacitated himself to appreciate the legitimacy of the perception of history as a more or less coherent succession of stages of consciousness. While it is, also for me, indispensable to reject the idea of historical progress in the area of “the truth” and of “the soul’s logical life,” it would be foolish to deny a (very roughly speaking) “linear and
one-way” development of history in certain other regards, where, as Saban puts it, “when one stage is completed it can never be returned to, it is left behind forever.” He rejects this conception of an at times irreversible development, has to reject it, because he cannot, or does not want to, discriminate between the universal and the particular and therefore has not differentiated the higher soul level from the lower practical and phenomenological one. This means concretely that for him the lower level of the phenomenal is not released from the burden of having to immediately carry and express the higher values of the soul.

When we, however, are willing to render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar’s (the concrete empirical process of history) and to God the things that are God’s (the soul’s logical life; truth), when we work with the psychological difference, then we can state, quite soberly and relaxed, that once we have iron tools we cannot return to stone axes; that once we have gun powder (let alone explosives and nuclear weapons) we cannot go back to bows and arrows; once we have advanced to industrial modes of production we cannot return to manual spinning and weaving. Once we have gone through puberty we cannot go back to the sexual innocence of childhood; once we have developed a cultivated taste for wine, we cannot go back to a primitive description of wine as either sweet or sour. These are not merely shifts of the prevailing myths, of the stories, changes that could be reduced to semantics. No, they are changes of a different caliber, changes in the logical form of culture or person, in the level of complexity and differentiation, and as such involve a degree of irreversibility. Now turning to the area of intellectual and religious regards: once I am in modernity, in the stage of “born man” and of the unbridgeable difference, I cannot go back to classical metaphysics, to Hegel or Schelling, nor to Thomas Aquinas or Plato (although this does in no way preclude the possibility of our learning from them). Let me simply quote Jung: “We cannot turn the wheel backwards; we cannot go back to the symbolism that is gone” (CW 18 § 632). Thus, once consciousness has entered the stage of logos, of philosophical, critically-reflective thought, of conceptual thinking (which it did more than 2,500 years ago), it cannot return to mythos. Following Jung (ibid.) we can say: it cannot do this because consciousness then knows too much; doubt [i.e., reflection] has killed mythos. The innocence, the immediacy, of the former mythic stance to the world is lost.

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After having blamed Hegel and me for favoring a model of a linear and one-way progressive development in history, Saban, surprisingly, believes to detect the opposite theory in my history of consciousness, namely “a powerful mythic story” (that according to him gives to my account its plausibility), namely, “a version of the myth of the fall, whereby a paradisal world ... is somehow lost ....” In other words, first: “from the shadows in Plato’s cave upwards to the glory of the notion,” now: a myth of the degeneration from a “more perfect age,” the Golden Age, to a stage accompanied by a “traumatic sense of loss.”

Here we have again the conflation of what in my work comes as a sober phenomenological description of different modes of being-in-the-world with a higher soul value, a secret emotional pathos, and a mythic quality. Saban uses a guileful trick. What is in fact part of the obvious phenomenology of the 19th century, its voicing—through many, many individual voices that capture a generally prevailing Lebensgefühl of 19th century man—the loss of meaning, the emergence of nihilism, the death of God, etc., this he tries to twist to make it appear as if it were in truth a hidden “mythical-archetypal” struc-
ture in my mind, my being in the grip of the myth of the fall, a myth that I merely project upon history out there.

But I am not responsible for the phenomenon of the historically unparalleled feeling and notion of nihilism, for the emergence in the 19th century of the absolutely novel question of and search for the “meaning of life,” for Schopenhauer’s disillusioned pessimistic philosophy of the blind will, for Feuerbach’s exposure of metaphysics as illusion, for Marx’s declaration of religion as the opium for the people, for Nietzsche’s “God is dead,” for what is expressed in the writings of Beaudelaire, Edgar Allen Poe, De Quincey, and a host of others. All this is, as it were, part of the “dream text” to be interpreted by the psychologist. Saban has not disproved any of this.

But “the sense of loss” that is undoubtedly inherent in this phenomena to be interpreted is nonetheless boldly, but illicitly, given out by Saban as not having its place “out there” in the historical phenomena but as stemming from a “powerful mythic story,” the myth of the fall, that unwittingly structures the interpreter’s subjective perception from behind. This is a clear mystification, an abuse of archetypal theory. In his paper, Saban at one point himself admitted that “there have been identifiable shifts in consciousness throughout historical time.” What I did with my idea of “the birth of man” was nothing else than to (1) identify and (2) psychologically interpret a historical shift in consciousness. We see: there are for Saban identifiable shifts in history, but when one such shift is identified and discussed, it is for him not a historical shift at all, but merely the projection of a myth upon history. His accepting the idea of historical shifts is without any practical value or consequence. Just talk.

When I speak, with respect to archaic times, of a participation mystique, I mean a particular discernable and concretely describable psychological (not psychic!) condition and not a vague mystified idea of anything “perfect,” enchanted, paradisal. I am concerned, quite matter-of-factly and unemotionally, with the logical constitution of the archaic “being-in-the-world,” rather than personalistically with people’s subjective states. No Golden Age! Nothing desirable. Just as, conversely, there is for me today no need for a “traumatic sense of loss.” It is not me who bemoans a loss; for me it is merely a logical change. This whole overlay of “good” and “bad,” “golden” and “degenerated,” this his inflating identifiable phenomenal features or differences with subjective emotional evaluations or ego preferences and overblown mythic ideas is Saban’s mystification, for which again he has to take the responsibility. Instead of remaining on the phenomenal level, the level of identifiable shifts (which is, of course, denounced by him as “the literal-historical”), and instead, furthermore, of “sticking to the image” and trying to see to what precise phenomena (psychological states) my descriptions and interpretations refer and what new light my descriptions may possibly be able to throw on the psy-

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5 Cf. Jung’s “This distinguishes our time from all others” (CW 10 §161); “This situation is new. All ages before us ...” (GW 9/1 § 50, my transl.).

6 The illicit character of his argument comes out quite clearly in his turning an argument I used against Erich Neumann against me, but withholding from the reader that when I charged Neumann with confusing myth with history I could rightly do so because Neumann, while alleging to be providing a history of consciousness, exclusively used atemporal mythic material and not once based his Ursprungsgeschichte on or correlated it with identifiable historical shifts.

7 Just as his initial high praise for the Jungian “mantra” of dream interpretation was just talk.

8 Saban’s already quoted, “Surely the relationship between individual and collective cannot really be as dissociated as this? Are the two not entwined to such an extent that they are ultimately indistinguishable...?” shows to what extent he is unable to see and hold the psychological difference, the difference between the psychic and the psychological, the semantic and the logical or syntactical, between what goes on in people and the life of the soul. His word “dissociated” points to his psychologically (or personalistically) reducing the notion of the psychological difference, which is itself a psychological or logical (syntactical) distinction, to an empirical-factual split, the idea of a positively existing duality.

W.Giegerich, “Saban’s Alternative” (15 Sep 2012)
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gogy of these concrete identifiable phenomena, Saban rather floats away into the height of the dis-
embodied non-committal generality of the mythic and archetypal. Self-blinding.

Equivocation and Anti-Discrimination

Saban’s declared purpose is “to genuinely think mythology as central to psychology.” For me, too,
mythology is central to psychology. But this idea must not be used to obliterate historical differences.
Mythology proper is central to historical psychology, not to the psychology of the modern situation.

What we see in Saban is that he has a wishy-washy concept of myth, or not really a concept of it at
all. He never says what myth is except that it is stories. And he levels out differences, using “myth”
equivocally for clearly distinct phenomena. For example, for him myth is
- the stories of gods and culture heroes in archaic, predominantly oral cultures (what I would call
  myth proper or authentic myth),
- narratives (such as the “myth of the fall”) which unconsciously structure the thinking of a modern
  theorizing mind, what Hillman might have called archetypal perspectives,
- an enframing world-picture,
- modern scientism,
- my idea of “the birth of man,”
- even history as such is a myth for him,
- “myth as an individual phenomenon,” such as Jung’s “my personal myth, the myth by which I do
  live.”

What do so-called “mythic” patterns that unconsciously structure the mind of a modern person have
to do with myth proper? The former are only accessible to critical reflection or self-reflection, whereas
authentic myth is always publicly known, told, and celebrated by a whole people. It is as much “out in
the open” as one’s mother-tongue. Myth needs no reflection, is untouched by and precedes reflection
sensu strictiori, which it also shares with one’s language. The unconscious pattern is implicit, veritable
myth explicit. The one is mental, “psychological,” the other cosmological. The one is only a logical
form, whereas the other is concerned with real deities that demand cultic service. How can one use the
same term for such different phenomena?

It is inherent in and essential to both history and science (and thus also scientism) that they base
themselves on documented or empirical evidence, whereas myth proper precedes all experience. For
this reason their results are by definition a priori open to correction and revision when new findings
emerge. Myth, by contrast, is extremely conservative and informs a people of “the a priori,” if I may
say so: of the true origins. Myth proper is the soul’s free self-articulation. There is no evidence for an
Atlas holding up the vault of heaven or for a world ash, Hades, a primordial Chaos.

As to “my personal myth”—it has never been shown that there is such a thing. And quite apart from
the contradictio in adiecto of “private myth” (myth proper is fundamentally a social, cultural, public
phenomenon)—if it is something that needs to be found, and this means sought, it is the reverse of au-
thentic myth, which, like people’s mother-tongue, always already precedes their personal existence
and, again like it, is unquestionable. Myth proper is not an experience, not a content of experience, not
a particular event in life (the way our dreams or visionary experiences are), just as our language is pri-
marily not an experience. It is the *medium in which* early man psychologically lived and experienced.

All these fundamental logical differences are wiped away by Saban as if he were an anti-discrimination official. Myth proper, I insist, is, just as “language” in its own right, but also like “theory” or “(scientific) cognition,” one particular, distinct “symbolic form” in Ernst Cassirer’s sense. And each symbolic form ought to be *respected* and, in our theorizing, preserved in its intactness. Saban’s inflationary use of the term myth makes of it a highly elastic label, a mere word without real substance, without a precise concept. Purely nominalistic.

What is especially objectionable about the particular idea of “my personal myth” is that the higher aura, the sense of “religious” value, of significance and of mystique, that comes with, and is transported in, the old traditional label “myth” is surreptitiously carried over to a subjective *experience* of a modern individual which is thus adorned with borrowed plumes. Modern people may have dreams or inner experiences of an archetypal quality and an impressive depth. But that does not justify using the name myth for them. They are just something that these individuals *experienced*, nothing more. Did, for example, Jung’s inner experiences recorded in the *Red Book* represent “the myth *by which I do live*”? They were certainly of great personal importance to him. But did they express that *by which* he lived, or not much rather a particular content of consciousness, a cherished belief, *separate* from his real life in the modern world?

What sets myth proper fundamentally apart from later personal “world-pictures” or “enframing” narratives is that the former was on principle unchallenged and without competition. There had neither been as yet a concept of “superstition” nor did myth co-exist with science, philosophy, various religions, political ideologies, private belief-systems, as in later ages, especially today. There was no market of meanings. Today every so-called “mythic” narrative comes as something a priori relativized by all other competing narratives, beliefs and by our historical and scientific knowledge. This relativity is incompatible with the ‘symbolic form’ called myth.

The wishy-washy nominalistic use of the label myth and the leveling out of specific differences between distinct phenomena through equivocation is my first point in this regard. Now I come to a new issue. It has to do with the elimination of difference as such, not merely with the obliteration of differences between particular distinct phenomena.

**Reduction of History to Story. Cocoonment in the Sphere of Ideality**

In my response to Saban, in connection with the psychological topic of the radical rupture from “One” to “Two,” I had asserted that he believed in the undisrupted continuity of myth. To this he surprisingly responded: “Not so. There are disruptions and violent shifts all the time, as myths are replaced by, and overtake other myths ...,” without realizing that this his answer precisely confirms my diagnosis. He seriously believes that he can fob me off with an answer that obviously follows the logic of “The king is dead, long live the king.” The particular incumbents change (sometimes indeed violently, through regicide), but the office of king, i.e., monarchy as such, remains. Disruptions and the violence of shifts occur, in Saban’s scheme, only on the semantic or content level (with respect to *which* particular mythic *story* happens to rule), whereas the syntax, the symbolic form of myth itself, inevitably persists. On the psychic, empirical, or experiential level there may be changes (even radical
ones), but the logical form of the soul itself is and remains unalterably that of myth. The soul dwells in undisrupted Oneness with itself. The “Two,” that is to say: the notion that the soul becomes (has become) different from itself, that it leaves (has left) the form or stage of myth altogether, that it has pushed off from it through a reflection and critique of it, is unthinkable. Of course this has to be unthinkable when the psychological difference remains unconscious, unthought, and when consciousness exclusively focuses on what happens on the psychic and semantic level, in the obvious empirical, naturalistic, or personalistic foreground, and when psychology has no rigorous notion of its own root metaphor, soul—although in Saban’s very response the difference between the semantic and the syntactical is implicitly already in operation.

The king must not die! Even when the king in fact dies! The move from monarchy to republican democracy must not happen! The Two, the emergence of the difference as such, namely, the difference, for example, between monarchy and republic or democracy, or between mythos and logos, is absolutely excluded.

But of course, Saban’s consciousness is a modern one. It is not naive, does not live on the level of the One. It has numerous historical shifts from the One to the Two behind itself, such as that, more than twenty-five centuries ago, from mythos to logos, that from the pagan cosmos to the Christian “having overcome the world,” or more recently, that from the containment in the world of metaphysics to “the birth of man.” In fact, his is already the consciousness of “born man.” The difference, therefore, inevitably exists for Saban’s consciousness, and for this reason his consciousness must, in order to nevertheless (against its own syntactical form) semantically maintain its scheme of the One. It has to resort to a strategy to render the difference (the Two) ineffective, since the Two cannot be disposed of altogether once consciousness has objectively become aware of it.

The difference can be neutralized (so that the one side, i.e., the Two, does not do anything anymore to the other) when consciousness succeeds in letting the One subsume or swallow the Two, when the Two is pocketed by the One. If the One can be defined as itself fundamentally ambivalent, as itself being both opposites in their mutual exclusiveness, then the One cannot possibly any longer become exposed to a possible experience of the Two as happening to itself and thus becoming destroyed as Oneness, for now it seems that, as Saban claims, “there never was a time before one became two.” By in this way semantically denying that there ever was a time of the One, the One has syntactically achieved absolute immunity. And the Two has become frozen in the permanent oscillation called “ambivalence” within the One.

In Saban this pocketing becomes especially visible in his theory of the equiprimordiality of the Two,

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9 The shift from One to Two must not be literalized. It was not a one-time event. It, as well as the state of the One itself, are psychological concepts, not empirical-factual ones. In empirical reality, or for a naturalistic thinking, once One has turned into Two, there is no One anymore that could possibly divide itself into Two. But psychologically this shift happened repeatedly in history and can, and often has to, happen repeatedly because the One restores itself on each new level of consciousness that emerged through the shift from One to Two.

10 Maybe Saban thinks this way because he has a completely mystified idea of the One as something miraculous, a literal state of paradisal bliss? But the One must not be imagined in such a naturalistic or psychological way. The distinction between One and Two is a psychological one. And in psychological discourse it is not in any way more mysterious as, for example, the distinction in logic or linguistics between language and meta-language. To deny the One would be as reasonable as it would be to deny that there are first-level statements. Meta-language statements are evidence of a higher structural complexity, comparable, in a rather crude sense, to the higher complexity of multicellular over against monocellular organisms. In the phrase “from mythos to logos” logos is “Two” because qua reflection (the reflection of mythos) it is in itself the unity of (1) the critique and (2) what it is the critique of. It is a two-tier phenomenon.
namely *mythos* and *logos*, and of myth being always and from the outset both true and false story.\(^\text{11}\) We get even an indirect demonstration of the strategic act performed for absorbing the difference, so that what actually is a difference that played itself out as a historical succession and as the secondary negation (critique) of a former position was turned into a difference that as equiprimordial and simultaneous is logically subsumed under the One. Saban writes in his paper, “... even in the earliest Greek discourse about myth it already has the meaning ‘false story’. As Eliade puts it, ‘if the word ‘myth,’ in all European languages denotes ‘fiction,’ it is because the Greeks declared it to be so twenty-five centuries ago.’” What in Eliade’s statement clearly refers to the time of the Greek Enlightenment, to an act of the pre-Socratics (their *doing* something to it, denouncing as false the myth which they had inherited from earlier times, in order to push off from it into their own *philosophical*, and as such post-mythological, conceptual thought), Saban twists into a support for his thesis of the equiprimordiality of true and false story in myth as such, even in Homer. What in truth is an earlier/later difference is translated into an *eternal* co-existence and co-dependence.\(^\text{12}\) We witness here a withdrawal from history (in the sense of “subsequent moments in a linear/historical movement of soul”) into the higher spheres of atemporality and the generality of principles.

In another paper, I had once analyzed the 20\(^{th}\) century phenomenon of the experience and idea of disenchantment as one that within itself is the opening up of the opposition of enchantment and disenchantment. Saban quotes this analysis and takes it as a model or justification for his idea that the “step into logos” (which he unconvincingly locates already in Homer and claims is inherent in myth as such) amounts to “the simultaneous generation of mythos, as a kind of inevitable supplement”—just as if the myths told in Homer had been generated, created by Homer and were not much rather taken from a much older stock of stories and used for his own purposes within his own epics! The real step into logos was, however, taken not any earlier than by the early Greek philosophers. Applying Saban’s just mentioned principle to those thinkers, it would mean that their reflection and critical rejection of myth within itself generated that myth in the first place as a supplement, a supplement that they then critiqued. Absurd. They reacted (“re-flection!”) to a given, to stories they had inherited from an ancient tradition, not only poetic-literary tradition (Homer et already.), but also a tradition of popular religious belief and practice. The relation between the mythic stories and their critique by logos is clearly one of

\(^\text{11}\) Saban’s equiprimordialization of the Two and of “true” and “false” story is in competition with his other method of explaining logical developments in history away, the one that we discussed earlier: the interpretation of the obsolescence of myth in history as the projection upon history of the myth of the Fall. This is a merely subjective invalidation of the obsolescence diagnosis (the branding of it as a mistake in the observer’s consciousness). The theory of equiprimordiality, by contrast, has the advantage of eliminating the difference in the object itself, sort of ontologically. (Saban’s third strategy of ridding himself of the rupture from One to Two is of course his leveling out of the differences between distinct phenomena by equivocally calling them all “myths.”)

\(^\text{12}\) Yes, indeed: “... even in the earliest Greek discourse about myth” myth does mean “false story.” Precisely: because it is *discourse about* myth, the critical reflections by philosophers about myth. So we are here already in the situation of the Two (1. the meta-level discourse and 2. the phenomenon of myth as what this discourse is about). But the mythic stories themselves do not present themselves as “false stories.” They claim to be fundamentally true stories. *Mythos*, we learn from Walter F. Otto, meant linguistically, in contradistinction to other Greek words for “narration” (such as “logos”), “the true word,” where truth does not mean dogmatically claimed truth, but something that cannot be questioned at all, *absolutely* true: freed (absolved) from, or *preceding*, the opposition between truth and falsehood. I mentioned that *mythos* was unchallenged by critical notions such as “superstition” and by having to compete with science and belief-systems, indeed, that it was similarly unquestionable as one’s mother tongue. This similarity underlines once more why the idea of “false story” is totally misplaced. And, conversely, we have to say that the moment when it had become possible to view *mythos* as “false story,” *mythos* no longer existed. It had lost that *constitutive* self-evidence and inescapability that it once shared with language, a self-evidence and inescapability that language in contrast to myth was able to retain up to the 20\(^{th}\) century (and for most ordinary people [and in everyday contexts anyway] even until today).
“subsequent moments.” Again, we see this tendency to hover above history.

This takes me to a third point. Saban states in his second forum post to me that “... for you it does seem to matter whether it [the creation myth which is at the centre of your ‘Killings’ paper] is ‘historically true’ or not. ... For me it requires no further evidence from outside itself to function as an illuminating psychological fable. It already has everything it needs.” I would never speak of “historically true” in the sense of literal history and literal facts, since I am fully aware of the fact that my thesis in the “Killings” paper is my version (my analysis and interpretation, and in this sense perhaps also my “fable”) of the logic of what happens within the phenomenon of archaic sacrificial killings, my view of how the soul “killed itself into being.” However, I protest against the idea that as a “psychological fable” it has everything it needs within itself. I protest against the abuse of this alchemical insight. What has everything it needs within itself is much rather the prime matter, the dream image, the specific pathology, the myth, the psychological phenomenon, but not our opus performed upon it, not our interpretation of it, not the story we tell about it. Only when such stories told by us about it in turn at a later date should perhaps become the prime matter for a new opus, a new psychological interpretation, only then do they already have everything they need. Because then (in and for this new psychological reflection) they are no longer stories we tell, but a given prime matter.

For me it is indispensable that what I say is about a real matter, is in touch with something outside of me, with a substance—here, in the case of archaic sacrificial slayings, with the best knowledge available to date about early prehistory. How else could it be an interpretation? I am concerned with the soul in the Real—with the stone that is not a stone—not with my own self-sufficient fictions or fables. My account has an “about” outside itself. I have and feel a responsibility towards the given mat

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13 This is also why stories we tell are never myths, simply on account of their logical form. A myth and, to a lesser degree, a dream, an archetypal vision, are characterized by the fact that it is inherent in their logical constitution that they do not come as our speaking, but come to us as the soul’s speaking. We can only listen them. “It has a say now, not you.” “Say it again, as best you can.”

14 If what we said can nevertheless for a later opus become a genuine prima materia, and if the shift from One to Two has to be understood as happening repeatedly, always as something radically new (rather than an idle repetition), one sees that in psychology a fluidity of thought is needed in contrast to a tough-minded literalism that thinks that it is in the nature of a matter per se to be either this or that. In reality it depends only on the methodological perspective. This has momentous consequences. When Jung, for example, said that, “in any psychological discussion we are not making statements about the psyche, but the psyche is inevitably expressing itself” (CW 9i § 483, transl. modif.), he was already in psychology and apperceived those “psychological discussions” from a truly psychological point of view. But the same psychological discussions, even the work of Jung himself, can also be studied as the human author’s theorizing and thus not as psychological phenomena (that have everything they need within themselves and are self-referential), but much rather as human opinions or statements about, e.g., the psyche, statements for which the author has to personally stand up. Only in the second case, only when we see each other as colleagues and as developing our theories about the soul and thus on the human level, can there be a debate and can the statements, e.g., be criticized as unconvincing or false, whereas when apperceived psychologically, as psychological phenomena, which becomes possible once they have become historical for us, those same human statements have to be taken the way they are, just as if they were dreams (in the sense of “What the dream, which is not manufactured by us, says is just so” and “... the dream itself, which we cannot criticize,...”). It is not that certain statements are human statements and certain other ones are the soul’s speaking about itself. And it will not do either, in order to avoid one’s acting out such a tough-minded literalism, to have recourse to the idea of “ambivalence,” in which case one’s tough-mindedness is not overcome. Pictorially speaking: the trembling in Parkinson’s disease is not the opposite of rigidity.

15 This is a fundamental difference between my theory of sacrifices and René Girard’s (both of which are for Saban “a fantasy, a myth” in the same sense and on the same level). But Girard indeed offered what was his own fantasy of the origin of sacrificial rituals, postulating mimetic rivalry and a scapegoat mechanism, two factors which are precisely not in the phenomenon of sacrifices itself. They are his addition to the phenomenon, his postulates or constructs. By contrast, much like Jung said (thereby at the same time incidentally marking the fundamental difference between a naturalistic and the truly psychological approach), “I don’t teach how neuroses come about, but what one finds in neuroses” (Letters 2, p. 293, to Jolande Jacobi, 13 March 1956, transl. modif.), so I analogously don’t try to explain the causal origin of sacrifices at all, but, conversely, describe sacrifice as origin (of soul and culture); I don’t identify or invent any causal factors that led to sacrifices, but merely reconstruct the internal logic of sacrificial killings on the basis of the main observable features of this phenomenon.
ter that I am dealing with, to real phenomena: real patients, symptoms, dreams, fairy tales, myths, cultural phenomena, historical developments, etc. Psychology is not in the business of creating and inventing “illumining psychological fables.” It is in the business of being responsive to a prime matter (whatever this may be in each case), of reflecting and refining it, of reconstructing its inner logical life so as to release it into its truth (its disclosedness, unconcealedness). Quod Natura relinquit imperfectum ars perficit. Reflection after the fact, not production. The perfect tense. The owl of Minerva. The psychologist is never self-sufficient. Like the alchemist he is the one half of the “adep-chemical vessel” relation.

With his view that my thesis about sacrifices “already has everything it needs,” Saban severs the soul’s ties to reality. With it he goes up into the air. His psychology’s “soul” then hovers in the clouds, in its own bubble. The soul that his psychology advocates is a disembodied soul, uprooted, a soul content with a kind of free-floating, “l’art pour l’art”-type fables. It is anima alba.

Saban is very clear about it. He says: “History is, after all, a fable, invented by moderns, and it is just as mythological as any other myth. History doesn’t exist outside of the stories we tell ....” This sounds very advanced, very critical, very post-modern, but it is unacceptable. A perfect self-encasement in a bubble. And in my view also a total missing the point of history in modernity, that is, its psychological significance. No doubt, Saban is perfectly right to negate the naive positivistic belief in history as literal facts (“how it really was,” L. von Ranke). Even those alleged facts are, as a matter of course, always already seen by us in a certain light, always already part of our accounts. But to say that history does not exist outside of the stories we tell, that history itself is a fable and a modern invention is reductive, Saban’s not seeing the forest for the trees.

With his negation he only negates his own naive standpoint, believing that merely by dissolving history into the stories we tell, into fictionality, he has already escaped the naivety of positivism. But in reality this fictionalism is only the obverse of that naivety, and in no way gets beyond the naive thought structure. What is missing is the negation of that primitive negation of his, that type of negation that Jung, for example, performed when he rejected free association and the stories we tell altogether and thereby penetrated to the notion of the objective soul. Instead of having escaped from the naivety of positivism Saban in truth merely escaped from the insight into the psychological difference and into the reality of the objective soul.

Within the context of systems theory, Niklas Luhmann made the following illumining point. He said that as soon as in history

it becomes evident that already during one single life span [...] almost everything essential changes, then the difference of past and future (which of course had also already been known before) enters into the position of a guiding difference for the understanding of time and here replaces the distinction between ever-present eternity and time. The consequence of this is that the present is defined by the difference of past and future, that is, that it turns into a now-

non. I said that my “Killings” paper was my interpretation. Again, let me stress, there is a difference between interpretation and positing a fantasy.

16 When Saban says “For me it requires no further evidence from outside” he turns the real sequence around. There is for me not first a theory or “fable” in the subjective mind that thereafter needs to be bolstered up by evidence from outside. It’s the other way around. I begin with the, e.g., historical material as my prime matter. —This reversal of the sequence is consistent with and supportive of Saban’s denial of the shift “from mythos to logos” and from the One to Two. For him there is nothing, must not be anything, that precedes philosophical reflection as the reflection’s own given prime matter. (But: reflection is for him, naturalistically correct, preceded by “unprethinkable being.”)

W.Giegerich, “Saban’s Alternative” (15 Sep 2012)
point of time (that it previously had only been on the level of the temporality of events), a now-point of time that “be-
 tween” past and future makes possible the constant switching from the one time horizon to the other, but is not itself
time. [...] With this, the present turns itself into the paradox of time: into the unity of the difference of past and fu-
ture, into the third excluded by it, but included within it, into the time in which one does not have time.\footnote{17}

“History” as such certainly arose in modernity, not earlier. Here I agree with Saban. But it was not
invented by moderns. History (the forest) is not just the stories we tell (the trees). It exists “outside”
them in the objective soul, indeed as the modern objective soul, namely, as the “difference of past and future”\footnote{18} the moment when this difference has become the new guiding difference of the understanding
of time. The former guiding difference used to determine the understanding of time since time imme-
memorial, from the oldest ritualistic and mythological cultures onwards through the age of Christianity
and Metaphysics (in other words: this old vertical difference even survived the shift from mythos to lo-
gos, as well as the later shifts within the age of metaphysics). The worldshaking shift from this old vertical
guiding difference—the difference of ever-present eternity versus the temporal, the saeculum—to
the new horizontal, that is, itself temporal guiding difference along the time-line, occurred during the
19th century and represents one essential aspect of what I called “the birth of man.” Because with this
strictly temporal, secular understanding of time man has logically, psychologically fully come into the
world, the saeculum. He has really come down to earth.\footnote{19}

This shift is not just a fable. And its result, history (history in the sense of the “forest,” not the
“trees” = the historical events or our stories about the events), is a psychological reality, our psycho-
logical reality, part of the objective soul. It is a power, and it exists outside the specific historical sto-
ries we tell, which are always up for revision. It is the reason why we tell, have to tell, historical sto-
ries. We all are keenly familiar with that time in which one does not have time, the time experienced as
stress. We inevitably think in terms of past and future. We cannot help it. We have to think historically.
And we cannot really (as, during eighteen centuries before, people certainly were able to) think any-
more in terms of the Bible Stories about God’s creation and salvation work as ever-present origin, on
the one hand, and merely-temporal events here on earth, on the other. Not even fundamentalist
creationists can really do this without some kind of self-induced brainwashing. We think in terms of
Darwinian evolution and see ourselves and the human organism as a result of evolution. We explain
our psychic conditions in terms of our personal childhood history. We have archeology, museums, the
concept of the world’s cultural heritage that needs to be conserved. We restore old historical buildings
(rather than using their stones as building bricks for our own construction of new buildings). In certain
types of psychotherapy we look back to Greek myths for meaning.

Darwinian evolution is of course a story or, if you wish, “fable.” But regardless of the entire ques-
tion whether this story is factually correct or not and whether it is an “illumining fable” or not, the his-
torical point of view and the dependence of it on evidence is in any case a psychological truth, a reality

\footnote{17} Niklas Luhmann, Die Wissenschaft der Gesellschaft, Frankfurt a. M. 1992 (1st ed. 1990), p. 613 (my italics, my transla-
tion).
\footnote{18} This is, as it were, the definition of the historical, linear sense of time.
\footnote{19} Here one can see that my metaphor of the birth of man has a concrete descriptive quality, rather than telling a new “story,”
a “myth of lost oneness, of having fallen into twoness.” I psychologically interpret a specific identifiable historical phe-
nomenon.—This fundamental shift is also a good example for the succession of stages of consciousness. The new guiding
difference is not added to the old (the way Saban likes to view things), but, as Luhmann says, replaces it, thus irreversibly
rendering the former one obsolete.
of the modern soul, a “factor” in Jung’s sense.

What Saban aims for with his thesis of history as nothing more than our stories is ultimately the dissolution of historical time into space (spatial extendedness, juxtaposition). It is, as it were, the storybook idea of history: all kinds of different “myths” spatially side by side on the same level. In the imagination, all stories and images are simultaneous. And as such this theory is the undoing of historical time as successive sequence of moments and as development altogether.

But the psychological function and meaning of history is precisely that through the ritual of our historical dating of the events we talk about and our thereby positioning also ourselves at some specific place on the time-line, the soul localizes and firmly moors itself in the temporal world as such, in the saeculum, that is, down here on the real earth, and ipso facto cuts its ties that used to connect it with ever-present eternity. Each time we try to give an account of some historical event we logically attach ourselves anew to something empirically real (in the psychological sense of empirically real), and thus root ourselves in the Real. As finite and “civil man,” unborn man too had as a matter of course his place down here in earthly reality. Psychologically, however, he, that is, his soul, lived in the illud tempus of myth, in that heavenly, metaphysical time that “never was, but always is” (Sallustios, modified), in ever-present eternity, which as ever-present was Time as atemporal space. The soul of modern born man can no longer be content with psychologically living in that ever-present eternity. It insists on also psychologically or “metaphysically” coming down to earth and ground itself in temporality.

To that space of the metaphysical Time that never was, but always is, Saban cannot, and probably even does not want to, return. It lies irretrievably behind us. But, so it seems, he tries to establish his psychology (and thus also himself as psychologist) in an emaciated abstract modern version of it. By rejecting the idea of history as directional process in favor of mere replacements of stories, he dissolves history into a fundamentally homogenized sphere. No successive stages. For stories fundamentally co-exist in the same spatial and atemporal sphere of the imagination. Saban still calls the stories myths, but they are now in reality nothing but “(more or less) illumining fables,” self-contained and self-sufficient two-dimensional narratives. Qua narratives they exist high above the Real in the free-floating bubble of their own timelessness and fictionality. What makes these narratives two-dimensional and fictional and turns them, in contrast to myth proper, into mere narratives without soul dignity is that, to be sure, they are, much like myth, about “what never was,” but (a) precisely neither tell us anymore “what always is,” nor do they (b), following the modern soul’s need, aim at and tie themselves to what

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20 The theoretical withdrawal from the temporal world into the sphere of fictionality might perhaps also explain the strange fact that Saban had to construe the word “commitment” abstractly as absolute (he speaks, for example, of his “stubborn inability (unwillingness) to ‘commit’”) and to give to it an existential(ist) meaning. Since he is, as a theoretician (I am not speaking about him as person), in this atemporal sphere, the word commitment seems to have instinctively suggested to him the imposition to have to give up his position in the heights off realm of stories and to come down into the temporal world. As a fundamental plunge from one theoretical level to another, “commitment” does not refer to an object. It means “commitment per se,” simply having to give himself (as theoretical consciousness) over to the saeculum, the historical world, and thus it does have an existential aspect. But for a theorizing consciousness that from the outset has its place in temporal-historical reality and therefore is concerned with the real phenomena presenting themselves to it, the word “commitment” would immediately suggest a practical and perfectly unspectacular commitment to this or that. Similarly, Saban’s absolute construal and hypostatization of “the dialectic” is one that is pictorially imagined from high above and outside, whereas for a theorizing consciousness that dwells with the phenomena in the sphere of the secular world, “the dialectic” is as a matter of course always the specific dialectic of and in this or that. Also “the other” is absolutized in his discourse. It is an abstraction and functions as the fiction of “the other per se,” “the remnant per se,” “alterity as such.” For me such an abstract other does not exist. There are only concrete, specific others in the plural and in their eachness, as well as “my own other,” “this reality’s other,” “the soul’s other.” “Tout autre est tout autre” (Derrida)!
is “historically true.”

But the soul’s move into temporality involves more than our necessity to think historically, to base our stories on historical evidence and revise them whenever new evidence comes to light or a new assessment of the old evidence becomes necessary. What it in addition means is that “what always is,” the mythic-imaginal and metaphysical substance itself (in short: the “archetypal” objective soul) has come down to earth into the sphere of the historical. The religious or metaphysical treasures that the soul of former ages possessed have ceased being for the soul of modernity an immediate present reality, ceased being ever-present eternity (accessible, above all, through initiations or personal faith). These treasures are now a historical presence, a presence in Mnemosyne, presence mediated through the ample treasury of what is already given to us in the a priori distanced and reflected form of texts or cultural works by our historical tradition (“historical” in contrast to the mythological, religious, or metaphysical traditions, which were precisely the traditions of the ever-present eternity as present reality). “Texts and works” means: something to be studied in the spirit of critical scholarship, such as the ancient myths, symbols, and fairy tales, the gospel of John, the letters of Paul, the precious works of art, the texts of Homer, Sophocles, Dante, Cervantes, Shakespeare as well as Heraclitus, Plato, Aristotle, Meister Eckhart, Descartes, Hegel, Nietzsche, to arbitrarily select a few names from an endless list.

The modern soul does not want an immediate presence, an immediate reality of this presence, a direct access to eternity. It demands of us to acquire, as fully conscious, enlightened mind, a presence of the eternal or infinite, to make it present, through our own conscious laborious learning and study of texts, through our devoted penetration—with all the power of thought and the depth of passionate commitment available to us—into the inner infinity and truth accessible in the (historically present) treasures of the past. Opus. Soul-making. Jung was fully aware of the soul’s move down from the heights of heaven and ever-present eternity. He realized full well that the spirit “has descended from its fiery heights” and become heavy, that we live in “an age in which the spirit [is] no longer up above but down below, no longer fire, but water.” He understood that “the stars have fallen from heaven.” However, intruding into his insights with his subjective desire, he nevertheless kept insisting on immediacy. He wanted the individual’s Unerfahrung, primordial experience, as a new present reality. “I must have a situation in which that thing becomes true once more.” And so he came up with a compromise formation, with something that, on the one hand, was an ever-present eternity, one which, however, on the other hand, was no longer above but below: the collective unconscious. The archetypes of the collective unconscious, they are nothing else but those same former stars that have fallen from heaven, but that allegedly even after this fall nevertheless still “hold[-] sway” even if now “as a secret life” “in the unconscious”—as “spirit that has become nature” (my italics).

Nature, living water, immediate primordial experience. This is what Jung was committed to. He would have laughed at the now fashionable idea of narratives, “the stories we tell.”

However, what Jung was not ready to allow was that the fall of the stars was, instead of a change

21 That is, let them be interpretations of something real.
22 The difference can easily illustrated with an example: the Bible as Holy Scripture, as the Word of God, on the one hand, versus the Bible as a historical record, a psychological document, on the other.
from spirit to nature, precisely a move from directly experienced spirit to \textit{historical} heritage, to text and letter, to what is not a priori alive, but what can come alive only through our studying, the \textit{work} of our reading, thinking, and understanding. Over against the spirit that has become nature, over against the living water holding sway in the collective unconscious, over against \textit{experience} and “revelations” coming from the unconscious, Jung slighted the historical cultural heritage: “In the end we dig up the wisdom of all ages and peoples, only to find that everything most dear and precious to us has already been said in the most superb language. Like greedy children we stretch out our hands and think that, if only we could grasp it, we would possess it too. But what we possess is no longer valid, and our hands grow weary from the grasping ...” (\textit{CW} 9i § 31).

The problem with this last idea is of course that to Jung only a (metaphorically) literal grasping with the hands seemed to be conceivable (which is due to his insistence on immediacy). But there is also a very different kind of grasping. And this is why I say: it is precisely to the \textit{dead letters} of the texts and art works of our historical heritage that we have to bring to bear Faust’s insight: “The spirit world is not barred shut; / Your mind is closed, your heart is dead! / Up, adept, bathe without reserve / Your earthly breast in aurora’s blush.” The texts have everything they need within themselves.

History as a psychological reality must be distinguished from all the specific historical stories we tell about particular events or developments. I mentioned the difference between the forest and the trees. History conceived as nothing more than the stories we tell (or, more naively, the events about which these stories go) has been reduced to the visible semantics of it, the empirically existing historical accounts. History as such, however, the \textit{logic} or \textit{syntax} of history, that is, the importance \textit{for the modern soul} of “historicism” as the \textit{commitment} and obedience to the (I admitted) “fiction” of historical truth and thus to documented evidence, has then been excised—and along with it the soul’s logically, psychologically irrevocably rooting itself in the world as the Temporal.

The fact that all our historical accounts are incomplete, that they always are \textit{our} interpretations, \textit{our} stories, even our “fables,” rather than “the literal truth,” the fact, furthermore, that “historical truth” is only an idea or ideal and never a fact,\footnote{Cf. Jung’s statement that “The goal is important only as an idea; the essential thing is the \textit{opus} which leads to the goal...” (\textit{CW} 16 § 400).} is \textit{psychologically} neither here nor there. It belongs to the empirical foreground, to the sphere of “the ego,” so to speak. It does not detract in any way from the reality and significance of \textit{history itself} as a soul need and a modern psychological acquisition. Psychological reality is absolute, that is, absolved (freed) from the opposition of fact and idea/ideal. History is a modern acquisition, not because the moderns allegedly invented it, but because in modernity “the soul” definitively descended from the heavenly height of the mythological and metaphysical spheres of the \textit{illus tempus} and ever present eternity and began to feel the need to immerse itself in the Temporal.

\textbf{Brute, Unassimilable Alterity}

The first thing to turn to under this new heading is the idea of “unthinkable being.” And although this phrase is taken from Schelling, we have to keep in mind that we are speaking as psychologists and not as philosophers. What the term may mean in Schelling and what its philosophical legitimacy, as well as the legitimacy of Schelling’s arguments against Hegel, may or may not be within his own phi-
losophy is of no concern for us. Saban shows himself impressed by this phrase, but he does not in any way show that his discourse is on the level of philosophical thought, of real thinking. He merely expresses his own views and argues for them. Schelling, by contrast, truly thought. He was one of the great thinkers, and he deserves to be respected as such, which means not to bring phrases taken from his works down to our commonplace level discourse. The same applies to Hegel. This is also why I never considered or presented myself as a Hegelian, all the less so as I think it is impossible today to return to Hegel’s (or Schelling’s) philosophy. It lies irretrievably behind us moderns, which, however, does not mean, that we cannot learn a lot from Hegel and that studying his philosophy could not be indispensable for anybody who wants to make sense of our present reality. I have gratefully learned a few things from Hegel, but I have always only spoken as a psychologist and on my own responsibility.

Psychology must not base itself on a philosophy, i.e., some other, but autonomously on nothing but its own concept: psychology as the logos of the soul.

Having said this it is clear that I will take issue with “unthinkable being” only insofar as it is an idea that comes up in Saban’s psychological text. Then I can say that it does not make sense to me. As pointed out earlier, “being” is a word, a concept, the mind’s own property. The notion of “being” is a product of reflective thought and itself an expression of reflective thought. There is no place anywhere in the empirical world where you could find “being.” The concept “being” does not have a referent in outer reality. It is a category, not itself a being or entity. So how can it be unthinkable? How can it be “outside logos”? As a product of the mind and as its own category it is itself a manifestation of logos. When Saban presents a paper, when he writes his texts, he is practicing reflection. How does he get, inside his reflections, to something outside of reflection when what he is referring to is not given to us from outside, by the senses and empirical experience, but is reflection’s own product? With this idea Saban thinks himself outside of thought. Thought does have the capacity to think itself outside of itself. But it nevertheless is still thought.

Furthermore, can there, for psychology, be anything “outside logos”? Logos here does obviously not have the narrow meaning of the word (explicit reflection, philosophical, conceptual thought) that is used when we speak of “from mythos to logos.” In that narrow sense, mythos, e.g., would of course (by definition) precede logos and in this sense be outside of it. What is meant here, however, is much rather logos in the comprehensive sense, the world of shared meanings, the mind as such, the soul’s logical life. Since the only topic and object of psychology is the soul or mind (and not the physical organism, nature, positive facts), since it is human experience, human ideas, images, feelings, thought (all of which have inevitably logos-nature), the question arises: how can there possibly be something outside logos for psychology? It would be a contradiction in terms.

For psychology the question of the concept of the “unthinkable” is a methodological and not an ontological one (not one of “fact”). It is constitutive for psychology that it apperceives the phenomena that become its subject matter exclusively as the soul’s speaking about itself, as motifs, statements, ideas, meanings, existing beliefs, and documents of the soul, while systematically and on principle leaving out of consideration the naturalistic question of whatever efficient causes that may have produced, and whatever possible substrates that may be the underlying carriers of, the psychological phenomena (i.e., phenomena apperceived in the mode just described). I quoted Jung’s, “I don’t teach how neuroses come about, but what one finds in neuroses” (Letters 2, p. 293, to Jolande Jacobi, 13 March
1956, transl. modif.). This means that neurosis itself as the thought (arrangement, mise en scène)—that it is, neurosis as a self— is what psychology has to take into its purview, not what lies outside of or precedes this thought or is the naturalistically imagined, positive-factual precondition of its possibility. About a religious idea Jung said, “I am concerned with the statement only, and I am interested in its structure and behaviour” (Letters 2, p.570, to Robert C. Smith, 29 June 1960), that is, concerned with the statement as a self and interested in its internal logic and functioning.

What is really outside logos is outside of human experience and ipso facto beyond (external to) psychology. What we don’t experience, what we don’t know, feel, sense, have an idea, image, or hunch of, simply does not exist for us. But the moment something does exist for us, it is ipso facto irrevocably already thought, captured in linguistic, logical form, even if it may be utterly vague, nebulous, and puzzling. The faintest odor, the slightest hunch, the most vague impression that “there was something,” even the idea that there was nothing, all happen in logos, where else? Here we may also remember Jung’s statement that “We are in truth so wrapped about by psychic images that we cannot penetrate at all to the essence of things external to ourselves” (CW 8 § 680). Our envelopment in psychic images, and this means in logos, is inescapable. No exit—as long as we exist as soul and mind. Even the very fiction of something outside of logos is a logos fiction, and what is allegedly “unassimilable” has ipso facto already been assimilated, namely as something unassimilable (which is a logos concept and not an empirical fact or external referent), because if it had not been assimilated at all there would simply be a blank, that is to say, not even the awareness of something unassimilable, not even the feeling of anything having been missed.

An example might be the bacteria that caused the plague. It is to be assumed that naturalistically speaking these bacteria caused this illness even during the Middle Ages when they were not known. But this is our perspective. For medieval man, however, the bacteria simply did not exist at all because he had not even the vaguest concept of such a thing as bacteria. There was no “remnant,” nothing unassimilable. The very possibility of suspecting something like bacteria or viruses as the actual pathogen did not exist, was simply absent (and can only be called “absent” from our modern perspective). Medieval man therefore looked for the cause of the plague on completely different (a “macro”) level, for example, the religious and moral level of God’s punishment for people’s sin, or on a social level as the evil doings of Jews, etc., and in this or some other way assimilated the frightening appearance of the plague.

On the other hand, what is this constant harping on about “the other,” about “brute, unassimilable alterity,” “the remainder,” and “the ungraspable,” polemicizing against? And what does it have to offer in its own right? The enemy seems to be the mind’s fantasy of a theory that purports to present an absolutely watertight totalitarian rationalistic account of everything, an account that altogether excludes surprise, mystery, unsolved questions, infinity, etc. But such a fantasy is just as childish as it is absurd. And because it is so absurd, I also find it silly to feel the need to object to it, as Saban does by insisting on brute alterity. Anyone working as a psychotherapist finds himself time and again confronted with surprising phenomena, with puzzling dream images, patients’ symptoms, and life situations. Does a therapist’s dialectically trained mind eliminate all question? Are for it the dreams or myths to be worked with “sublated into sameness” “without remainder”? And as to Hegel, although he is really not our topic here—did he claim to be able to deduce “Klug’s writing quill”? Did he get rid of surprises, the
accidental? Did he dissolve mystery and infinity into thin air (or, worse, into dry rational formulas)?

It is a triviality that for us, for the finite mind, much remains unknown, uncomprehended, and that we bump into surprises. So why this whole fuss about “the other” and “the remainder”? What’s new with those ideas (apart from this fuss and the fetishization of them)?

But all this is only a rejoinder on the level of external reflections. Much more central is the fact that the process of real thought leading to the uncovering of the dialectic of things is in itself full of surprises, a real adventure. Was it not surprising what emerged when above, rather than reducing it to a sealed mantra, we read **thinkingly** Jung’s dream interpretation maxim about not letting anything in that does not belong? The false dichotomy between Saban’s “alternative” leading to surprises and the dialectical approach obviously viewed by him as a mechanical routine that only leads to foreseen results bears witness to a mind that never let himself in for real thought and never experienced the excitement brought by the discoveries possible on the path of veritable thinking.

The devotion with which Saban speaks about, and permanently insists on, “unassimilable alterity” sounds as if he considered our all too often manifested human incapability to assimilate or grasp something particular a virtue, and “the remainder” a precious treasure, and “the gap between” an “infinite Other” and an “assimilable same” as something that at all cost needs to be cultivated. Pascal wrote, “Man is obviously created for thinking. This is his entire dignity and all his merit; and it is his whole duty to think correctly ...” (Pensées, #146, my transl., cf. #365). For Jung, too, “man has the gift of thought that can apply itself to the highest things.” And he wondered, for example, “whether it is not much more dangerous for the Christian symbols to be made inaccessible to conceptual thought and to be banished to a sphere of unreachable unintelligibility” (CW 11 § 170, transl. modif.). Saban’s highest goal is precisely to make a certain region (or what) by definition inaccessible to conceptual thought, to banish it to a sphere of unreachable unintelligibility.

In the light of the fact that Saban disapproves of our “picking and choosing the bits of Jung we like and rejecting the bits we don’t like” and wants “to read him as a whole,” it is utterly astounding that he does not see that his own insistence on brute alterity is absolutely counter to the main line of Jung’s thinking and his deepest concern. Jung is anything but a thinker of the totally unassimilable, of the fundamental gap mentioned, of brute alterity. Here I insert just a few key phrases and ideas of his as a mere list:

- **Mysterium coniunctionis.**
- “The connection between ‘humans and gods.’”
- The Relation Between the Ego and the Unconscious.
- Jung’s story of the Pueblo Indians who help their father, the sun, to travel across the sky.
- The conception of the other not as brute Other, but precisely as “the Self”! The soul’s own other.
- Jung’s bank employee who shows his friend “his bank” (which in an illumining way contrasts with the exclusive otherness that exists, in the Marxists’ scheme, between the proletariat and the capitalists).
- Jung’s “spectrum” metaphor used to highlight the unbroken connection between instinct/affect/emotion, on the one hand, and image/thought, on the other.
- God as “one of the most natural products of our mental life [1. product, 2. our mental life!], as the birds sing, as the wind whistles, like the thunder of the surf.”
- “That was the primal stuff which compelled me to work upon it, and my works are a more or less successful endeavor to incorporate this incandescent matter into the contemporary picture of the world”: incorporation, integration, assimila-
tion into logos. (As a deterrent to the idea of the brute unassimilability we might here also keep in mind that trauma, such as one caused by torture, is due to “the unassimilability” by the person concerned of what he or she experienced.)

No, from a Lévinas-inspired Other no bridge leads back to Jung. Jung was not one of the so-called post-moderns, by no stretch of the imagination. Jung was committed to the preservation, or recovery, of the metaphysical mode of being-in-the-world, the logic of the copula, the logic of the alchemical ligamentum or vinculum. He circumambulated the center. No, there is in Jung no artificial “forcing together” of “the apparently exclusive and contradictory ideas of myth on the one hand and individual experience on the other.” Jung does not need such a violence in the joining together (coniunctio), because for him in the depth of the soul the bond between the opposites has not been broken at all. There is not for him the “disruptive relation” hailed by Saban, however much empirically at first the relation between the ego and the unconscious may be neurotically dissociated.

The idea of a “brute, unassimilable alterity” can have a place only in a brutish, not really “human” (humanized), psychology.

My refusal to accept the idea of a “disruptive relation” for Jung does not mean that I exclude surprise and overwhelming experiences and the experience of a counter-will from his scheme. Not at all. My point is only that all this did not represent a fundamentally disruptive Other in his view, but on the contrary was conceived as what needed our “work upon it” in order to integrate it into consciousness.

* * *

If we now ask what the psychological function of the fantasy of the radical Other and of “brute, unassimilable alterity” within the economy of Saban’s scheme is we can say that it is the reification of consciousness’s stance of aloofness itself, the semantic image into which the abstract logic of exteriority congealed. As such it functions also as the guardian and guarantor of this standpoint, of the principle of a fundamental difference, the unbridgeable gap as such. It is the literalization and fixation of the first negation, the negation asontologized. If you have this radical Other in your theoretical scheme, it logically cements the ordinarily existing naturalistic position (based on the opposition of consciousness: subject – object) and protects you from the necessity to have to give yourself over to the phenomena at hand and to go under in what you study or work upon, in the prime matter in the hermetic vessel—to go under in that spirit that is expressed in Faust’s already cited alchemical exhortation to himself (which we as moderns and psychologists should neither take literally, nor metaphysically, and also not existentially, but only methodologically): “The spirit world is not barred shut; / Your mind is closed.

24 The center psychologically remains a full-fledged center even if for Jung it is not a literal one but merely an idea. For the soul an image, thought, idea or ideal to which the soul happens to be seriously committed (cf. “is it my fable, my truth”) is just as real as something factual.

25 It is interesting to note that Saban insists on the objective, static relation’s (between the opposites) being disruptive, whereas he does his best to deny any historical-temporal discontinuities or ruptures, which play a crucial role in Jung’s and my thinking. It was Jung who repeatedly emphasized the psychological importance of the idea contained in Nietzsche’s “Then, suddenly, friend! One turned into Two / And Zarathustra passed me by ....”—Of course, we must also remember that there is at times in Jung some sense of brute otherness, such as when he talks about a “collision of duties” or in the way how he imagined the immediate encounter with God as an overwhelming will. But these are semantic details in Jung’s thinking that do not undo the basic psychological logic of his thinking. Much more serious in Jung is the problem of a radical otherness and dissociation on the syntactical or structural level of the fundamental logic of his psychology, which, however, is not our topic here. It has to do with his concept of the unconscious and the split between the semantics and the syntactical form.

26 One way of integrating and assimilating for Jung is practical: religion, the symbolic life (“Have you got a corner somewhere in your house where you perform the rites ...?” CW 18 § 626. “... to serve a god is full of meaning and promise ...” CW 13 § 55).
your heart is dead! / Up, adept, bathe without reserve / Your earthly breast in aurora’s blush.” Immersion in the bath. Letting oneself thinkingly in for what manifests. This is my response to brute alterity.

The unassimilable Other is what remains (just think of “the remainder”!) of the Real when—at a time when the soul insists on uncompromisingly rooting itself in the temporal world, the saeculum, and when ipso facto the Real is defined as the temporal world—consciousness refuses to moor itself in the temporal by letting itself be bound by historical evidence, and which it instead prefers in its psychological scheme to stay in the higher sphere of so-called myth, of stories, self-sufficient narratives, that is, in the homogenized space of the imagination. The radical Other represents, as it were, the (residual) Real the way it appears from that psychological position that refused to get committedly involved in it, from out of that bubble into the aloofness of which the said mind withdrew. It is the utterly abstract, emaciated remainder of the Real, its zero-stage, completely non-descript—just “other” (whatever that may be), in other words, the ghost of the Real.

But qua ghost also mystified and overblown with significance (“fathomless alterity,” “the endless excitement ...,” Saban’s celebration of “the ungraspable,” “the call of the other”). The “call of the other,” which, as an ethics, is addressed to “civil man,” to the ego-personality, is, it seems to me, the mirror reflection, in the sphere of the ego-personality, of the unconscious memory of the fact that the soul’s real move into its real other (the temporal world down here) has not simply been followed suit, not been accompanied, by consciousness. As such it is the return of the repressed. The refusal reappears as the fantasy of the bruteness of alterity, the avoided psychological entrance into the temporal world as the fantasy of an unending ethical call, and the missed phenomenal simpleness and concreteness of the manifold phenomena of the historical world as the fantasy of the oversized, inflated, but abstract and vacuous “The Other.”

And finally, the fetishization or idolization of the Other that we sense in the emphatic feeling-tone of Saban’s speaking about it shows that psychologically it is a God-term, God incognito, the rescued, but nihilistic, remnant or substitute of what once used to be God. For Saban the brute, unassimilable alterity is absolutely negotiable. It is a supreme value. Through it the sacred, the untouchable, the absolute taboo enters through the back door. This new God is nihilistic, God’s zero-stage, because nothing can be said about Him but that He is “other.” Former gods had a specific story and concrete attributes: creator, almighty, savior, our Father, the highest good, Spirit, Love, etc. This God is reduced to the naked, abstract concept of alterity and unassimilability.

Joseph Campbell spoke of “The Masks of God.” “The Other” is God, but God as nothing but a mask. The ghost of God as a theoretical construct.

The Wrong Patron Saint

The “alternative approach” that Saban wanted to offer was announced by him as one “informed by Schelling’s philosophy of mythology.” I already pointed out that I find it problematic to use certain phrases or ideas pulled out from the living thought and spirit of Schelling’s philosophy and to make use

27 The notion of “brute alterity” reflects, and is in turn reflected in, the tough-mindedness of Saban’s understanding referred to above, his tough-minded abstract understanding, for example, of Jung’s dictum about the image that has everything it needs within itself, of Hegel, of the shift from One to Two, and of “the dialectics.”
of them in a very different, (a) no longer philosophical (thinking) discourse and (b) a discourse not really informed by the metaphysic of Schelling but by a decidedly anti-metaphysical post-modern thinking. There is in Saban’s writing some obvious misrepresentation of Schelling’s ideas.

In his attempt to defend “Jung’s idea of the personal myth,” Saban says that Jung discovered that “soul is to be found in the mythic conflict at the heart of the modern individual” and adds: “Here he is following Schelling who suggests that the modern individual is
called to structure from this evolving (mythological) world, a world of which his own age can reveal to him only a part. I repeat: from this world he is to structure into a whole that particular part revealed to him, and to create from the content and substance of that world his mythology.

But when we look at this passage in early Schelling’s *Philosophy of Art* we find that Schelling by no means spoke about the modern individual (neither “modern” in our sense, nor “individual”), but about the “great poets.” His examples are Dante, Shakespeare, Cervantes, and Goethe. And as befits a philosophy of art, he is not talking at all about the “soul” “to be found in the mythic conflict at the heart of the modern individual” but about works of art by great poets, in other words, about something essentially of public cultural significance. And Schelling is speaking about this in the context of a reflection about an envisioned distant future “when the Weltgeist itself will have completed the great Poem that it plans.” For Schelling, “Jung’s question, what is my myth, the myth by which I do live?” would not make any sense, nor would Saban’s idea of a “shift from myth as collective phenomenon to myth as individual phenomenon.” Schelling is precisely very much aware that the present is not a fulfilled present (which Jung’s “by which I do live” implies), and he puts his hope on his vision of the future, a future fulfillment determined by the Weltgeist and precisely not the individual.

By the same token, late Schelling’s Positive Philosophy is a philosophy of religion whose system unfolds as historical succession of (a) natural (= mythology), (2) revealed (= Christianity), and (3) future philosophical (i.e., comprehended) religion. In Schelling we therefore find that very linear, one-way scheme of history that is so despised by Saban. We find a history of subsequent stages of which the later ones overcome the earlier one(s). And on top of it there is in Schelling, with his hope for a final comprehended religion, the idea of a full assimilation, albeit only in the future, of religion (mythology and [Christian] revelation) into logos. In this regard, Schelling and Hegel are much closer together than suggested. The also existing disagreement between them has to be understood differently from the way that is intimated by Saban, namely in strictly philosophical terms. The same applies to Schelling’s insistence on “unprethinkable being,” which has to be seen in the light of his (to my mind: Titanic\(^{28}\)) attempt to truly think philosophically “the real process [Hergang], a free world creation” (*SW* vol. XIII, p. 132, my emphasis, my transl.)!\(^{28}\)

Another problem I have concerns Saban’s understanding of Schelling’s “tautegorical” myth interpretation and his viewing my myth interpretation as “allegorical” because, so he claims, my interpretation conceives mythic images as expressive of “the notion” or “the dialectic.”\(^{29}\) But by these standards,

\(^{28}\) Cf. also his raising and wanting to answer the question, “Why is there something in the first place? Why is there not nothing?” (*SW* vol. XIII, p. 7, my transl.).

\(^{29}\) He asks, “Is Giegerich really suggesting that all myths of all time from all cultures are nothing but imaginal representation of the dialectic? I do think this is not only an implausible idea but perhaps more importantly a depressingly dull one.” A silly (dull) misconception. “The dialectic”? What is that supposed to be? Here we have again one of Saban’s utter formul-
Schelling’s myth interpretation too would, even much more so than mine, have to be seen as allegorical, inasmuch as for Schelling “tautegoria” is the speaking about the same in different mythological systems! Schelling sees, for example, numerous diverse figures as actually representing Dionysos rather than themselves (cf. his famous dictum: “everything is Dionysos,” *SW* vol. XIII, p. 463f., my transl.), and he viewed Dionysos, and along with him the stage of mythology as such, as a foreshadowing of Christ. Dionysos is in truth the Logos, who comes into his own through Dionysos’s transformation into Christ. Mythology is for Schelling Dionysiology (*SW* vol. XIII, p. 333) and ultimately the workings of the Christian God incognito. For Schelling, without the freedom reached through the transformation of Dionysos into Christ, man remains entangled in the web of mythology and does not reach his goal (which lies beyond mythology). Is Saban’s pleading for “mythology-as-central-to-psychology” really “informed by Schelling’s philosophy of mythology”?

But in both cases such interpretations have really nothing to do with allegorizing. Saban confuses here, I submit, a non-literal, seeing-through-type reading (be it philosophical or psychological), in Schelling’s case a reading along the lines of “the masks of God,” with an allegorical one. Schelling’s term “tautegorical” aimed at the rejection of, for example, the euhemerist-type of allegorical interpretations, of interpretations that reduce the mythic gods to something empirical or positive-factual, something other than the divine (such as stars, nature’s growth and withering cycles, prehistoric great kings or heroes, etc.).

Schelling would have shuddered at Saban’s ahistorical and wishy-washy concept of myth and his insistence on unassimilability, that is, unintelligibility. His whole work throughout his life was to make intelligible. He was firmly rooted in the stance of Christian metaphysics (although he certainly went to its utmost borders). And merely on account of a certain formal similarity to retroject a “post-modern” stance of unassimilable alterity unto him and into his ideas of “unprethinkable being” and “Abgrund” is doing him a great injustice.

To these my few points about Schelling let me here append a brief comment about Hölderlin’s idea of an “eccentric path,” because it shows again that it will not do to pick out individual phrases from a body of thought and insert them, without regard to the context and spirit of the whole work of the respective thinker, into one’s own different thought. Žižek’s description of the phrase (quoted by Saban in his paper) as implying a “permanent oscillation between the loss of the Center and the repeated failed attempts to regain the immediacy of the Center…” is un-Hölderlinian. Hölderlin’s word *Bahn*, first of all, suggests from the outset a unidirectional path. An oscillation is out of the question. The word *Bahn* in German is used, for example, for the “orbit” of planets, for “railroad,” for “trajectory,” “race track,” etc. Hölderlin describes the *exzentrische Bahn* as the only “way [...] from childhood to completion,” from a “state of highest innocence [Einfalt]” to a “state of highest Bildung [cultural refinement],” both in a historical (cultural) and a personal (biographical) sense. And it has been shown (Metaphysical abstractions. He reifies “the dialectic” as if it were a kind of entity, something in its own right, and always the same thing. But we are not hunting for “the dialectic” as our object of desire. We are trying to understand, e.g., the myths psychologically and in depth, each one on its own terms. His comment is as insightful as if a person would say that all the numerous biographies that exist are depressingly dull because they all are nothing but the representation of “the life.” But they are of course the representation of the very different lives of all the different persons. I made it very clear in my writings that for me all the different myths are portrayals each of a different archetypal or soul truth, a different notion, a different moment within the whole spectrum of the soul’s life. And each myth, as the imaginal portrayal of that particular soul truth that it is about, reveals itself to a psychological in-depth understanding as the narrative unfolding of the (again particular, concrete) inner dialectic of this one soul truth.
michael Franz) that the course of this path follows a mathematical, geometric figure and that Hölderlin’s whole conception of the “eccentric path” is inspired by complicated Platonic mathematical ideas (accessible to Hölderlin through the *Timaeus*, as well as through Proclus’ commentaries to Euclid and Plato). This is of course not the place to go into this in detail. May it suffice to point out that it is a spiral and in no way center-less.

* * *

After this lengthy exposition we are now ready to answer the question raised in the title of this paper. Saban’s alternative is certainly an alternative, first, in an external, comparative sense, because it represents a fundamentally different scheme incompatible with a psychology as the discipline of interiority, and, secondly, in a definitional sense and thus doubly so because in itself, through what it is committed to, it is a scheme of brute alterity.

But it is not an alternative to psychology as the discipline of interiority, in the intrinsic sense of being a new option for it, or of being in competition with it, because in order to be that it would have to share a common ground on which to engage with it.

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30 “Eccentric” in Hölderlin’s phrase harks back to the Greek expression for “radius”: “the line (drawn) away from the center (*hê ek toy kentroy grammê*).”